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i 
 
Abstract 
Individuals do not always follow the rules at work, yet it is not entirely clear what 
conditions generally contribute to higher rates of misbehaviour.  Much of the research on 
organizational misbehaviour is ethnographic or based on limited sample populations 
(single organization, single industry, etc.), so there remains a gap in the literature for 
findings representative of a wider population and comparison across occupational classes.  
Additionally, there has been an over-emphasis on the study of misbehaviour by 
employees, while employer misbehaviour remains relatively unexplored within the 
literature.  Organizational misbehaviour is also often treated as an objective act with little 
recognition for how individual attitudes and structural position shape perceptions of what 
constitutes ‘proper’ behavior and, in turn, misbehaviour.  This dissertation reconnects the 
study of organizational misbehaviour with Marxist class analysis and examines the 
connection between the structural conditions of work and employee and employer 
misbehaviour, also incorporating a study of how individual reporting of misbehaviour 
frequency is influenced by respondent class consciousness.  Each integrated chapter uses 
nationally representative data for Canada from the 2016 Changing Workplaces in a 
Knowledge Economy (CWKE) survey (N=3007).  Methods utilized include chi-square, 
gamma and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.  Findings contribute to a growing 
section of the literature focused on identifying the structural determinants of 
organizational misbehaviour, examine the link between individual subjectivity and 
perceptions of misbehaviour frequency and provide unique initial exploratory research 
into the phenomenon of employer misbehaviour.       
 
Keywords 
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consciousness; Perceptions of misbehaviour; Structural predictors of misbehaviour; 
Quantitative methods  
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Chapter 1 
1 Literature Review and Theoretical Foundations 
1.1 Introduction 
The practice of workplace misbehaviour – for example loafing on the job, vandalism, 
absenteeism, sabotage and theft – is at least as old as the experience of wage labour, and 
likely much older.  Though one might be inclined to focus on the early days of 
industrialism, organizational misbehaviour remains widespread in modern times.  Some 
scholars have estimated that 33% to 75% of employees engage in at least one of the 
practices of misbehaviour outlined above (Harper, 1990; Lawrence et al., 2007), but even 
these figures might be conservative:  Several notable studies have suggested that – at 
least in the case of service sabotage – more than 90% of informants believe misbehaviour 
to be an everyday occurrence in their workplace (Harris & Ogbonna, 2002, 2006; Lee & 
Ok, 2014; Slora, 1989).  The figures differ somewhat based on one’s definition of what 
misbehaviour entails, but the phenomenon is clearly widespread.  It is also evident that 
this abundance of organizational misbehaviour can be quite costly, with some parties 
estimating annual business losses due to misbehaviour as high as two-hundred billion 
dollars in the United States alone (Lee & Ok, 2014; Murphy, 1993).  These figures, 
which at first might seem surprising, seem a lot more reasonable with the knowledge that 
the average worker spends approximately two hours of their workday engaging in 
activities which are not related to their paid work (Paulsen, 2014). However, it is not just 
because of profit-loss that we should be concerned with the study of misbehaviour:  The 
prevalence of these behaviours suggests widespread discontent and enduring conflicts of 
interest within the contemporary workplace.   
With these figures in mind, the study of workplace misbehaviour should be of utmost 
priority to any who concern themselves with the study of organizational behaviour 
because it has become increasingly clear that most individuals do not blindly follow the 
rules at work (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Burawoy, 1979).   
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However, there is still much to be learned about the phenomenon of organizational 
misbehaviour:  The literature has rarely touched on misbehaviour in Canada or 
considered misbehaviour engaged in by anyone other than non-managerial employees.  
Additionally, while qualitative methods have taught us much about misbehaviour, there 
remains a gap in the literature for quantitative and nationally representative results.  This 
dissertation is positioned to address each of these current limitations of the literature.    
 
1.1.1 Outline of the Study 
This dissertation will explore multiple dimensions of organizational misbehavior in 
Canada, many of which have not received attention in the past.  In particular, our decision 
to examine employer misbehaviour and include class as a key explanatory variable 
represents a unique approach to the study of organizational misbehaviour. 
This chapter (chapter 1) provides a review of the literature, describes the theoretical 
framework which later chapters build upon and outlines our general methodological 
notes.  
Paper 1 (chapter 2) advances the study of employee misbehavior within Canadian 
workplaces, focusing on the structural determinants of employee misbehavior for non-
managerial employees.  Taking our cue from the organizational misbehavior literature, 
we examined the relationships between worker autonomy and injustice and the perceived 
frequency of employee misbehavior.  Additionally, we incorporated occupational class in 
our analysis as a key explanatory variable – one which has been left out of previous 
studies on organizational misbehavior.  Paper 1 also contains a supplementary 
multivariate analysis of managerial employees to compare with our primary results for 
non-managerial employees. 
Paper 2 (chapter 3) explores the often-overlooked phenomenon of employer misbehavior.  
First, we consider how the reported frequency of misbehavior varies by the occupational 
class of the respondent – and compare the perceived frequency of employee versus 
employer misbehavior.  Second, we explore whether economic pressures on employers 
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and the vulnerability of their workforce relate to the amount of employer misbehavior 
reported by employers.   
Paper 3 (chapter 4) examines the relationship between the class consciousness of the 
individual and their perception of the frequency of both employee and employer 
misbehaviour in the workplace.  Here, we suggest that the perception of organizational 
misbehavior as a more frequent phenomenon is incompatible with ideological 
assumptions about harmonious industrial relations and unity of interest between workers, 
managers and employers and hypothesized that those who were more critical of the 
capitalist system would perceive misbehavior as more frequent.  
The final chapter (5) summarizes the results of the previous chapters, discusses their 
significance and suggests directions for future research. 
 
1.2 Theoretical Framework 
1.2.1 Defining Organizational Misbehaviour 
There are several definitions of organizational misbehaviour – many of which are 
coloured by the interests of stakeholders – but we believe the best working definition is 
one which is quite general, allowing for the comparison of a diversity of behaviours 
which might not seem immediately comparable and reminding us that misbehaviour is 
always shaped by prevailing expectations of proper behaviour.  Therefore, we chose to 
adapt the definition outlined by Sprouse (1992) and Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) of 
organizational misbehaviour as ‘anything at work that you are not supposed to do’ 
(Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999, p. 7).   
To some extent, misbehaviour should be understood as inevitable.  There will always be a 
limited number of pathological cases and interpersonal conflicts that will contribute to 
our statistics on workplace misbehaviour.  However, there is evidence to suggest that 
many cases of misbehaviour are instead linked to conditions of structural inequality and 
conflict of interests within the workplace:  Analoui observed that ‘65 percent of all acts 
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of unconventional practice [sabotage] stemmed from the discontent experienced in the 
workplace, with management and its behaviour at the heart of the dispute’ (Analoui, 
1995).   
Understanding that misbehaviour is often connected to structural factors and unequal 
power relations in the workplace also raises the question of when organizational 
misbehaviour is more properly understood as an act of resistance against capitalist 
relations of production.  In a later section, we will explore this question in greater detail.  
However, it is advantageous here to outline our specific focus in the study of 
organizational misbehaviour and clarify this phenomenon’s relationship with worker 
resistance in the context of alienating and exploitative working conditions and the 
struggle for greater autonomy for workers. 
It is clear to us that not all employee misbehaviour should be understood as authentic 
resistance:  The range of activities properly understood as misbehaviour is far too vast for 
such a conclusion.  Additionally, resistance is also not necessarily a form of 
misbehaviour, as certain avenues for disaffected workers to advance their interests will be 
permitted or even encouraged – though the effectiveness of any sanctioned resistance 
should always be questioned.   
Clearly, not all misbehaviour is resistance and not all resistance is misbehaviour, but we 
are most interested in when these two activities may coincide – and how they may both 
be provoked by the alienation and exploitation experienced by the worker under the 
capitalist mode of economic production.  Correspondingly, our treatment of employee 
misbehaviour emphasizes those activities that are best understood as a reaction to the 
enduring contradictions of the capitalist system and the ability of the phenomenon to act 
as an indirect measure of the class conflict present under the surface of most modern 
work organizations. 
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1.2.2 The Enduring Relevance of Marx 
The theoretical work that is most foundational for our understanding of organizational 
misbehaviour is that put forth by Karl Marx and many of the ideas he originally outlined 
remain important to our contemporary understanding of the social world.  In a study of 
Marx, one is continually reminded of possible motives for why a worker might choose to 
misbehave at work and what follows hereafter is a limited summary of only those 
concepts most central to our theoretical understanding of organizational misbehaviour.   
Marx recognized exploitation in the wage relationship between owners and workers as a 
prerequisite for the production of profit under the capitalist system.  In his theory of 
surplus value, Marx outlined how profit is extracted from the labour process through the 
exploitation of the worker – paying her a wage which is lower than the true value of her 
labour (1867).  Without this exploitation, it is usually not possible for the capitalist to 
maintain profitability and – because the driving motivation towards production under the 
capitalist system is to increase profit and further concentrate capital – exploitation 
remains present in the standard wage relationship to this day.  
However, wage work under capitalism is damaging to the worker not only because she is 
systematically underpaid, but also because of the alienation that she feels because of the 
degraded circumstances under which she must labour.  Correspondingly, Marx argued 
that workers were bound to become increasingly dissatisfied as they came to recognize 
how the structure of capitalist production rendered them separate from the product they 
create, any meaningful control of the work process, their human counterparts – both 
capitalists and workers – and their very species-being (1844).  
The concepts of surplus value and the exploitation and alienation of the worker are 
important because they demonstrate how the economic interests of the owner and the 
worker are always in opposition to one another within a capitalist system of production:  
The former always striving to create surplus value by paying wages that are less than the 
true value of the labour derived while the latter seeks to regain control over her labour 
and the value she produces.  Marx’s observations were based on capitalism at an earlier 
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stage of development, but his account of this essential class conflict remains relevant to 
this day.   
This point on the enduring role of class antagonism within the contemporary workplace is 
particularly important to our understanding of misbehaviour in two specific ways.  First, 
if we accept that much of Marx’s critique of capitalism remains relevant and that class 
conflict endures, we can recognize that contemporary workers are also alienated and 
exploited and could reasonably be expected to be motivated towards engaging in 
misbehaviour in the face of a system of production which does not serve their best 
interests.  Second, if one were to instead argue that class conflict no longer exists – or is 
at least greatly diminished – one might be inclined to perceive alienation and exploitation 
as being in decline and individuals’ dissatisfaction with work largely traceable to external 
factors unrelated to class – such as bureaucracy, mass production or poor management 
(Adler, 1999; Ashforth, 1994; Matheson, 2007; Sanders, 1997; Sarros et al., 2002).   
From this second perspective, a decrease in direct confrontation in the workplace, and the 
conspicuous lack of the revolution predicted by Marx, might be portrayed as evidence of 
a new alignment of worker and owner interests within the capitalist workplace.  We can 
understand this perspective as being generally in line with the premature declaration of 
the end of class conflict, the triumph of the capitalist model of progress and the rise of the 
classless society – viewpoints which came to political prominence with the Thatcherism 
of 1990s and Fukuyama’s declaration of the end of history (Blair, 1999; Fukuyama, 1989, 
1992A, 1992B; Kingston, 2000; Oakley, 1990; Thatcher, 1992).   
However, in response to general acceptance – or habituation – to the ideologies of 
capitalism and sustained efforts to discredit class as a useful unit for social analysis, 
numerous scholars have illustrated how the line of exploitation and alienation – originally 
outlined by Marx – has continued unbroken into the present – and perhaps even 
intensified (Adonis & Pollard, 1997; McGlynn, 2016; O’Donohue & Nelson, 2014; Rosa, 
2010).   
Even with the expansion in popularity of the human resource style of management and 
various participatory and enculturation schemes, the alienation and exploitation of 
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workers remains prevalent.  Many workers still find themselves confronted by more 
traditional managerial regimes and – even for those who do find themselves invited into a 
more participatory role in the organization of production – the reality is often 
underwhelming:  Worker input is too often restricted to a limited range of topics or 
perspectives predetermined by management to be complementary of established 
organizational goals (Talwar, 2002; Vallas, 2003, 2006).  Even where participatory 
strategies appear successful and employees come to identify with their work organization, 
it does not automatically follow that this extra commitment is always in the worker’s best 
interest – external exploitation can easily be replaced with self-exploitation, overwork 
and peer-pressure (Hodson, 2001; Rinehart, 2006).  Now, this is not to say that all worker 
participation programs must necessarily result in failure or further intensification of 
alienation and exploitation – where a rhetoric of empowerment or inclusion is backed up 
by substantive structural changes, workers may come to see significant improvement in 
working conditions (Poole, 1978).   
The body of literature critiquing the popular narratives of the classless society and the 
new harmonious work relations of advanced capitalism is extensive – we have cited only 
a portion of it above – but it should be clear that the study of workplace misbehaviour has 
been greatly informed by this scholarly work. 
 
1.2.3 Pitfalls in Misbehaviour Research 
The study of misbehaviour as a structurally-derived phenomenon is in part a 
contradiction of perspectives like the following: ‘[v]irtually all available evidence 
indicates that actual behaviour is orderly and purposeful, and appears to support the goals 
of the organization’ (Luthans, 1972).  This normative assumption of compliance is 
widespread, to the extent that the common admonishment ‘to behave one’s self’ is 
synonymous with being told to obey (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999).  Working from the 
assumption of general employee compliance has led some to pathologize workplace 
misbehaviour as originating from a small group made up of staunch anti-authoritarians 
(Leavitt, 1973) and the unreasonable or criminal (Wilson & Rosenfield, 1990). 
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There is a well-established history within the literature of looking toward individual 
deficiency and weakness of character as explanations for employee misbehaviour.  This 
perspective persists in the academic realm but thrives within the workplace as a popular 
assumption among managers and employers that the misbehaving individual is 
necessarily ignorant, undeveloped or undisciplined in some manner (Analoui, 1995; 
Edwards et al., 1995).  There is much talk of a lack of discipline, but some authors have 
added additional layers to the pathological theory of misbehaviour by incorporating 
explanatory concepts like “emotional intelligence” (Lee & Ok, 2014).  The implication of 
this research being that the misbehaving employee is underdeveloped or perhaps less 
evolved in a manner that makes it difficult for them to engage in harmonious work 
relations (Bibi, 2013).  Still others have discussed misbehaviour as the result of moral 
failings and ‘ethical misconduct’ on the part of the employee (Henle et al., 2010).   
In more extreme accounts, misbehaviour is sometimes even defined as anti-social and a 
manifestation of destructive, aggressive and violent impulses born out of unconscious 
mental disturbances (Giacalone & Rosenfield, 1987; Kets de Vries, 2017).  This view of 
misbehaviour as violence has been widely publicized in the past, and Giesberg (2001) 
explains how American media coverage of sabotage as a form of violence has served to 
discredit it as a legitimate tactic that could be used by organized labour.  Finally, while 
some have gone as far as to compare sabotage to homicide (Laabs et al., 1999), it will not 
surprise the reader to hear that this perspective represents only a fringe element within the 
literature on organizational misbehaviour. 
Those familiar with the counterproductive work behaviour (CWB) literature may already 
be familiar with efforts to explain the phenomenon of organizational misbehavior through 
the individual characteristics of the employees who engage in it.  A major current within 
the CWB literature makes use of the Five-Factor Model of Personality to document how 
the individual characteristics of conscientiousness, agreeableness and emotional stability 
correspond with a lower likelihood of counterproductive work behavior (Berry et al., 
2007; Berry et al., 2012; Jensen & Patell, 2011) – counterproductive work behavior here 
being defined as ‘deliberate actions that harm the organization or its members’ (O’Boyle 
et al., 2011).  Much of this work is valuable and interesting and a number of the studies in 
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this area provide us with useful quantitative results for identifying individual 
predisposition towards counterproductive work behavior which – considering the 
similarity between the phenomena of CWB and organizational misbehavior – can also 
contribute to a more complete scientific understanding of the latter.  However, the main 
weakness in the CWB literature surrounds its characteristic focus on only individual 
explanations, with very limited effort to include structural factors.  Contemporary 
additions to the CWB literature suggest this trend is likely to continue, with recent 
explorations of the phenomenon focusing on either the interactional and mediational 
effects of Five-Factor Model personality traits (Hofstee et al., 1992; Hogan et al., 1996; 
Jensen & Patel, 2011; Sackett & DeVore, 2001; Witt, 2002; Zaccario, 2007) or 
incorporating other individual psychological concepts – such as the dark triad of 
Machiavellianism, narcissism and psychopathy – into the CWB literature (Cohen, 2016; 
Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; O’Boyle et al., 2012).  This primary emphasis on individual-
level explanations – though not exclusive (Hershcovis et al., 2007; O’Boyle et al., 2011; 
O’Boyle et al., 2012) – can be easily understood in the context of the traditional scientific 
purview of psychology.  However, the general failure to control for relevant structural 
measures makes for significant validity issues and provides little indication of the actual 
explanatory power of the personality traits predictors favored by CWB researchers 
compared to any other potential motivators.  Until this field of scientific research 
incorporates a greater awareness of the structural motivators towards CWB, it is likely 
that the chief contributions of this work will be limited to the provision of new employee-
screening techniques for interested managers/employers. 
Now, while many, unlike those referenced above, succeed at avoiding the trap of 
individualizing and pathologizing misbehaviour, another theoretical misstep to be 
avoided concerns the overestimation of the effectiveness of new managerial initiatives 
aimed at incorporating the modern worker into the work organization and rendering her 
compliant to its aims. 
A particularly popular turn in the human resource and organizational behaviour literature 
is to focus on developing corporate culture in such a way as to foster high commitment 
from employees towards organizational interests (Barker, 1999; Casey, 1999).  It is 
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common within this literature to argue that employee misbehaviour and resistance have 
largely been eliminated through the process of corporate enculturation (Frenkel et al., 
1998).  Combining this focus on fostering organizational commitment with more 
traditional management techniques is thought to have resulted in the rise of a successful 
new managerial regime based on the twin pillars of ‘fun and surveillance’ (Kinnie et al., 
2000).  Under this ‘fun and surveillance’ model of management, the typical worker is 
portrayed as primarily content with her lot and comfortably invested in organizational 
interests, while the misbehaving worker is cast as an exception explained either by 
pathological deviance or by a breakdown in effective communication between 
management and employees (DiBattista, 1991, 1996; Giesberg, 2001).   
Perspectives on misbehaviour such as those above rest heavily on the assumption that the 
workplaces of today are generally free of class antagonism, alienation and exploitation, 
so we should remain suspicious of any premature celebration of modern working 
conditions.   
 
1.2.4 Neo-Marxist Lessons on Contemporary Work 
Though the realities of the contemporary workplace are very different to those 
experienced by the factory workers of the 1800s, the structural foundations of class 
inequality and derived motivations toward misbehaviour endure into the present.  It has 
been the constant task of more than the few referenced here to remind the wider 
community of the relevance of a structural approach informed by Marxist theory to the 
study of contemporary workplace phenomena (Ackroyd, 2015; Ackroyd & Thompson, 
1999; Braverman, 1974; Burawoy, 1979; Hodson, 1995, 2001; Rinehart, 2006; 
Thompson, 2016).  What follows is an outline of some of the major contributions of a 
neo-Marxist approach towards improving our theoretical understanding of contemporary 
work.  
Faced by the popular conflation of technological innovation in production with the 
liberation of the worker, it is necessary to remind ourselves that technological 
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development should never be understood as taking place within a vacuum and that the 
direction and pace of technological development is determined by the dominant social 
currents of the time.  If we do not keep this social-technological connection in mind, we 
risk technological determination and the denial of human agency.   
In any social system, substantial technological development will make the labour process 
more efficient but, under capitalism, machinery is also set to the task of exploiting the 
worker and separating her from control over her own labour – except in those 
circumstances where expanding worker discretion will result in increased profitability 
and productivity (Braverman, 1974; Noble, 1986; Rinehart, 2006).   
Technology, as a tool which is developed in concert with human society, contains a wide 
range of possibilities.  However, technological development as the actual process by 
which a potential technology is brought into reality is not neutral and is guided by 
dominant interests.  In contemporary times, the general direction of technological 
development is determined by the imperatives of the capitalist organization of society and 
is directed towards further improving the position of the economic elite and other 
powerful interest groups (Braverman, 1974; Chun et al., 2010; Goldhaber, 1986; Kraemer 
& King, 2006; Mergel et al., 2009).   
Instead of granting the labourer a shorter work day or freedom from drudgery, 
advancements in efficiency are channeled into efforts to increase the amount of surplus 
value that can be extracted from her and divesting her of what little control she has over 
the production process.  In this context, it is not hard to understand why workers of the 
past and present have sometimes expressed their discontent with degraded working 
conditions by attacking the very machinery which is instrumental to their exploitation – 
the Luddites are probably the most famous example of this behaviour (Fox, 2002; Sale, 
1996).  In the future, it may be possible to harness the latent possibilities within human 
technology in the service of the true liberation of the worker – or to aid in combatting the 
threat of climate change – but this moment in history yet eludes us and cannot be 
expected to arrive spontaneously. 
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Continuing our comparison of the capitalist production of today with that of the past, it 
behooves us to emphasize that – while the typical workplace of the advanced capitalist 
world is often assumed to be qualitatively different from the shop floors central to Marx’s 
original critique – the assembly lines have not disappeared.  Corporations have extended 
assembly-line labour processes into the service sector and moved manufacturing plants 
overseas, in order to exploit new pools of cheap and insecure labour power provided by a 
global labour force fragmented by the national boundaries which capital crosses with 
relative ease (Bieler et al, 2008; Robin-Olivier, 2012).   
While the character of modern capitalism is distinctly international, it has primarily been 
the labourers residing within the wealthiest nations which have benefited from any 
improvement to working conditions derived from the advent of late capitalism.  In 
addition, even these limited advantages gained by the privileged workers of advanced 
industrialized nations may have been overstated:  While the turn towards office work at 
first appeared to offer knowledge workers a sanctuary from the alienation and 
exploitation of the shop floor, this new reality of work was only temporary, as further 
rationalization of the office quickly reversed these circumstances (Braverman, 1974).   
The distinction between the mental work of the office and the manual work of the factory 
has broken down as management increasingly takes on the role of administrating all 
intellectual processes required for production and office workers are increasingly 
confronted by routinized, rationalized and alienating work (Braverman, 1974; 
Livingstone & Watts, 2018; Rinehart, 2006). It is worth remembering the revulsion 
displayed by the workers of the past when confronted by the reality of a life working on 
the assembly line:  Their reaction was a natural resentment towards the alienation of work 
under capitalism.  This resentment remains present, even as the advance of capitalist 
hegemony casts any alternative methods for organizing human production as unrealistic 
pipe dreams and can reappear wherever it finds traction – often in the form of employee 
misbehaviour (Braverman, 1974). 
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1.2.5 Basis for a Structural Perspective on Misbehaviour 
As outlined above, treating the misbehaving worker as deviant, criminal or at least 
atypical can lead to major theoretical oversights – such as the mistaken assumptions that 
misbehaviour is not widespread or that it is only engaged in by a minority.  Such a 
perspective on misbehaviour offers little more than the dismissal of misbehaving workers 
and the adoption of new surveillance and social control strategies.  There is no 
recognition of – or effort to rectify – the structural circumstances which contribute 
toward an individual’s decision to misbehave. 
It is only by reconnecting our study of misbehaviour with an appreciation of the 
structurally-derived conflicts of interest present within the workplace that we can move 
forward to a better understanding of the phenomenon: “Recent attempts to unravel the 
nature of sabotage have taken a broader and more realistic view – one which sees conflict 
as related to clashes of interests and values at work and which is an important index of 
underlying industrial conflict…a contemporary example of neglected grass roots action” 
(Analoui, 1995, p. 3). 
By acknowledging the fundamental conflict of interests between employees and 
employers, we emphasize the important structural determinants of misbehaviour and 
develop a frame through which misbehaviour might come to be recognized as a potential 
form of resistance.  More than a few authors have characterized misbehaviour in the 
workplace in this manner, demonstrating how workplace conflict continues to be located 
surrounding issues of the employment relationship – the amount of pay, the amount and 
intensity of work – the effort bargain – or control over the labour process (Ackroyd & 
Thompson, 1999; Analoui, 1995; Courpasson, 2016; Dundon & van den Broek, 2015; 
Edwards & Scullion, 1982; Hodson, 1995, 2001; Karlsson, 2012; Lawrence & Robinson, 
2007; Mulholland, 2004; Thompson, 2015).  This developing focus on misbehaviour for 
its potential as worker resistance runs the gamut of a variety of types of misbehaviour, 
from cynical joking and withholding effort to destruction of company property and 
sabotage.  Whether each of these forms of misbehaviour is equally deserving of an 
association with resistance is a question examined in a later section, but it is sufficient 
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here to note that much of misbehaviour will function as resistance – by undermining 
efforts to organize work in a way that violates worker interests and by reducing the 
absolute effort expended in the production of profit for the owner (Hodson, 1995; 
Mulholland, 2004).   
 
1.2.6 For Justice and Autonomy 
Even from a recognition of the association between class conflict and misbehaviour, the 
task remains of determining the specific conditions under which misbehaviour is likely to 
take place.  Correspondingly, much of the literature on misbehaviour has been committed 
to narrowing down the circumstances which are most likely to give rise to it.   
DiBattista (1996) focuses on how the hierarchical structure of many organizations 
facilitates a culture whereby thinking is done by those at the top and those at the bottom 
are expected only to follow orders.  Others have emphasized how the particular form of 
power that is exercised within an organization (influence, force, discipline or domination) 
can help to predict the amount and type of misbehaviour engaged in by employees 
(political, personal aggression, work limitation or theft) (Lawrence & Robinson, 2007).  
Still others have highlighted the importance of looking at the presence (or absence) of a 
union in the workplace and its relative strength and influence (Dundon & van den Broek, 
2015; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Hartt, Mills & Mills, 2015).  However, the most relevant 
current within the misbehaviour literature – at least for our purposes – is concerned with 
how the phenomenon of misbehaviour is linked to worker autonomy and the injustice 
experienced by them within the workplace. 
Worker autonomy is a variable included in much of the research on employee 
misbehaviour and is frequently identified as a – if not the – central variable for 
understanding the prevalence of misbehaviour within any given organization (Ackroyd & 
Thompson, 1999; Ambrose et al., 2002; Analoui, 1995; Ang & Koslow, 2015; DiBattista, 
1996; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Paulson, 2014).  These 
theorists identify autonomy as an important requirement for an individual to experience 
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their work as meaningful and misbehaviour as a likely result whenever autonomy is 
threatened or managerial control is perceived as excessive.  The desire of the worker to 
be meaningfully engaged in the labour process as an active agent runs deep and cannot be 
satisfied by the relatively shallow employee-engagement strategies often encouraged by 
the human resource style of management – for example, employee feedback systems 
functionally limited to topics of relative insignificance or those deemed appropriate by 
management (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1995; DiBattisita, 1996; Edwards et al., 1995; 
Mulholland, 2004).    
The second most important motivation towards misbehaviour is the experience of 
injustice in the workplace (Edwards et al., 1995; Folger, 1993; Sheppard et al., 1992).  
The theory here goes that ‘the motivation to redress violations of moral norms indeed 
triggers retaliatory tendencies… [towards misbehaviour]’ (Skarlicki et al., 2008).  In this 
way, misbehaviour functions as a method of retaking one’s dignity in the face of 
whatever source of injustice is present within the workplace (Skarlicki et al., 1999; 
Skarlicki et al., 2008).  And it appears that employees are mostly accurate in directing 
their misbehaviour only towards the source of the perceived injustice:  Collateral damage 
would undermine the legitimacy of the act of misbehaviour (Paulsen, 2014) or increase 
the psychological cost of performing the retaliatory action for the individual – who most 
often prefers to act positively at work (Hodson, 2001).      
Some amount of the injustice experienced within the workplace is a result of 
interpersonal conflict not necessarily related to the unequal exercise of power.  The poor 
treatment of service personnel by belligerent customers is one good example of such non-
structural interpersonal injustice.  In these cases, employees will be more inclined 
towards retaliatory misbehaviour directed towards a specific offending customer – though 
this misbehaviour may become endemic if mistreatment by customers is routine (Ang & 
Koslow, 2015; Ferris, 2012; Harris & Ogbonna, 2006; Skarlicki et al., 2008).   
On the other hand, much of the injustice experienced by workers is linked to the exercise 
of power over them and it follows that much of the retaliatory misbehaviour undertaken 
by employees will be directed towards management and employers (Hodson, 1995; 
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Karlsson, 2012; Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Skarlicki et al., 1999).  In fact, some of the 
most commonly cited sources of injustice are bad bosses, unethical companies and hostile 
work environments (Paulsen, 2014).   
In a fascinating study of sabotage by Ambrose, Seabright and Schminke (2002), the 
authors provide evidence for several important claims about retaliatory misbehaviour in 
general – and sabotage more specifically.  First, it was discovered that perceived injustice 
wields considerable explanatory power with regards to employee misbehaviour and is 
perhaps the most common cause of sabotage (Ambrose et al., 2002).  Second, the source 
of injustice and the target of sabotage is most frequently the same, but the type of 
misbehaviour – retaliatory or equity focused – may differ based on the source of 
unfairness (interactional or distributive injustice) (Ambrose et al., 2002).  Finally, 
Ambrose and colleagues determined that sabotage increased in intensity in situations of 
greater organizational injustice and that a combination of different forms of injustice 
increased the intensity of sabotage even further (2002).   
So far, we have discussed autonomy and justice separately in terms of their relationship 
with employee misbehaviour, but these variables are frequently brought together as 
primary prerequisites of meaningful labour or the ability to work with dignity (Hodson, 
2001; Karlsson, 2012; Marx, 1844; Rinehart, 2006).  Employees’ need for autonomy and 
fairness are of central importance in attaining a more complete understanding of 
workplace misbehaviour, and the frustration of either of the former should be expected to 
consistently lead to an increase in the latter (Lawrence & Robinson, 2007). 
 
1.2.7 Innovation and the Dialectic of Employee Misbehaviour and 
Managerial Control 
In the previous section, we have explored how the need for autonomy and fairness relates 
to employee misbehaviour, but this section introduces the dynamic interaction between 
the actions of management and the misbehaviour of employees.   
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In any work organization, managers have numerous options of how to deal with 
misbehaviour and their chosen strategy for doing so will shape how employees decide to 
misbehave.  Because misbehaviour does not take place in a vacuum, it should not come 
as a surprise that the sort of misbehaviour expressed in a particular organization can be 
related to the character of the managerial regime:  Every organization features a set of 
unique strengths, weaknesses and organizational contradictions which incentivise the 
deployment of particular types of misbehaviour (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Edwards, 
1979; Hodson, 2001; Mulholland, 2004).  For example, it has been argued that where the 
managerial strategy of technical control exists, misbehaviour will tend to take forms such 
as playing dumb, restricting output, being late or absent and work avoidance to best 
challenge management’s efforts to regulate work intensity and duration (Hodson, 1995). 
However, it is important not to overstate the influence of management in determining the 
expression of misbehaviour:  Workers are creative and always capable of innovating new 
methods of misbehaving which cannot effectively be contained or controlled by the 
established managerial regime (Ackroyd, 2015; Burawoy, 1979; Mulholland, 2004; Vaz, 
1984).  A typical managerial response to employee misbehaviour is the implementation 
of new policies to crack down on the particular form of misbehaviour which has become 
most threatening but, once again, employees are ever capable of innovating new ways of 
misbehaving which evade the controls put forth by the new strategies of management.  In 
workplaces where employees are particularly skilled at finding new ways to misbehave or 
where past managerial initiatives have been unsuccessful, management can seem almost 
schizophrenic in its attempts to control misbehaviour – jumping back and forth from 
coercive strategies to those of seduction or enculturation (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; 
Edwards et al, 1995). 
Now, it is not a necessity that management move against every form of misbehaviour and 
often it is tolerated for a time – particularly if it is not challenging managerial authority, 
reducing productivity or if the costs of curtailing the misbehaviour are considered 
prohibitive (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999).  However, management, in its controlling role 
over the labour process, decision-making, organizational initiatives and general working 
conditions, will be inclined to move against any misbehaviour that weakens its authority 
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or damages profitability sufficiently to raise the ire of the owners.  And so, with these 
processes, we can perceive a dialectic emerge in the actions and reactions of employees 
and managers as both groups act to advance their interests – or undermine those of the 
other group (Ackroyd, 2015; Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Dundon & van den Broek, 
2015; Edwards et al., 1995; Thompson, 2015). 
 
1.2.8 The Missing Phenomenon of Employer Misbehaviour 
Until this point, we have focused primarily on the misbehaviour of employees, with some 
mention of how customers and managers can misbehave.  But what remains absent from 
our discussion – and from the literature at large – is an examination of employer 
misbehaviour.   
One area in which the misbehaviour literature is expanding to include employers is by 
recent attempts to merge the misbehaviour and entrepreneurship literatures (Barnes & 
Taksa, 2012; Lundmark & Westelius, 2015; Webb et al., 2009).  This work has linked the 
two concepts by focusing on misbehaviour as the violation of normative expectations in 
the pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunity.  Entrepreneurial activity is not fully restrained 
by the boundaries of normative or legal institutions and employers will often cross these 
boundaries in the pursuit of their “vision” – usually personal or organizational gain 
(Lundmark & Westelius, 2015; Robinson & Bennett, 1995).  This work is very 
promising, but the topic of employer misbehaviour still remains relatively unexplored.  
Below, we attempt to provide some explanation for this gap in the literature. 
We should start here by acknowledging how the hegemony of capitalist logic influences 
perceptions of misbehaviour in such a manner that the resistant actions of employees 
against injustice and to expand autonomy (working with dignity) comes to be discredited 
as anti-social, irrational or criminal, while efforts by management and employers that 
intensify exploitation and alienation – typically in the guise of organizational efficiency – 
is perceived as normal and appropriate organizational behaviour.  The normalization of 
capitalist imperatives towards profit maximization and competition presents the 
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degradation of work life as a necessary component of the production process – regrettable 
perhaps, but with no viable alternatives.  It will likely come as no surprise to the reader 
that the character of the dominant ideology will significantly influence the popular 
determination of what constitutes misbehaviour (Contu, 2008; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; 
Hartt et al, 2015), nor is it surprising that those who are economically dominant also 
wield considerable ideological influence and political clout (Braverman, 1974; Burawoy, 
1979; Marx & Engels, 1846).  And so, the actions of employers are already less likely to 
be defined as misbehaviour because of the privileges of their ownership and the unity of 
their actions with wider capitalist norms.   
One particularly obvious example of the relationship between ideology and misbehaviour 
comes in the discussion of time theft or time banditry – defined as the unethical or 
counterproductive involvement of the individual in non-work activities during paid work 
time (Atkinson, 2006; Brock et al., 2013; Brock Baskin et al., 2017; Henle et al., 2010).  
This type of misbehaviour is particularly reviled by employers and managers and doing 
personal work on company time is sometimes viewed as tantamount to sabotage – in fact, 
Ron DiBattista (1996) included personal work on his sabotage event list.  What is left 
unsaid – and taken-for-granted – in this conceptualization of time theft is the capitalist 
definition of a fair day’s work as the maximum amount of effort that a labourer is capable 
of outputting during her shift (Braverman, 1974; Taylor, 1911).  Though it makes just as 
much sense to define a fair day’s work as the amount of effort required to add value to 
the product equivalent to the worker’s wages, accommodation to the logic of capital 
accumulation and the primacy of the profit motive will cause many to instinctually recoil 
at such a suggested alternative.  Therefore, the ideological definition of misbehaviour 
results in the questionable acts of employers being less likely to be defined as 
misbehaviour.  However, there are at least two additional reasons why employer 
misbehaviour is difficult to detect.  
First, many employers are not physically present within the modern workplace.  By 
contrast, in the early days of capitalism, the role of manager and owner were most often 
located within the same person (Braverman, 1974; Zeitlin, 1989).  In those 
circumstances, it was much easier to assign blame and connect the actions of the 
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individual misbehaving owner to the resulting outcome.  However, in advanced capitalist 
society, the corporation has taken over the role of capitalist from the individual owner, 
while managerial duties are now primarily fulfilled by a new labour elite (Braverman, 
1974; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Zeitlin, 1989).  In contemporary times, even if the results 
of employer misbehaviour are felt within the workplace, it is rare to assign blame to 
absent owners – instead, on-site hired management are routinely scapegoated (Ackroyd, 
2015; Lundmark & Westelius, 2015).  Additionally, the advantages of ownership are 
such that employees might even be perceived to be engaging in sabotage by reporting the 
misbehaviour of their employers to their occupational health and safety or union 
representative – as it is not uncommon for the act of whistleblowing to be regarded 
negatively as a form of misbehaviour (Ackroyd, 2015; Bigoni et al., 2012; DiBattista, 
1996; Jackall, 2010). 
In this manner, the structure of contemporary capitalist production protects employers 
from having their actions defined as misbehaviour, but this protection also extends into 
the legal realm:  The nature of the limited liability corporation makes it difficult to assign 
culpability to any of the – possibly thousands of – shareholders who may have little 
individual input on organizational decisions (Gilson & Gordon, 2003; Gobert & Punch, 
2003; Lamb, 2012; Peston, 2012; Punch, 1995).  However, the corporation also benefits 
from unique legal protections not afforded to most human individuals which make the 
punishment of employer misbehaviour incredibly difficult.   
First, criminal law tends to focus on the prerequisites of individual responsibility and 
intent to commit the crime – both of which are made harder to prove due to the protection 
from liability that the corporate entity provides for its controlling executives and large 
shareholders (Dominoes Pizza, 2006; Edwards et al., 2014; Fisse & Braithwaite, 1993; 
Greenfield, 2006; Lamb, 2012; Wells, 2001).   
Second, companies are regulated by a separate set of laws and enforcement agents as 
compared to those of criminal law and police enforcement.  Instead, they are regulated by 
civil and administrative law and civilian inspectors, many of whom have a close 
relationship with the industries they are expected to keep watch on and the tendency to 
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see themselves more as advisors or educators, rather than serious investigators (Barkan, 
2013; Gobert & Punch, 2003; Greenfield, 2006).   
Third, the complicated nature of a corporate prosecution makes it harder to find jury 
members capable of following every legal intricacy – a difficulty compounded by the fact 
that many judges come to be generalists because of the practical demands of their 
position (Gobert & Punch, 2003).   
Fourth, due to the concentration of capital within them, individual corporations and 
coalitions of corporations are capable of mustering incredible resources to their defence.  
As a result, they can effectively lobby against legislation that threatens their interests and, 
if they are brought to court, they can often outmatch any prosecution in the courtroom 
with a team of high-powered and specialized attorneys (Healy, 2014; Punch, 1995).   
And finally, corporations have the option of voluntarily dissolving themselves, 
significantly complicating the matters of effective prosecution, enforcement of 
reparations or establishing ongoing liability (Lamb, 2012; Okla, 1927; Rice, 2010).    
For all the reasons outlined above, it is difficult to detect and define the misbehaviour of 
employers or hold them responsible for it – even when this misbehaviour is also illegal.  
In this context, it is not difficult to understand why employers’ actions are frequently 
excluded from the general misbehaviour literature or characterized as managerial 
misbehaviour (Biggerstaff et al., 2015; Fisse & Braithwaite, 1993; Jackling et al., 2007; 
Pacces, 2011; Shaban et al., 2017).  Either way, serious discussion of the structural 
factors related to employer misbehaviour remains almost entirely underdeveloped within 
the organizational misbehaviour literature. 
However, the literature on white-collar and corporate crime seems to offer a way back 
into this discussion – by connecting instances of particularly egregious corporate violence 
with the ruthless pursuit of profit characteristic of capitalism, a space can sometimes open 
in the popular consciousness to discuss how employers are also capable of misbehaviour.   
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1.2.9 Corporate Crime and Employer Misbehaviour 
The destructive potential of systematic employer misbehaviour is considerable, and it is 
people in the highest positions of power who cause the largest number of avoidable 
injuries and deaths (Box, 1983; Punch, 1995).  If we compare the statistics for victims of 
street crime and corporate crime, the differences are staggering – and worth reproducing 
here:  
If we take the 19,000 deaths related to street crimes recorded by the 
FBI in 1985, then we can compare that to the yearly total of victims of 
'corporate crime and violence' in the USA….  Almost 800 Americans 
die every day from cigarette-induced disease. Over the next 30 years, 
240,000 people - 8,000 per year, one every hour - will die from 
asbestos cancer. An estimated 85,000 American cotton textile workers 
suffer breathing impairments due to cotton dust (brown lung) disease. 
100,000 miners have been killed and 265,000 disabled due to coal-dust 
(black lung) disease.  Product-related accidents are said to cause 
28,000 deaths and 130,000 serious injuries; there are annually 5.5 
million injuries in the work place (of which 3.5 million require hospital 
treatment); and some 100,000 deaths have been related to exposure to 
dangerous chemicals and 390,000 deaths to occupational diseases. The 
figures are staggering, and shocking, and these are only for one 
country. On a world-wide scale, the amount of suffering and damage, 
partly unavoidable but also partly avoidable, is immense, virtually 
beyond measurement, and almost beyond comprehension (Punch, 1995, 
p. 95). 
Injury is endemic in Canadian workplaces. In 2012, there were 
245,365 accepted workers’ compensation claims for injuries that 
required time away from work as well as 977 claims for workplace 
fatalities. These statistics significantly underreport the true level of 
workplace injury by excluding injuries that did not require time away 
from work, injuries to those outside the workers’ compensation system, 
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and unreported injuries—which some studies put at 40 percent of all 
injuries (Foster & Barnetson, 2017, p. 612). 
Unfortunately, and despite the established historical record of corporate capacity for 
violent crime, these tragedies of employer misbehaviour rarely result in a serious critique 
of how the structure of the capitalist system gives rise to such destruction.  However, 
when a moment of corporate crime is well publicized – usually a result of extensive 
damage to human life – and there is an obvious connection to profit-maximization and 
corporate disregard for human life or the health of the environment, the true character of 
employer misbehaviour is rendered clear.   
A useful case study can be perceived in the sinking of the ferryboat Herald of Free 
Enterprise in 1986, when the front-loading doors were left open upon departure from 
port, resulting in the taking on of water, destabilization of the ship and the deaths of 197 
passengers and crew.  Though initial blame was placed at the feet of the crew member 
who had forgotten to close the ferry doors, subsequent inquest revealed a culture of 
corporate negligence where safety was regularly sacrificed for speed, convenience and 
profit – in fact, requests by ferry captains for a device which would notify those on the 
bridge about the status of the bow doors were repeatedly dismissed as too costly (Clarke, 
1990; Pontell & Geis, 2007; Sheen, 1996).  The calamity aboard the Herald of Free 
Enterprise may have resulted in new maritime safety regulations, but the prosecution of 
Townsend Thoresen for corporate manslaughter never went anywhere and the rebranding 
of the organization as P&O European Ferries was quickly accomplished (Punch, 1995).  
Instances of employer misbehaviour featuring a death toll are not necessarily the only 
ones which receive media attention:  The more common forms of employer misbehaviour 
characterized by a failure to pay workers their earned wages or pensions are also 
periodically covered – usually in the context of a large organization going under and 
leaving numerous employees in the lurch.  Several recent Canadian examples of this sort 
of employer misbehaviour can be perceived in the 2016 closure of Ontario Goodwill 
locations or the declaration of bankruptcy and liquidation of Sears Canada (Kopun, 2017; 
McFarland & Gray, 2016).     
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Conspicuous instances of employer misbehaviour provide for moments of awareness of 
the existence of corporate malfeasance, but the fact that much of this misbehaviour comes 
about as the result of the regular functioning of the capitalist organization is a point rarely 
highlighted outside of the academic literature – with notable exceptions such as Bakan’s 
The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Power and Profit (2004) and Nader’s 
Unsafe at any speed: The designed-in dangers of the American automobile.  
Nevertheless, there is a significant body of literature which challenges corporate 
sovereignty and questions the professed ability of corporations to autonomously self-
regulate and act ethically (Fisse & Braithwaite, 1993; Foster & Barnetson, 2017; 
Mokhiber, 1988; Rhodes, 2016).  These works are most important to understanding how 
the structure of the for-profit corporation and its organizational priority of advancing the 
economic interests of owners will often result in misbehaviour by employers.   
What should now be clear is that there is an asymmetry between employee and employer 
misbehaviour.  This asymmetry is obvious in the motives of the different parties 
involved, the perception of how common misbehaviour is, the character of the 
misbehaviour engaged in, and the scale of disruption or destruction that can result.  While 
this asymmetry offers some obvious challenges in comparison between these types of 
misbehaviour, the present situation whereby the study of employer misbehaviour is 
largely forsaken represents a dangerous oversight.  
 
1.2.10 The Ambiguous Position of Managers 
At this point, we have focused on the difference between employee and employer 
misbehaviour, but how do managers misbehave in the work organization?  It is obvious 
that managers also misbehave at work, but the general character of this misbehaviour can 
be ambiguous.  Often, the misbehaviour of managers can be understood as an extension 
of employer misbehaviour performed as part of the manager’s duty to uphold the interests 
of the owners.  In this way, managers are often party to employer misbehaviour as the 
latter’s agent within the workplace (Ackroyd, 2015; Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; 
Jackall, 2010).  It is because of their role as the owner’s representative, that managers 
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will often find themselves engaged with non-managerial employees in the dialectic of 
misbehaviour and control explained in an earlier section.   
However, managers do not always act as good stewards of the employer’s capital and can 
also misbehave in a way that advances their own interests at the expense of both workers 
and owners – for example, drawing wages unrelated to productivity, promoting 
individuals unfairly or dividing work unfairly (Ackroyd, 2015; Barnes & Taksa, 2012; 
DiBattista, 1996; Sayles & Smith, 2005).   
Additionally, some managerial misbehaviour is probably better understood as an 
extension of employee misbehaviour:  Managers have the same need for autonomy and 
dignity at work and may react similarly to employees when these are threatened 
(Karlsson, 2012).  This is particularly likely to be the case for those lower and middle 
managers who are better understood as clerical workers engaged in the routine 
administrative processes of organizational management and without significant personal 
authority over organizational direction or policy-making (Braverman, 1974).   
Unsurprisingly, this last type of managerial misbehaviour – which is very similar in 
character to employee misbehaviour – is less likely to be engaged in by those managers 
who identify strongly with employers or have a real chance of breaking into the upper 
class – only true for a select few of the managerial elite (Zeitlin, 1989).  However, it 
could be that managerial misbehaviour will increasingly come to resemble that of non-
managerial employees as the total number of managers continues to increase – diluting 
their previously privileged control over the labour process – or if they begin to portray 
economic attitudes similar to those of non-managerial employees (Livingstone & Watts, 
2018).  
 
1.2.11 Misbehaviour and Resistance 
Multiple scholars of misbehaviour have suggested that there is an emerging trend away 
from organized or formal resistance towards routine and informal resistance in the form 
of covert misbehaviour by employees in the work organization (Ackroyd & Thompson, 
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1999; Edwards et al., 1995; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Hodson, 2001; Muholland, 2004; 
Prasad, 2000; Thompson, 2016).  The decline in influence of more formalized forms of 
resistance – such as unions – is due to a variety of factors such as the decline in union 
membership in the private sector, disagreements over the primary purpose of the union 
and who should be included in the membership, and the added difficulties of reasserting a 
discourse of workers’ rights perceived by many to be in ideological association with the 
Soviet Union (Hartt et al, 2015).  In reaction to the obstacles faced by traditional 
formalized and organized resistance, employee misbehaviour has received greater focus 
because of its potential to function as a more subtle and individual resistance against the 
enduring contradictions of the capitalist system and new managerial initiatives of 
normative control and enculturation. 
Against the backdrop of a modern workplace commonly assumed to be characterized by 
relatively harmonious industrial relations, we see that workers are engaging in a wide 
variety of forms of misbehaviour – but how much of this misbehaviour should be 
understood as resistance?   
There are those who are very optimistic about the possibility for resistance contained 
within misbehaviour.  Not just focusing on the forms of misbehaviour most obviously 
containing a component of resistance – like sabotage or output limitation – these scholars 
have examined how even smaller acts of misbehaviour such as feigning ignorance, 
loafing behind a veneer of false compliance, ironic and overexaggerated compliance with 
rules and regulations – to the point of inefficiency – and cynical disengagement can 
introduce significant disruption into a workplace and act as a way for workers to reassert 
their own identities against corporate ideals (Baines, 2011; De Certeau, 1984; Fleming & 
Sewell, 2002; Hodson, 2001; Mumby, 2005; Sotirin & Gottfried, 1999). 
However, this optimism surrounding even the most seemingly innocuous forms of 
misbehaviour has led others to question whether we have been too quick to attribute the 
label of resistance to actions which offer relatively little threat to capitalist relations of 
production (Contu, 2008; Paulsen, 2014; Prassad, 2008).  One of the best examples of 
this skeptical turn in the misbehaviour literature is contained in Contu’s work on ‘decaf 
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resistance’: “These transgressive acts that we call ‘resistance’ are akin to a decaf 
resistance, which changes very little.  It is resistance without the risk of really changing 
our ways of life or the subjects who live it” (2008, p. 367).  The work of Contu and others 
who problematize the connection between misbehaviour and resistance is particularly 
useful in raising the question of whether these small acts of misbehaviour should instead 
be understood as evidence of how capitalist power relations are truly effective – allowing 
us to imagine ourselves as free-thinking and agentic individuals engaging in a ‘resistance’ 
that actually contains no significant potential for social change (Contu, 2008; Fleming, 
2005; Fleming & Spicer, 2003; Paulsen, 2014).  
While the misbehaviour-as-resistance debate is important – and ongoing – perhaps the 
most important lesson we should take from it is a recognition that resistance is rarely pure 
or authentic; rather, it is often ambiguous and complex and may contain some measure of 
collusion or consent (Burawoy, 1979; Collinson, 1994; Edwards et al., 1995; Fleming & 
Sewell, 2002; Kondo, 1990).  An intriguing suggestion is to dispense with both the effort 
to draw a line in the sand between authentic resistance and ‘decaf resistance’ and the 
tendency to readily declare any minute deviation from the strict observance of capitalist 
organizational standards as a revolutionary act.  Therefore, it is probably most useful to 
treat routine resistance as a local social product – requiring a closer study of how 
individuals interact with their unique workplace settings, their specific intent and the 
results of their actions – and appreciate how the same type of misbehaviour can be 
regarded as relatively unthreatening mischief in one context and a significant act of 
resistance in another (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Burawoy, 1979; Courpasson, 2016; 
Dundon & van den Broek, 2015; Prasad, 2008).   
However, even with our recognition that both the “resistance is everywhere” and 
“resistance is nowhere” perspectives are lacking, we can make no meaningful evaluation 
of resistance without a definition large enough to avoid reification and small enough that 
we do not declare all misbehaviour as resistance.  For these purposes, a good place to 
start is the definition of resistance put forth by Paul Thompson: “[W]orkplace resistance 
should be considered an intentional, active, upwardly-directed response to managerial 
controls and appropriation of materials and symbolic resources” (2016, p. 118).  This 
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definition, as is, continues the trend in most previous research on organizational 
misbehaviour of leaving employer misbehaviour outside the critical gaze.  So, it is 
necessary to make the addendum that workplace resistance is also an upwardly-directed 
response against employer control or interests.  This is a particularly important addition 
as the actions of managers are most frequently in-line with and representative of 
employer interests, and our understanding of the conflict between workers and managers 
is incomplete without this recognition. 
 
1.3 General Methodological Notes 
1.3.1 Data 
The data for this study on misbehaviour was gathered as a part of a larger national survey 
project, titled “Changing Workplaces in a Knowledge Economy: Occupational Class 
Structure, Skill Use and the Place of Professions in Canada”.  Two workplace 
misbehaviour items – employee and employer – were added to the 2016 version of the 
survey specifically for use in this study and are not included in the datasets from previous 
years. The other variables drawn upon were already present in the CWKE survey due to 
its general focus on issues related to work in Canada.   
 This survey was administered by the Leger research and polling firm through telephone 
and online questionnaires – beginning with a pilot phone survey in September 2015 – and 
all interviews were completed by the end of March 2016.  Respondents were selected 
through random digit dialing (RDD) and simple random selection of respondents from 
the Leger web panel (made up of approximately 475,000 members).  In total, 1248 
respondents were reached through telephone while the remaining 1779 sampled 
respondents completed their interviews online.  Our total sample is comprised of just over 
three thousand respondents (N=3007) drawn from the Canadian population of adults 
above 18 years of age who speak one of Canada’s official languages and reside in a 
private home in one of Canada’s ten provinces (territories excluded).  The sample was 
also intended to include only employed individuals and those temporarily absent from 
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work (ex. parental leave, vacation, etc.), but 28 unemployed individuals were erroneously 
included.  After removing these unemployed individuals, our final sample is comprised of 
2,979 employed Canadians.  For the telephone portion of the survey, the response rate 
was approximately 33%, while the online portion had a response rate of 65%:  This 
resulted in an overall response rate of 52% (for further information on response rate, 
please see Appendix 1).  The survey data have been weighted using information from the 
2016 Labour Force Survey on region, age, sex and educational attainment.  Our dataset is 
nationally representative, allowing us to study the general phenomenon of misbehaviour 
as manifested within the workplaces of Canada and facilitating accurate comparison of 
different segments of the labour force.  This dataset is utilized for the entirety of the 
analyses that follow. 
One common limitation with survey data collected from web panels is under-
representation of those without access to the internet (or limited access) and those who 
are less-skilled in internet use.  A second limitation of web panels is that they are often 
susceptible to self-selection bias.  These limitations represent a potential source of error 
for the 1779 respondents selected from the Leger web panel.  However, the Leger 
Research and Intelligence Group have taken a number of efforts to increase the quality of 
their web panel and guard against these limitations which are worth mentioning here: 
1) 60% of the panel of 475,000 individuals are recruited by phone using RDD (The 
majority of the rest are recruited through referrals – 25%). 
2) The panel is monitored using email verification, digital fingerprinting, quality 
checks and illogical response detection to remove inactive users, cheaters or 
“speeders” (those who rush through filling out a survey without comprehension of 
questions). 
3) Respondents for this survey were selected at random from the larger Leger web 
panel. 
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1.3.2 Practical Issues Related to the Study of Organizational 
Misbehaviour 
There are two main characteristics of workplace misbehaviour which complicate any 
study of the phenomenon.  First, workplace misbehaviour – by the very definition of it as 
such – will always be accompanied by some manner of negative connotations.  Where the 
activities associated with workplace misbehaviour are not illegal, they are usually at least 
frowned upon – if it were otherwise, they would not be perceived of as misbehaviour, 
after all.  Even when an individual does not perceive her own actions as constituting 
misbehaviour, an appreciation for the fact that others may view the matter differently 
may cause her to take measures towards hiding evidence of her involvement in 
questionable practices.  As a result, any study of misbehaviour is faced by the usual 
challenges of research into behaviour widely perceived as deviant or undesirable and 
requires the addressing of significant ethical considerations and guaranteed protection of 
the respondent. 
Faced with these challenges, much of the study of misbehaviour has taken the form of 
participant observation with reasonable effort taken to conceal the identity of the 
involved parties.  Participant observation is particularly useful for demonstrating how the 
expression of misbehaviour is associated with the unique factors and social dynamics 
present within every workplace, but there are obvious complications with connecting 
these findings with a more generalizable understanding of the phenomenon.   
In the present study, we chose a different methodological approach for dealing with the 
ethical and practical challenges of studying misbehaviour by requesting only that 
respondents report their evaluation of the overall frequency of misbehaviour in their 
workplace – not necessarily including any misbehaviour engaged in by them.  An 
obvious benefit of this approach is to provide protection for respondents and encourage 
them to answer truthfully – granting them deniability as well as anonymity.  A drawback 
of our approach is that we cannot know how much of the misbehaviour reported by the 
respondent is also carried out by them, though it is reasonable to assume that our 
measures of the frequency of misbehaviour within a respondent’s workplace and a 
hypothetical measure of the respondent’s own misbehaviour might be associated.  Our 
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decision to rely exclusively on survey data allows us to make inferences about the extent 
of the phenomenon in Canadian workplaces but does prevent us from a deeper 
understanding of organizational misbehavior which might be provided by qualitative 
methods. 
The second characteristic of misbehaviour that needs to be acknowledged in the context 
of our methodological approach is the element of subjectivity contained within our 
measures of misbehaviour.  This is not an issue unique to the present study, as any 
research utilizing data reported by human subjects will contain some reporting error, but 
this issue is likely compounded by differences in individual definitions of what 
constitutes misbehaviour.  While we expect that our respondents are generally accurate in 
their evaluation of the frequency of misbehaviour within their workplace, it is undeniable 
that these reports will be coloured by their own subjectivity and the availability of 
evidence of misbehaviour, some of which will be hidden from them.  We acknowledge 
that fact here and move forward with the understanding that this is an inherent limitation 
of our decision to study misbehaviour in general – instead of limiting ourselves to one or 
more specific manifestations of the phenomenon. 
 
1.3.3 Key Misbehaviour Variables 
Our study is concerned with perceptions of misbehavior frequency in the work 
organization and we have two measures available for examining this phenomenon.  Our 
first measure concerns the most often studied form of organizational misbehaviour – 
employee misbehaviour.  For this questionnaire item, respondents were asked the 
following: “How common do you think employee misbehaviour such as taking 
organization-owned materials or loafing on the job is in places like where you work?”  
Responses were close-ended with options on a 4-point scale ranging from extremely 
uncommon to extremely common.  Two non-response categories were also available for 
those who preferred not to answer or said they did not know – around 10% of all 
respondents chose one of these non-response options. 
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Our survey also contained a measure for employer misbehaviour.  Respondents were 
asked, “How common do you think employer misbehaviour such as not paying 
employees some earned benefits or avoiding taxes on earnings is in places like where you 
work?” and provided with the same four ordinal response options as for the employee 
misbehaviour item.  Once again, respondents had the ability to give the answers “I don’t 
know” or “I prefer not to answer” and 13% of them chose to do so. 
We conducted a non-response analysis for each of our key misbehaviour variables (See 
Appendix 2 for detailed results).  Self-employed respondents had significantly higher 
odds of providing non-valid responses to each of these items compared to the comparison 
category of service workers:  They were 3.38 times more likely not to respond to our 
employee misbehaviour item and 2.10 times more likely not to respond to the employer 
misbehaviour item.  Female respondents (1.64) also had higher odds of nonresponse to 
the employee variable compared with male respondents.  The rest of the significant 
results of our non-response analyses concerned only the employer misbehaviour item.  
Higher respondent wealth increased the chance of valid response, with each unit increase 
in the 15-point wealth variable corresponding with a 7% decrease in the odds of non-
response.  On the other hand, a higher respondent age suggested greater chance of non-
response, with each extra year of life representing a 2% increase in the odds of non-
response.  Finally, highest level of education received played a role, as both the holders 
of a non-university post-secondary certificate (.60) or a Bachelor’s degree (.58) had about 
40% lower odds of non-response to our employer misbehaviour item, compared with the 
reference category of those whose highest education is a high school diploma. 
 
1.3.4 Conceptualization of Misbehaviour 
The concept of misbehaviour utilized throughout the present study is that advanced by 
Sprouse (1992) and Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) of organizational misbehaviour as 
‘anything at work that you are not supposed to do’ (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999, p. 7).  
There are two primary methodological justifications for why this conceptualization is 
appropriate for our study.   
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First, we think it is reasonable to suggest that this definition runs close to a layperson’s 
understanding of workplace misbehaviour and the standpoint from which most 
respondents would understand our questions as presented to them.  Second, the 
misbehaviour items available to us are not specific in identifying what behaviours 
respondents should consider as misbehaviour.  Aside from the examples included in the 
questionnaire of taking organizational materials or loafing for employee misbehaviour 
and not paying out earned benefits or avoiding taxes for employer misbehaviour, we 
cannot make assumptions about which activities respondents perceive as examples of 
employee or employer misbehavior.  It might also be the case that respondents restricted 
their answers to primarily those activities described by the examples and other types of 
misbehavior (ex. sabotage) may be underreported.  As a result, our misbehaviour items 
provide us with a more diffuse measure of the phenomena of interest and it makes 
methodological sense to make use of a general definition which can be expected to 
encompass a diversity of perceptions on misbehaviour. 
 
1.4 The Path Forward 
This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework of this dissertation and covered a 
number of general methodological notes.  The following three chapters (2, 3 and 4) 
contain our data analyses.  Our fifth chapter brings together the results of the chapters 
which precede it and concludes this dissertation.   
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Chapter 2 
2 Canadian Workers Misbehaving 
2.1 Introduction 
Individuals do not always follow the rules at work and the study of the organizational 
misbehaviour of employees is concerned with expanding our understanding of why 
workers engage in activities on the job that they are not supposed to do (Ackroyd & 
Thompson, 1999; Burawoy, 1979; Sprouse, 1992). 
The variety of practices understood as misbehaviour is extensive – ex. loafing on the job, 
vandalism, absenteeism, sabotage, theft – and varies considerably based on one’s own 
definition of proper behaviour, but it is increasingly clear that employee misbehaviour is 
pervasive within contemporary workplaces.  Several notable studies have estimated that 
as many as 75% of all employees routinely engage in some form of misbehaviour 
(Harper, 1990; Lawrence et al., 2007) with 90% of informants reporting it as an everyday 
occurrence in their workplace (Harris & Ogbonna, 2002, 2006; Lee & Ok, 2014; Slora, 
1989) and the average worker spending approximately two hours of her workday engaged 
in activities unrelated to her paid work (Paulsen, 2014).  
The aim of this study is to contribute a general study of perceptions of undifferentiated 
employee misbehaviour that goes beyond individualistic accounts of the phenomenon and 
illuminates class position, lack of autonomy and experiences of injustices as primary 
explanatory variables.  In doing so, we reconnect the already established currents within 
the organizational misbehaviour literature surrounding issues of injustice and challenges 
to autonomy with a Marxist appreciation of alienation as an enduring source of 
dissatisfaction with work – and motivation towards employee misbehaviour – inherent to 
the structure of the capitalist system.   
A major contribution of this study is located within its provision of results representative 
of the entire Canadian working population – the first study on employee misbehaviour to 
do so, according to our knowledge.  In fact, the lack of representative data sets in 
misbehaviour research is not an issue limited to Canadian studies.  Due to the negative 
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connotations associated with employee misbehaviour and the difficulties associated with 
definition and detection, many studies have opted for a qualitative approach focused on 
intimate observation of the activities taking place in a single work organization – or 
occasionally several (Ambrose et al., 2002; Brock et al., 2013; DiBattista, 1996; 
Giacalone & Rosenfeld, 1987; Muholland, 2004; Shkoler & Tziner, 2017; Skarlicki et al., 
1999, 2008; Sprouse, 1992).  These studies are interesting and informative – particularly 
for their ability to illuminate the motives and varieties of employee misbehaviour – but 
are limited in generalizability or comparison between diverse types of workers.  Our 
study addresses this general gap in the organizational misbehaviour literature. 
 
2.2 Background 
The activities defined as misbehaviour – and the types of misbehaviour most deserving of 
attention – obviously differ by the interests and discipline of the individual researcher, 
but there are still some dominant trends within the literature.  Emphasizing employee 
misbehaviour as a method of output restriction and re-appropriation by workers 
(Amichai-Hamburger, 2003; Burawoy, 1979; Flynn, 1916; Roy, 1952; Taylor, 1911) is 
one major trend that has contributed to a prioritizing of activities which are readily 
understood in such a context, such as sabotage (Ambrose et al., 2002; Analoui, 1995; 
Sprouse, 1992; Taylor & Walton, 1971) and pilferage/employee theft (Atkinson, 2006; 
Brock et al., 2017; Greenberg, 1990, 1993; Henle et al., 2010; Hollinger & Clark, 1983).   
This stream of research remains strong, but other new and interesting perspectives on 
misbehaviour are expanding the range of activities coming under study:  For example, the 
conception of misbehaviour as a coping strategy for disaffected workers has brought 
previously unacknowledged activities – clowning, cynical joking and gossip – into the 
picture (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Contu, 2008; Fleming & Spicer, 2003; Noon & 
Blyton, 2007; Noon & Delbridge, 1993; Taylor & Bain, 2003), while the growth of the 
service industry has prompted understandable interest into the unique forms and 
characteristics of service sabotage and a new appreciation of the workplace conflict 
arising from the required interaction with belligerent or harassing customers (Ang & 
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Koslow, 2015; Harris & Ogbonna, 2002, 2006; Hawkins, 1984; Lee & Ok, 2014; 
Skarlicki et al., 2008). 
Almost as numerous as the forms of employee misbehaviour are the diversity of 
explanatory variables which have been explored, but these factors are generally aligned 
with either an individual pathological approach to the phenomenon or one that 
emphasizes the role of structural conditions present within the workplace. 
Some of the individual explanatory factors that have received considerable attention in 
the organizational misbehaviour literature are emotional intelligence (Bibi, 2013; Lee & 
Ok, 2014), aggression or anti-social tendencies (Giacalone & Rosenfeld, 1987; Kets de 
Vries, 2017) and ethical or moral immaturity (Henle et al., 2010).  To some extent, there 
will always be a limited number of cases of employee misbehaviour traceable to 
individual pathology or interpersonal conflict.  However, any approach to the study of 
employee misbehaviour that prioritizes individual characteristics will advance an 
incomplete understanding of the topic – and it is an unfortunate reality that pathological 
explanations of employee misbehaviour remain popular among managers and other 
policy-makers (Analoui, 1995; Edward et al., 1995).   
Individualistic models of employee misbehaviour draw on a popular assumption of 
general worker compliance in advanced industrial countries (Barker, 1999; Casey, 1999; 
Frenkel et al., 1998; Kinnie et al., 2000; Luthans, 1972) and the mistaken belief that most 
acts of misbehaviour are attributable to a small minority of “bad-apple” employees (Bibi, 
2013; Henle et al., 2010; Kets de Vries, 2017; Laabs et al., 1999; Leavitt, 1973; Wilson & 
Rosenfeld, 1990).  However, it has become increasingly clear that the worker pathology 
explanation of misbehaviour is untenable in the face of a wealth of evidence that suggests 
these activities are ubiquitous and engaged in by numerous – if not the majority of – 
workers (Harper, 1990; Harris & Ogbonna, 2002, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2007; Lee & Ok, 
2014; Paulsen, 2014; Slora, 1989). 
Correspondingly, the primary trend in the organizational misbehaviour literature has been 
to approach the phenomenon as a rational reaction by individuals to the conditions of 
their work environment.  A variety of organizational characteristics has been highlighted 
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as potential predictors of employee misbehaviour, but the structural factors which receive 
the most attention are those which result in greater dissatisfaction and discontent for the 
worker – feelings which, according to one source, may account for as many as 65% of all 
cases of employee misbehaviour (Analoui, 1995).  It should come as no surprise that the 
most influential determinants of employee misbehaviour are also useful for measuring 
degraded or dissatisfying working conditions – lack of autonomy and the experience of 
injustice. 
 
2.2.1 Autonomy 
Worker autonomy is a variable included in much of the previous research on employee 
misbehaviour (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Ambrose, 2002; Analoui, 1995; Ang & 
Koslow, 2015; DiBattista, 1996; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; 
Paulson, 2014) and has received frequent attention as a prerequisite for satisfaction with 
one’s work.  The desire of the labourer to be meaningfully engaged in the labour process 
as an active agent runs deep and – when this need is not satisfied – employees are more 
motivated towards engaging in misbehaviour (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1995; DiBattista, 
1996; Edwards et al., 1995; Mulholland, 2004).   
Hypothesis 1:  Respondents reporting more autonomy in their work will report less 
employee misbehaviour in the workplace. 
 
2.2.2 Injustice 
Another key variable found to be associated with higher rates of employee misbehaviour 
is the experience of injustice in the workplace.  Here, the literature provides considerable 
evidence of how ‘the motivation to redress violations of moral norms indeed triggers 
retaliatory tendencies…’ (Skarlicki et al., 2008) and how misbehaviour can function as a 
method of retaking one’s dignity in the face of whatever injustice is present within one’s 
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workplace (Edwards et al., 1995; Folger, 1993; Folger & Skarlicki, 1998; Sheppard et al., 
1992; Skarlicki et al., 1999; Skarlicki et al., 2008).   
It is true that some amount of the injustice experienced within the workplace will be the 
result of interpersonal conflict not necessarily related to the structural characteristics of 
the organization, but a great amount of the injustice experienced by workers can be 
linked to causes endemic to the work organization – for instance, unethical operating 
procedures and hostile or unsafe work environments (Hodson, 1995; Karlsson, 2012; 
Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Paulsen, 2014; Skarlicki et al., 1999).   
Therefore, in accordance with the findings of previous studies, we expect to find that 
greater injustice in the workplace will be accompanied with greater amounts of employee 
misbehaviour (Ambrose et al., 2002; Baron & Neuman, 1996; Martinko & Zellars, 1998; 
McLean Parks, 1997; McLean Parks & Kiddler, 1994).   
Hypothesis 2:  Respondents experiencing injustice at work will report more 
employee misbehaviour. 
 
2.2.3 Occupational Class 
Writing before the establishment of organizational misbehaviour as a distinct area of 
study, Marx’s work on exploitation and alienation of the wage labourer – inherent 
contradictions of the capitalist system – remain relevant as factors explaining 
contemporary dissatisfaction with work (Adonis & Pollard, 1997; Marx, 1844, 1867; 
McGlynn, 2016; O’Donohue & Nelson, 2014; Rosa, 2010).  It is evident that the majority 
of contemporary workplace conflict continues to surround traditional issues related to 
class antagonism – amount of pay, the amount and intensity of work and control over the 
labour process (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Edwards & Scullion, 1982; Hodson, 1995, 
2001; Karlsson, 2012; Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Thompson, 2015).  
A useful method for conceptualizing class in contemporary times is to emphasize the 
individual’s occupational position within the relations of capitalist production 
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(Livingstone & Scholtz, 2016; Livingstone & Watts, 2018; Wright, 1980).  Taking this 
perspective is particularly useful in recognizing and accounting for the reality that 
workers can occupy a variety of class positions and may have interests in conflict with 
other workers – that is, semi-autonomous workers may share some interests in common 
with less privileged workers, but more closely align with the interests of employers on 
other matters.   
An approach to class based on occupational position offers a more nuanced 
understanding of the diversity of interests represented within the employed population. 
The distinctions between isolated groups of workers enabled by a focus on occupational 
class is particularly useful for understanding the divergent experiences of workers in the 
face of the developing knowledge economy in Canada – characterized by growth in the 
service sector, a higher proportion of labourers attaining post-secondary education, 
credential inflation and a growing number of jobs requiring specialized knowledge 
(Adams, 2010; Livingstone, 2014; Livingstone & Guile, 2012).  Without a recognition of 
class divisions between employees, one risks making general assumptions about the 
experience of work in contemporary society (see the professionalization of everyone vs. 
proletarianization debate [Bell, 1976; Cotada, 1998; Haug, 1975; Larson, 1980; 
Wilensky, 1964]).  Our occupational class position variable (see Appendix 3 for 
construction logic) allows us to compare how the unique working conditions faced by 
different classes of employees can contribute to divergence in the amount of 
organizational misbehaviour and explain why more privileged workers (professionals) 
might be less motivated towards engaging in misbehaviour than those who are confronted 
by less-desirable working conditions (industrial and service workers).   
Hypothesis 3:  Professional workers will report less employee misbehaviour than 
service and industrial workers. 
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2.2.4 Social Class 
Although the focus of the class analysis presented in this paper surrounds occupational 
class (outlined in the section above), we had some interest in exploring the relationship 
between alternative conceptions of class and employee misbehaviour.  Correspondingly, 
we included two alternative measures for class in our study – one an objective wealth 
measure and the other comprised of a subjective self-evaluation – with the intention to 
interrogate whether either of these social class measures might have a unique relationship 
with our dependent variable not already accounted for by the occupational class variable.  
We expect that individuals of a lower social class are more likely to be exposed to the 
degraded working conditions that often give rise to a greater frequency of employee 
misbehaviour.   
Hypothesis 4:  Lower social class (objective economic and subjective evaluation) will 
correlate with a greater amount of employee misbehaviour in the workplace. 
 
2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Data 
The dataset for this study is made up of a subsample drawn from the larger Changing 
Workplaces in a Knowledge Economy: Occupational Class Structure, Skill Use and the 
Place of Professions in Canada (CWKE) 2016 sample of employed Canadians (N=2,979).  
This survey focuses on examining issues surrounding work and lifelong learning and 
respondents were selected through random digit dialing (RDD) and simple random 
selection of respondents from a professional web panel of approximately 475,000 
respondents maintained by the Leger Research Intelligence Group (see our general 
methodology notes in chapter 1 for more information about our data).  Our focus on non-
managerial workers’ reporting of employee misbehaviour frequency necessitated the 
removal of all employers and managers from our analytical sample.  Using our 9-
category occupational class variable as a filter, we removed all large employers, small 
employers, self-employed, upper managers, middle managers, supervisors and 
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unclassified individuals from the data set.  Our final analytic sample is made up of all the 
employed respondents belonging to one of the three categories of non-managerial 
employee: Professional employee, service worker and industrial worker.  After the above 
selection, we were left with 1,880 respondents (from a total sample of 2,979 working 
individuals). 
 
2.4 Measures 
2.4.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for the present analysis measures the most commonly studied 
form of organizational misbehaviour – employee misbehaviour.  The questionnaire item 
associated with this variable requested that respondents answer the following: “How 
common do you think employee misbehaviour such as taking organization-owned 
materials or loafing on the job is in places like where you work?”  The valid responses to 
this question make up a 4-point Likert scale ranging from extremely uncommon to 
extremely common, with fairly uncommon and fairly common as intermediary options 
(See general methodological notes section in chapter 1 for more information about this 
variable and Appendix 2 for a non-response analysis).  
 
2.4.2 Independent Variables 
2.4.2.1 Occupational Class 
Our original occupational class variable was constructed using detailed job description 
and job title information (See Appendix 3 for construction logic).  After the selection of 
only non-managerial employees for our analytical sample, we were left with a 3-category 
occupational class variable: (1) professional employees, (2) service workers and (3) 
industrial workers.  We privilege occupational class over social class in these analyses 
because of the former’s closer connection with the actual conditions that individuals 
experience in their work as a result of their occupational position within the relations of 
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capitalist production (Livingstone & Scholtz, 2016; Livingstone & Watts, 2018; Wright, 
1980). 
We also regard certain occupational classes as lower in the hierarchy of the relations of 
production:  Industrial and service workers are lower in the class order than both non-
managerial professional employees and managerial employees.  Within the managerial 
hierarchy, we consider supervisors as lower in class position than middle managers, who 
are themselves lower than upper managers.  In the context of this study, we will often 
refer to industrial and service workers as lower class and we do so in the context of their 
relatively disadvantaged position in the relations of productions compared with other 
employees.     
 
2.4.2.2 Social Class 
We utilized 2 measures to represent social class:  Respondent total net wealth and 
personal class identification.  Our net wealth variable was originally presented to 
respondents as a 15-point scale ranging from “less than $5,000” to “Above $10 million,” 
but has since been reduced to only ten categories for ease of analysis and presentation.  
Our second measure of social class – personal class identification – was selected to 
complement our wealth measure with one which incorporated respondent subjectivity.  
Our personal class identification variable was constructed by grouping together the 
verbatim results of inquiry into what class respondents placed themselves.  Respondents 
were not limited in their answers, but most answers fit cleanly into one of five categories 
used in the construction of our final personal class identification measure: (1) Poor, (2) 
Working, (3) Middle, (4) Upper middle and (5) Rich.  It will not surprise the reader to 
hear that our two measures of social class are significantly associated, but we believe 
both to be important in a discussion of how social class – and the interests derived from it 
– relates to the amount of employee misbehaviour in the workplace.  
 
60 
 
 
 
2.4.2.3 Autonomy 
Our survey data provided us with many potential autonomy measures, but we have 
limited ourselves to just the two most relevant.  The first of these measures provides a 
local measure of job autonomy and how much control respondents have in relation to the 
specific circumstances under which their labour takes place, while the second is 
concerned with employee involvement in general decision-making processes in the work 
organization.  
Our local autonomy variable is composed of responses to the question “How often is it 
possible for you to plan or design your own work?” recorded on a 5-point scale from 
“Never” to “All the time”.  For our ‘inclusion in organizational decision-making 
autonomy’ variable, responses to the question “Would you like to have more say than 
you do now in decisions in your workplace?” are limited to two categories – yes and no.   
 
2.4.2.4 Injustice 
The process of selecting appropriate measures to operationalize the experience of 
workplace injustice was not uncomplicated.  In the absence of a straightforward measure 
of injustice, we have identified four variables which together outline common 
circumstances experienced by employees which might reasonably result in a sense of 
unfair treatment:  Feeling that one is undercompensated, being discriminated against, 
feeling one’s health and safety is threatened and expecting to lose one’s job.   
Our first injustice measure – related to inadequate compensation – is ordinal and made up 
of responses to the question “Compared to the value you produce at your workplace, do 
you think your compensation is much less than you deserve, somewhat less, about right, 
somewhat more than you deserve or much more than you deserve?”.  Our second 
measure of injustice was measured by asking respondents whether they had been 
discriminated against by anyone at work in the past year (yes or no).  For our third 
injustice variable, we measured threats to employee health and safety with the question 
“To what extent, if at all, do you think your health or safety is at risk because of your 
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job?”  Valid responses fell into one of four ordinal categories ranging from “Not at all” to 
“A great deal”.  Finally, the risk of job loss as a source of injustice was measured with 
respondents’ answers to the question of how likely it was that they would lose their job in 
the next 12 months.  Responses are once again organized into four ordinal categories: (1) 
Very likely, (2) Somewhat likely, (3) Somewhat unlikely and (4) Very unlikely. 
 
2.4.2.5 Demographic Variables 
In preliminary analysis, we examined the relationships between several individual 
demographic variables that are often influential in sociological research (race, gender and 
age) and our dependent variable (see Table 2.1).  Race and gender were found to have no 
significant impact on the reporting of employee misbehaviour.  Age was expected to 
show a negative correlation with misbehaviour and we found evidence of a weak 
relationship in the expected direction.  This relationship may be explained by older 
employees having more to lose from discovery of their misbehaviour or being more 
content with/accustomed to their position and so less motivated towards misbehaviour.  
This age effect was relatively minor, however, with only a 18% difference between the 
youngest and oldest groups in the number of respondents reporting misbehaviour as 
common in their workplace.  All three of these demographic variables were left out of 
any further analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
 
 
Table 2.1 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Demographic Variables 
Demographic N Percentage % who report employee 
misbehaviour as common or 
extremely common 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
Race     
  White 1370 38.6   
  Non-White 318 37.7   
  Total 1688 38.5 -0.15 .756 
Gender     
  Male 867 39.3   
  Female 839 37.6   
  Total 1706 38.5 -0.008 .838 
Age     
  18-24 250 44.0   
  25-34 409 37.7   
  35-44 367 41.4   
  45-54 376 37.0   
  55-64 262 35.0   
  65+ 49 26.5   
  Total 1713 38.5 -0.065* .015 
 
2.4.2.6 Organizational Control Variables 
Our control variables were selected to avoid spuriousness related to important 
organizational characteristics which we might expect to be related to the amount of 
organizational misbehaviour taking place within a workplace.   
The first of these control variables is the size of the work organization, represented by the 
categories of an 8-point scale from “1 to 2 employees” to “1000 or more employees”.  
The second organizational control variable is the general industry associated with the 
work organization: (1) Goods-producing, (2) Mixed (transport, storage or 
communication) or (3) Service-providing.  The final organizational measure accounts for 
the sector that best characterizes the work organization (private, public or non-profit). 
 
63 
 
 
 
2.4.2.7 A Note on Multicollinearity 
To check for potential issues with multicollinearity, we constructed a correlation matrix 
(see Appendix 4).  There are a number of weak or very weak correlations between 
independent variables that are not particularly surprising (ex. personal class identification 
and personal wealth).  Outside of these weak correlations, the stronger associations are 
primarily limited to the various categories of the included dummy variables (to be 
expected and not cause for concern).  One relationship of moderate strength that is worth 
mentioning here is between the industrial worker occupational class category and 
employment within a goods-producing organization (.42).  Again, this relationship is not 
particularly surprising, but worth noting.  Overall, our correlation matrix suggests that 
there is little reason to suspect multicollinearity of significantly impacting our results. 
We conducted a separate multicollinearity check for the supplementary analysis 
concerning managerial workers and found very similar results (see Appendix 5).  The 
industrial worker association with goods-producing organizations was not present 
(because there were no industrial workers in this analysis) and every one of the moderate 
or strong relationships were between the categories of the dummy variables and not a 
cause for concern in our supplemental analysis focusing on managers. 
   
2.5 Analytical Approach 
For the purposes of our analyses, we have divided our independent variables into several 
modules which group together like measures.  This grouping by module acts as a 
reminder of our underlying conceptual framework, facilitates the evaluation of our 
hypotheses and provides the basis for how our multivariate analysis is structured.  The 
modules are as follows: 
0: Occupational Class   
1: Social Class 
2: Autonomy 
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3: Injustice 
4: Organizational Controls 
Modules 0 through 3 represent our key explanatory variables, with occupational class 
(module 0) present within most of the following analyses to enable the sustained 
comparison of employees across occupational category.  Module 4 incorporates several 
organizational characteristics to be controlled for, but the role of these organizational 
variables in predicting employee misbehaviour is not otherwise emphasized in our study. 
Our analysis is composed of two major sections.  The first section is made up of the 
bivariate analyses between each independent variable and the employee misbehaviour 
measure.  Throughout this section, occupational class is controlled for and measures of 
association and tests of significance are generated for each category of employee 
alongside the undifferentiated figures for all non-managerial employees. 
The second section is composed of multivariate results from four ordinary least squares 
regression models.  The first of these models contains only the independent variables 
corresponding to modules 0 and 1 – occupational class and social class.  The second 
model retains modules 0 and 1 and adds in our autonomy variables (module 2).  The third 
model retains all the previous modules and incorporates injustice measures (module 3).  
The fourth and final model also includes organizational control variables (module 4).    
For the purposes of the multivariate analysis, we made the decision to treat our ordinal 
misbehaviour variable as continuous, enabling us to conduct OLS regression.  There are 
several reasons behind this decision.  First, we are more interested in measuring increases 
and decreases in misbehaviour related to changes in our independent variables than 
documenting the changes in likelihood of a respondent landing in a particular category on 
our dependent variable.  Second, OLS regression allows us to use statistical techniques 
and methods of presentation which we believe our audience will be more familiar with 
and the advantage this lends to the communication of our results should not be 
understated.  Third, we believe it is reasonable to assume approximately equal distance 
between the categories of our employee misbehaviour variable (1 extremely uncommon, 
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2 fairly uncommon, 3 fairly common, 4 extremely uncommon) and a linear relationship 
between variables, so OLS regression will provide us with understandable results based 
on realistic approximations.  In bivariate analysis, we used gamma when possible (ordinal 
by ordinal analysis) and chi2 when the independent variable was nominal (including 
Cramer’s V when strength of association was also required).  Gamma makes no 
adjustment for table size or considers tied pairs so that it sometimes overemphasizes the 
strength of a relationship in comparison to alternative measures (ex. tau-b and tau-c).  
However, gamma and tau measures are most often very similar, and the former was 
chosen for its relative ease of interpretation and familiarity to the author.  In preliminary 
analyses, we examined gamma alongside other ordinal by ordinal measures of association 
and found no evidence of gamma overexaggerating results. 
 
2.5.1.1 Supplementary Analysis 
Following a review of the results for our non-managerial analyses (outlined just above), 
the decision was made to expand on – and further contextualize – our initial findings with 
a supplementary analytical section.   
This supplementary section repeats the format of the multivariate section for non-
managerial employees, but substitutes an analytical sample made up of only managerial 
employees.  Following from the precedent set in the literature on organizational 
misbehaviour, we excluded managerial employees from our initial analysis because of the 
significant differences in working conditions compared to non-managerial employees.  In 
most research on employee misbehaviour, the role of managers in decision-making and 
setting policy and their efforts to control the behaviour of non-managerial workers are the 
aspects of their position that are emphasized (Ackroyd, 2015; Ackroyd & Thompson, 
1999; Dundon & van den Broek, 2015; Edwards et al., 1995; Jackall, 2010; Thompson, 
2015).  However, managers are still paid workers, so – though excluded from our primary 
results because of their role in organizational oversight – our supplementary analytical 
section examines how managerial employees experience organizational misbehaviour. 
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2.6 Results 
2.6.1 Bivariate Analysis 
2.6.1.1 Module 0: Occupational Class 
The first step of our analysis was to compare perceptions of employee misbehaviour by 
occupational class.  Here we found evidence of a significant relationship between 
variables (Table 2.2).  Only about 31% of professional employees reported employee 
misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common, compared with 42% of service workers and 
45% of industrial workers.   
Table 2.2 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Employee Occupational 
Class 
Occupational 
Class 
N % who report misbehaviour as 
fairly or extremely common 
Chi-Square Significance 
Professional 589 30.7   
Service 653 41.5   
Industrial 470 44.5   
Total 1712 38.5 Chi2 =30.79 .00 
 
2.6.1.2 Module 1: Social Class 
Table 2.3 displays the results of our analysis of wealth by employee misbehaviour.  Here, 
we found evidence of a weak negative relationship, with respondents of a lower wealth 
level reporting more employee misbehaviour (γ= -.06).  Interestingly, this relationship 
appears to be strongest for service workers (γ= -.10) though the association remains 
relatively weak overall. 
Turning to our subjective measure of class identity, we found more evidence supporting 
the existence of a negative relationship between social class and employee misbehaviour.  
In Table 2.4, we can see that half of the poor respondents and 41% of the working class 
reported misbehaviour as being common in their workplace.  The percentage of middle 
and upper middleclass respondents reporting misbehaviour is considerably lower and 
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only 29% of those employees who identify as rich report common misbehaviour.  While 
this relationship between perceived class and employee misbehaviour is significant, it is 
relatively weak (γ= -.14) irrespective of occupational class. 
Table 2.3 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Employee Social Class 
Level of Wealth ($) N % who report employee 
misbehaviour as fairly or 
extremely common 
Occupational 
Class 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
  Less than 5,000 237 46.4    
  5,000 to 20,000 178 38.6    
  20,001 to 40,000 111 31.5    
  40,001 to 75,000 102 40.2    
  75,001 to 100,000 69 44.9    
  100,001 to 150,000 94 38.3    
  150,001 to 250,000 115 32.2    
  250,001 to 500,000 202 35.1 Professional -.03 .60 
  500,001 to 1 million 131 42.0 Service -.10 .04 
  Above 1 million 55 30.9 Industrial -.01 .79 
  Total 1292 38.8 All Employees -.06 .03 
 
Table 2.4 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Employee Personal Class 
Identification 
Personal 
Class 
Identification 
N % who report 
misbehaviour as 
fairly or extremely 
common 
Classification 
of Employee 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
Poor 145 49.7    
Working 68 41.2    
Middle 781 34.6 Professional -.11 .24 
Upper middle 48 37.5 Service -.14 .11 
Rich 28 28.6 Industrial -.10 .25 
Total 1070 37.0 All 
Employees 
-.14 .00 
 
2.6.1.3 Module 2: Autonomy 
Looking at the results for our autonomy measures, we found a relationship between lower 
levels of autonomy and higher reporting of employee misbehaviour in the workplace.  
This inverse relationship is evident for both of our autonomy measures (Table 2.5 and 
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Table 2.6) and the general trend holds for all non-managerial employees with some 
notable differences in magnitude by occupational class.   
The relationship between having less local autonomy – the ability to plan/design your 
own work – and perceiving greater employee misbehaviour was significantly stronger for 
professional employees and slightly weaker for service employees.  On the other hand, 
the connection between wanting to have more say in organizational decision-making and 
reporting more misbehaviour was considerably weaker for professional employees (γ= 
.15), compared to service (γ= .24) and industrial employees (γ= .26).   
Table 2.5 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by How Often Plan or Design 
Own Work 
How often is it possible 
for you to plan or 
design your own work? 
N % who report employee 
misbehaviour as fairly 
or extremely common 
Classification 
of Employee 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
Never 249 45.8    
Some of the time 321 41.1    
About half the time 257 40.9 Professional -.12 .02 
Most of the time 517 33.1 Service -.10 .03 
All the time 332 37.0 Industrial -.06 .24 
Total 1676 38.5 All Employees -.11 .00 
 
Table 2.6 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Want More Say in 
Organizational Decisions 
Would you like to have more 
say than you do now in 
decisions in your workplace? 
N % who report employee 
misbehaviour as fairly 
or extremely common 
Classification of 
Employee 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
   Professional .15 .02 
No 882 32.9 Service .24 .00 
Yes 726 44.5 Industrial .26 .00 
Total 1608 38.1 All Employees .21 .00 
 
2.6.1.4 Module 3: Injustice 
The first of our bivariate analyses utilizing measures of injustice focused on how 
respondents’ evaluations of the fairness of their compensation relates to the amount of 
employee misbehaviour occurring in the workplace (see Table 2.7).  Here, we found 
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evidence of a negative relationship, with undercompensated workers reporting 
significantly more employee misbehaviour.  Those who reported fair compensation (a 
match between remuneration and value produced) reported the lowest amount of 
employee misbehaviour.  This trend held for all employees, but it appears that the 
relationship between compensation and misbehaviour is even stronger for industrial 
employees – and notably weaker for professional employees.  Interestingly, the 
frequencies from Table 2.7 suggest that perceptions of misbehaviour might increase again 
when compensation is considered more than fair, but only a minority of respondents are 
fortunate enough to be paid so well and their contradictory results are not influential 
enough to reverse the general trend already outlined.  However, this reversal in trend in 
later categories does make us question whether the relationship between subjective 
compensation and misbehaviour should instead be understood as curvilinear.  
Table 2.7 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Fairness of Compensation 
Compared to the value 
produced, respondent 
compensation is: 
N % who report employee 
misbehaviour as fairly 
or extremely common 
Classification 
of Employee 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
      
Much less than deserved 309 51.5    
Somewhat less 561 40.8    
About right 701 30.2 Professional -.14 .01 
Somewhat more 70 38.6 Service -.17 .00 
Much more than deserved 35 57.1 Industrial -.27 .00 
Total 1676 38.6 All Employees -.18 .00 
 
Table 2.8 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Experienced 
Discrimination at Work 
In the last year, at work, have 
you been discriminated 
against, in any way by anyone 
you've had contact with? 
N % who report 
employee 
misbehaviour as fairly 
or extremely common 
Classification 
of Employee 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
   Professional .41 .00 
No 1394 34.6 Service .44 .00 
Yes 282 58.4 Industrial .29 .00 
Total 1676 38.2 All Employees .39 .00 
The next step in our injustice analyses revealed a significant and moderately strong 
positive relationship between the experience of discrimination at work and reports of 
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employee misbehaviour (γ= .39; Table 2.8).  This relationship is even stronger for 
professional and service employees, in comparison to industrial workers, for whom 
discrimination and employee misbehaviour are less closely related.   
In Table 2.9 the results of the next bivariate analysis respecting job safety are displayed.  
Unsurprisingly, we found evidence of an inverse relationship between safety at work and 
reported employee misbehaviour (γ= -.26).  Only 28.9% of the employees whose job 
posed no risk to their health or safety reported employee misbehaviour as common in 
their workplace, compared with 48.4% of those whose job posed a great risk to health or 
safety.  Once again, this trend was consistent in direction across all classes of employee, 
but notably weaker for industrial workers (γ= -.11). 
Table 2.9 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Job Safety 
To what extent is your 
health and safety at risk 
because of your job? 
N % who report employee 
misbehaviour as fairly 
or extremely common 
Classification 
of Employee 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
Great deal 182 48.4    
Moderate amount 393 46.1 Professional -.30 .00 
A little 471 41.8 Service -.30 .00 
Not at all 653 28.9 Industrial -.11 .05 
Total 1699 38.6 All Employees -.26 .00 
 
Table 2.10 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Job Security 
How likely is it that 
you will lose your 
job in the next 
year? 
N % who report 
employee 
misbehaviour as fairly 
or extremely common 
Classification 
of Employee 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
Very likely 83 51.8    
Somewhat likely 177 51.4 Professional -.11 .08 
Somewhat unlikely 378 34.9 Service -.06 .29 
Very unlikely 933 35.8 Industrial -.16 .01 
Total 1571 38.2 All Employees -.12 .00 
Table 2.10 presents the relationship between job security and perceptions of employee 
misbehaviour.  Those respondents perceiving a greater likelihood of immanent job loss 
reported more employee misbehaviour in their workplace.  This relationship is significant 
for all non-managerial employees but is notably stronger for industrial workers. 
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2.6.1.5 Module 4: Organizational Measures 
The final section of our bivariate analyses was concerned with observing the changes in 
the amount of employee misbehaviour according to relevant organizational 
characteristics.  In Table 2.11, there is an obvious progression in the amount of 
misbehaviour reported according to the size of the organization (γ= .12) and, for service 
and industrial workers, this connection between larger organizational size and higher 
misbehaviour appears to be even stronger. 
Table 2.11 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Size of Work 
Organization 
Number of 
Employees in the 
Work Organization 
N % who report employee 
misbehaviour as fairly 
or extremely common 
Classification 
of Employee 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
1 to 2 48 27.1    
3 to 10 203 35.0    
11 to 49 238 30.3    
50 to 99 123 39.0    
100 to 249 156 39.7    
250 to 499 112 46.4 Professional .07 .20 
500 to 999 120 42.5 Service .20 .00 
1,000 or more 584 40.8 Industrial .15 .00 
Total 1584 38.3 All Employees .12 .00 
Looking to our second organizational variable, we found some limited – though 
significant – evidence of a relationship between the general industry of the organization 
and perceptions of the amount of misbehaviour taking place within it (Table 2.12).  
Service organizations appear to host slightly less employee misbehaviour than goods-
producing or mixed organizations, but this gap only amounts to a difference of about 5% 
between industry categories.  
The final organizational variable of interest to us was the sector of the work organization 
(Table 2.13).  Here, we did not find any evidence that perceptions of the amount of 
employee misbehaviour vary according to the sector of the organization (private, public 
or a non-profit). 
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Table 2.12 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Organizational Industry 
General Industry of 
Work Organization 
N % who report employee 
misbehaviour as fairly 
or extremely common 
Classification 
of Employee 
Cramer’s 
V 
Significance 
Goods-producing 264 42.4 Professional .07 .49 
Mixed (transport, 
storage, communication) 
194 42.3 Service .08 .31 
Service 1230 37.3 Industrial .06 .77 
Total 1688 38.7 All Employees .06 .04 
Note: Cramer’s V utilized in place of gamma because industry was treated as nominal. 
 
Table 2.13 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Organizational Sector 
Sector of Work 
Organization 
N % who report employee misbehaviour 
as fairly or extremely common 
Classification 
of Employee 
Cramer’s 
V 
Significance 
Private 1046 39.8 Professional .07 .45 
Public 545 35.6 Service .06 .56 
Non-Profit 111 42.3 Industrial .10 .18 
Total 1702 38.6 All Employees .05 .33 
Note: Cramer’s V utilized in place of gamma because sector was treated as nominal. 
 
2.6.2 Multivariate Analysis 
The results of all four of our multivariate models are displayed in Table 2.14.  Model 1 
included only occupational class and our two social class measures as independent 
variables.  The results from this model indicate that industrial workers – and service 
workers to a lesser extent – report more frequent employee misbehaviour than 
professional workers.  Model 1 also identifies a negative relationship between wealth and 
our dependent variable:  Those with more wealth were more likely to report lower levels 
of employee misbehaviour.  In contrast, we found no evidence of a significant 
relationship for personal class identification, suggesting that there is no unique 
association between it and the dependent variable not already explained by reference to 
occupational class or wealth. 
Model 2 incorporated all the variables present in Model 1 and introduced our two 
autonomy measures.  With these additions, we see that the higher reports of employee 
misbehaviour by industrial workers remains significant – and of comparable strength to 
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the results of Model 1 – while the difference between the amount of misbehaviour 
reported by service and professional workers loses significance.  Model 2 also reports a 
loss of significance for wealth – leaving both of our social class measures without 
evidence of association with the dependent variable.  On the other hand, there is evidence 
of significant association between both of the newly added autonomy measures and our 
dependent variable:  Respondents with less ability to plan/design their own work and 
those who indicated that they want more influence in organizational decision-making 
reported employee misbehaviour as a more common occurrence than employees with 
greater autonomy.   
Model 3 retains all previously included variables and introduces our four injustice 
measures.  Of these measures, we found two to be positively correlated with perceptions 
of employee misbehaviour – employees experiencing workplace discrimination or 
working in an unsafe or unhealthy workplace tended to report higher levels of 
misbehaviour.  Workplace discrimination seems particularly influential here (β= .16).  
Additionally, this third multivariate analysis saw our autonomy measures lose statistical 
significance.  Meanwhile, service employees were again found to report significantly 
more employee misbehaviour than professionals with a notably larger difference between 
the two classes than that seen in the second model – bringing the amount of misbehaviour 
reported by service workers closer to the figures for industrial workers. 
In our fourth and final multivariate model, we included several organizational measures 
alongside all variables from model 3.  Here, we found evidence of a positive relationship 
between the number of individuals in a work organization and the frequency of 
misbehaviour taking place.  There were also indications of significantly more 
misbehaviour within goods-producing organizations, compared to service organizations.  
Meanwhile, employees of mixed industry work organizations (i.e. communication, 
storage, transport) reported significantly less misbehaviour than the employees of both 
goods-producing and service organizations.   
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Table 2.14 Multivariate Models of Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour 
(Non-Managerial Workers) 
  Regression Coefficient (Standard Error) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Module 0: 
Occupational 
Class 
Employee Class     
  Professional (ref.) -- -- -- -- 
  Service .08* (.075) .072 (.077) .105* (.079) .136** (.082) 
  Industrial .134*** 
(.078) 
.128*** 
(.081) 
0.119** (.086) .129** (.100) 
Module 1: 
Social Class 
Total Net Wealth -.078* (.011) -.069 (.011) -.046 (.012) -.058 (.012) 
Personal Class 
Identification 
-.06 (.038) -.053 (.039) -.040 (.041) -.067 (.041) 
Module 2: 
Autonomy 
Allowance to plan or 
design own work 
 -.075* (.024) -.057 (.025) -.052 (.025) 
Want more say in 
organizational decisions 
 .07* (.064) -.001 (.068) -.017 (.069) 
Module 3: 
Injustice 
Appropriateness of 
compensation compared 
to value produced 
  .000 (.038) -.008 (.039) 
Experienced 
discrimination at work 
  .16*** (.089) .134*** (.090) 
Safety at work   -.147*** 
(.017) 
-.132*** 
(.017) 
Job security   .046 (.039) .026 (.040) 
Module 4: 
Organizational 
Measures 
Number of employees    .204*** (.015) 
Industry     
  Goods-producing    .085* (.105) 
  Mixed industry    -.076* (.114) 
  Service (ref.)    -- 
Sector     
  Private (ref.)    -- 
  Public    -.055 (.080) 
  Non-profit    .022 (.135) 
N  846 801 736 705 
R2  .031 .042 .089 .123 
Adjusted R2  .026 .034 .076 .104 
Notes. *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001.  
Regression coefficients represent standardized slopes (standard error in brackets).  
No notable relationship was discovered between organizational sector and employee 
misbehaviour.  And, once again, no evidence of significance was found for any of the 
social class or autonomy measures.  However, the relationships between two of the 
injustice measures – discrimination in the workplace and threats to health and safety – 
and the dependent variable remained significant and of comparable strength to previous 
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models.  Finally, occupational class also remained a significant indicator of reported 
organizational misbehaviour with both service and industrial workers reporting 
considerably more misbehaviour than professional employees.    
 
2.6.3 Supplementary Analysis for Managerial Employees 
Table 2.15 contains the results of the supplementary multivariate analysis for managerial 
employees.  The variables and order of inclusion in these models largely match those of 
the multivariate analysis for non-managerial employees, with the only real difference 
limited to the change in categories of occupational class resulting from the change in 
sample. 
Model 1 included only occupational class and social class measures as explanatory 
factors.  The results linked to occupational class follow the general trend established by 
the non-managerial employees of lower occupational class corresponding to more 
employee misbehaviour – supervisors reported significantly more misbehaviour (β= .245) 
than higher level managers.   
As before with the non-managerial employees, Model 2 of this supplementary analysis 
incorporates our two autonomy measures alongside the variables from Model 1.  Here, 
we found evidence of a relationship between wanting more influence in organizational 
decision-making and reporting higher amounts of employee misbehaviour (β= .118).  
Occupational class remained relevant with supervisors reporting considerably more 
misbehaviour (β= .279) than higher-level managers.    
Model 3 incorporates our four injustice variables alongside those of Model 2.  Once 
again, supervisors reported significantly more misbehaviour (β= .285).  However, we 
found that the relationship from Model 2, concerning the connection between the desire 
for more influence in organizational decision-making and reporting higher amounts of 
misbehaviour, lost significance in this new model.  On the other hand, appropriateness of 
compensation (amount received vs. value of work) emerged as a significant factor, with 
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managers reporting less misbehaviour as the appropriateness of their compensation 
increased (β= -.164). 
Table 2.15 Multivariate Models of Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour 
(Managerial Workers) 
  Regression Coefficient (Standard Error) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Module 0: 
Occupational 
Class 
Managerial Class     
  Upper manager (ref.) -- -- --  
  Middle manager .118 (.185) .164 (.188) .183 (.190) .182 (.192) 
  Supervisor .245** 
(.211) 
.279** 
(.215) 
.285** 
(.220) 
.267** 
(.226) 
Module 1: 
Social Class 
Total Net Wealth - .052 
(.020) 
- .061 
(.020) 
- 0.75 
(.021) 
-.080 (.021) 
Personal Class Identification - .026 
(.069) 
- .004 
(.071) 
.054 (.073) .058 (.075) 
Module 2: 
Autonomy 
Allowance to plan or design own 
work 
 - .020 
(.048) 
- .005 
(.048) 
-.009 (.050) 
Want more say in organizational 
decisions 
 .118* 
(.110) 
.057 (.121) .065 (.123) 
Module 3: 
Injustice 
Appropriateness of compensation 
compared to value produced 
  - .164* 
(.073) 
-.172** 
(.074) 
Experienced discrimination at 
work 
  .066 (.159) .075 (.160) 
Safety at work   - .083 
(.032) 
-.081 (.033) 
Job security   - .049 
(.074) 
-.033 (.076) 
Module 4: 
Organizational 
Measures 
Number of employees    -.007 (.028) 
Industry     
Goods-producing    .036 (.155) 
Mixed industry    .076 (.229) 
Service (ref.)    -- 
Sector     
Private (ref.)    -- 
Public    -.051 (.142) 
Non-profit    -.057 (.204) 
N  291 280 261 257 
R2  .038 .065 .121 .139 
Adjusted R2  .025 .044 .086 .086 
Notes. *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001.  
Regression coefficients represent standardized slopes (standard error in brackets).  
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Finally, the addition of our organizational control variables in Model 4 revealed no 
notable difference from the Model 3 results – supervisors and undercompensated 
managers continued to report significantly more misbehaviour than those who received 
better compensation or who occupied a higher position in the managerial hierarchy. 
 
2.7 Discussion 
Throughout all our analyses, respondent occupational class emerged as a variable 
wielding considerable influence over the perceived amount of employee misbehaviour 
reported.  From a perspective on employee misbehaviour that understands the 
phenomenon as a reaction by workers to the negative working conditions that confront 
them at work, we would expect those occupying lower occupational classes to endure the 
most degraded working conditions, experience the greatest alienation and to most often 
find their own interests in conflict with organizational imperatives (Edwards & Scullion, 
1982; Marx, 1844, 1867).  It would follow that workers of lower occupational classes 
will be most motivated towards misbehaviour and our results appear to reinforce previous 
work that has emphasized the potential for employee misbehaviour to act as a form of 
worker resistance (Analoui, 1995; Hodson, 1995, 2001; Karlsson, 2012; Lawrence & 
Robinson, 2007; Mulholland, 2004).  It is not clear to us whether employee misbehaviour 
should be understood as resistance, but it seems obvious that there is a positive 
correlation between the perceived frequency of misbehaviour and the experience of 
degraded work.  
In addition to the above general finding, we found that professional workers reported 
significantly less employee misbehaviour than both industrial and service workers.  There 
are several potential explanations for the lower rates in perceived misbehaviour by 
professional employees.  One explanation is that misbehaviour is no less frequent among 
professionals, but that professionals are less inclined to report the misbehaviour of their 
peers.  The literature suggests that many professionals are often hesitant to report even 
the most serious misconduct by their professional peers (Coburn, 1999; Collier, 2012; 
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DesRoches et al., 2010; Fesler, 2015), so it is reasonable to assume that less serious 
misbehaviour by others of their profession would frequently pass beneath notice.  
A second explanation for the lower reporting of misbehaviour by professionals could be 
differences between their definitions of organizational misbehaviour compared to the 
definitions of non-professionals.  Our misbehaviour survey item provides employee theft 
and loafing as examples of misbehaviour and it could be that these examples are less 
applicable to professional work.  A review of the professional literature reveals much 
emphasis by professional organizations on preventing unethical behaviour that violates 
the public trust in the profession (Bakre, 2007; Golden & Schmidt, 1998), and so it is 
possible that professionals interpreted our misbehaviour measure differently than non-
professionals.  
A third explanation for a lower perceived frequency of misbehaviour among 
professionals could be related to the behavioural regulation provided by a strong 
conception of occupational identity.  Previous work has outlined the importance of 
jurisdictional claims in the process of professional recognition (Abbott, 1988; Adams, 
2010) and the conception of a distinct professional identity is central to this process 
(Cruess, 2014; Procter, 2017).  Correspondingly, individuals seeking to break into 
professional work must do more than simply acquire the requisite technical skills and 
knowledge – they must construct a new personal identity in line with the values, beliefs 
and relations characteristic of the profession (Williams, 2013; Webb, 2017).  We suggest 
that the personal regulation required for a professional identity may inhibit employee 
misbehaviour because of the dissonance brought on by engaging in misbehaviour while 
also trying to maintain one’s conception of self as upholding the ideals of the profession. 
Perhaps the best way to understand the lower reported frequency of misbehaviour by 
professionals is with reference to the unique privileges enjoyed by these employees over 
non-professionals.  Professional workers generally enjoy more autonomy and authority in 
their work, greater protection through work-related rights and privileges and a higher 
social status than non-professionals (Abbott, 1988; Adams, 2010; Leicht & Fennell, 
2001; Wilensky, 1964).  Though the extent of these advantages will understandably vary, 
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it is evident that most professional employees enjoy some unique benefits over their non-
professional counterparts and partial protection from the conditions of degraded work 
that often motivate employees towards misbehaviour.  
In parallel with previous research, we found evidence of a relationship between 
workplace injustice and greater employee misbehaviour (Ferris et al., 2012; Giacalone & 
Rosenfield, 1987; Hollinger & Clark, 1983; Karlsson, 2012).  However, not every 
injustice measure was a significant predictor of the perceived frequency of misbehaviour 
in our multivariate model:  For non-managerial employees, we found no evidence of 
association for the injustice measures related to compensation or job security, so it was 
only injustice related to discrimination or unsafe working conditions that predicted a 
higher reporting of misbehaviour.  It is not entirely clear why these two measures of 
injustice are particularly influential, but there are some clues in the literature, as it has 
already been established that the type and source of injustice experienced by the worker 
is associated with the type and target of retaliatory misbehaviour (Ambrose et al., 2002; 
Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Skarlicki et al., 2008).  It could be that the injustice of 
working in unsafe conditions is particularly motivating towards misbehaviour because of 
its stark demonstration of a lack of regard by employers/managers for the safety and 
wellbeing of the worker.  In these circumstances – with a clear source of injustice and an 
obvious division between the interests of workers and owners/managers – it is easier to 
understand why we find evidence of greater employee misbehaviour than when the 
source of injustice is less obvious and the type of injustice less offensive.  Following this 
line of argument, the lesser effect of injustice related to compensation and job insecurity 
on the perceived frequency of employee misbehaviour might be explained by difficulties 
in locating the source of the injustice or assigning culpability – for example, inadequate 
reimbursement might be perceived as an organizational necessity dictated by market 
forces/competition, rather than as a concerted effort by owners to expand their profits at 
the expense of workers’ wages.      
We were interested to find that, among the managerial employees, misbehaviour was 
reported as significantly more frequent by those in lower managerial positions 
(supervisors).  The explanation of these results is not entirely clear, but we suggest the 
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systematic perception of greater misbehaviour by those in lower-management is likely 
connected to the expectations of their position within the work organization.  The job of 
supervisor or foreperson will usually entail some element of responsibility for the routine 
discipline of workers and the detection of – and intervention against – employee 
misbehaviour, and it makes sense that those who are paid to be on the lookout for 
misbehaving employees will more often find them.  In contrast to supervisors, middle and 
upper managers have a certain distance from the day-to-day activities of employees, so 
routine and minor misbehaviour might often go beneath their notice.   
Considering their strength of influence in our main analysis, it was surprising to find that 
working in an unsafe job or being discriminated against in the workplace were not also 
associated with higher amounts of reported misbehaviour by managerial employees.  
Instead, only the inappropriate pay injustice measure was significantly associated with a 
higher reporting of misbehaviour by managers.  These results may reflect class 
differences in the interests and priorities of managerial versus non-managerial employees 
– it is for this very reason that we conducted a supplementary analysis for these 
managerial employees and did not include them in our primary analysis of non-
managerial workers.   
The role expected of managerial employees in the work organization is to act as the 
employer’s agent and to represent the employer’s interests.  It is reasonable that a well-
compensated manager will be less motivated towards misbehaviour – as their interests are 
best served by maintenance of the status quo and the smooth-running of the organization. 
Correspondingly, managers will usually be those most motivated towards the curtailing 
of organizational misbehaviour – and it is for this reason that they have often been 
overlooked as subjects capable of their own misbehaviour in past research (Ackroyd & 
Thompson, 1999; Analoui, 1995; DiBattista, 1996; Fleming, 2002; Giesberg, 2001).  The 
results of our study could suggest that managers might also be inclined towards 
misbehaviour when the privileges of their position are not sufficient to insure their 
loyalty to employer interests – i.e. when compensation is too low – but we cannot be sure 
how much of the employee misbehaviour reported by managers is carried out by the 
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manager themselves: it is possible that managers who feel undercompensated are simply 
reporting more frequent non-managerial employee misbehaviour. 
Initially, we were surprised to find only limited multivariate evidence for the relationship 
between a lack of autonomy and increased misbehaviour, considering this relationship 
has been emphasized by numerous previous studies (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; 
Analoui, 1995; DiBattista, 1996; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; 
Paulson, 2014).  However, this finding may be explained by our inclusion of occupational 
class as an explanatory variable – a measure left out of most other research on 
organizational misbehaviour.  In an additional multivariate model not reproduced here, 
we found that the removal of class measures – occupational class and social class – saw 
every injustice and autonomy measure emerge as significant predictors of the perceived 
frequency of employee misbehaviour.     
Therefore, we suggest that fairness of compensation, job security and greater autonomy 
correspond with a lower amount of perceived employee misbehaviour, but that these 
variables are so closely related with class that they have little unique influence on the 
dependent variable once class is already controlled for. 
Finally, though organizational characteristics were not a focal point of our study, we did 
find evidence to suggest greater misbehaviour within larger work organizations.  This 
relationship was significant in the multivariate analysis for non-managerial workers (β= 
.204).   This relationship between organizational size and the perceived frequency of 
employee misbehaviour may be the result of the additional cover granted by the relative 
anonymity in the large organization (Ashforth, 1994; Roscigno et al., 2009).  
Alternatively, the intensification of alienation and heavy rationalization characteristic of 
many large organizations might act as additional motivation towards employee 
misbehaviour (Braverman, 1974; Hodson, 2001; Matheson, 2007; Rinehart, 2006; 
Roscigno et al., 2009; Sanders, 1997). 
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2.8 Conclusion 
In accordance with previous research on organizational misbehaviour, we found lack of 
autonomy and workplace injustice to be important predictors of the perceived frequency 
of employee misbehaviour.  However, by incorporating and controlling for occupational 
class – a variable not present in much of the previous work – we found the unique 
explanatory power of these factors to be considerably weaker.  Our results revealed a 
trend towards greater employee misbehaviour at lower class positions with industrial and 
service workers perceiving it as more frequent than professionals.   
Professional work seemed to correlate with lower perceptions of misbehaviour, and these 
employees reported it as much less frequent than industrial and service workers.  Taken 
together, these results make a case for the inclusion of occupational class as a general 
measure of the degraded working conditions that motivate employees towards 
organizational misbehaviour – and a measure that largely incorporates the roles of 
autonomy and injustice emphasized by previous work.   
Furthermore, even after occupational class is controlled for, certain injustice measures – 
discrimination at work or unsafe working conditions – remain significantly associated 
with the amount of employee misbehaviour reported.  Exploring the unique character of 
each different type of workplace injustice in relation to its impact on rates of 
organizational misbehaviour may provide one interesting direction for future research. 
In our supplementary analysis of managers, we found a considerable divergence from the 
factors of significance which predicted employee misbehaviour for non-managerial 
employees.  Appropriateness of compensation and managerial class emerged as factors of 
central influence and we found that managers who are lower in the hierarchy or who feel 
underpaid reported perceptions of employee misbehaviour as more frequent.  On the 
other hand, middle and upper managers – and well compensated ones – can be expected 
to be among those most opposed to employee misbehaviour.  It may be worth exploring 
managers’ ambiguous relationship with misbehaviour further in future work and 
exploring how differences in their working conditions – compared to non-managerial 
employees – may uncover unique predictors of organizational misbehaviour. 
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Finally, while our conclusions are based upon a number of significant relationships, the 
overall explanatory power of our models remains limited (Non-managerial analysis: 
Adjusted R2=.10; Managerial analysis: Adjusted R2=.09).  These figures tell us that there 
is still considerable unexplained variation in our dependent variable.  While this does not 
invalidate our findings, it does suggest that there is still room to expand our 
understanding of the phenomenon of organizational misbehaviour. 
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Chapter 3 
3 Exploring the Neglected Phenomenon of Employer 
Misbehaviour 
3.1 Introduction 
A more general definition of organizational misbehaviour as ‘anything at work that you 
are not supposed to do’ (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Sprouse, 1992) has been available 
since the 90s but, nearly three decades later, there has been very little effort to examine 
misbehaviour engaged in by anyone other than the non-managerial employee.  This 
overemphasis on the misbehaviour of low-level employees has contributed to a lack of 
systematic study into the misbehaviour of employers – a gap in the literature the 
following study is positioned to begin to address. 
Extending the general definition of organizational misbehaviour advanced by Sprouse 
(1992) and Ackroyd and Thompson (1999), we define employer misbehaviour as 
anything to do with work that employers are not supposed to do.  With this general 
definition, there are obviously a wide array of activities that can be understood as 
employer misbehaviour, but some easily recognized examples are denying employees 
earned benefits or pay, expecting unpaid overtime by workers, fraud and tax evasion.   
In the present study, we do not focus on any specific type of employer organizational 
misbehaviour but make use of an undifferentiated measure to expand our general 
understanding of the structural conditions that motivate or constrain employer 
misbehaviour.  Additionally, our sample of employers contains only a small number of 
corporate capitalist executives.  This group is too small to appear in most national 
samples, but their misbehaviour can often be the most consequential, with the greatest 
reach and capability to adversely affect the lives of thousands of employees, customers 
and other stakeholders.  Our findings suggest significant asymmetry between the 
phenomena of employee and employer misbehaviour, as economic pressure to increase 
profit and worker vulnerability to exploitation emerge as key predictors of the perceived 
frequency of employer misbehaviour. 
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3.2 Background 
The phenomenon of employer misbehaviour differs from that of employees in a variety 
of ways.  One distinction between employee and employer misbehaviour is that the 
former is assumed to be far more common than the latter.  The near-complete absence of 
any inquiry into employer misbehaviour is understandable in the context of its presumed 
rarity compared to the misbehaviour of employees, and there are numerous explanations 
for why this assumption might be well-founded.  One obvious reason to suspect that 
employer misbehaviour might be less common is because there are fewer employers than 
employees and, therefore, fewer potentially-misbehaving employers than potentially-
misbehaving employees.  However, there are additional explanations outside of the 
simple employee-employer ratio to expect employer misbehaviour to be less frequent 
than that of employees.  
In the previous chapter, we found that employee misbehaviour generally increased when 
workers were exposed to more degraded working conditions.  The general thrust of the 
organizational misbehaviour literature echoes this finding, emphasizing how 
dissatisfaction with work, lack of autonomy or feelings of injustice motivate workers 
towards greater misbehaviour (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Ambrose et al., 2002; 
Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Paulson, 2014; Skarlicki et al., 1999; Skalicki et al., 2008).  
Because the structure of capitalist production tends to produce these outcomes of 
degraded work (Marx, 1844, 1867) – and capitalist organizations most often do not 
adequately represent the best interests of their workers – we can expect employee 
misbehaviour to remain frequent – manifesting routinely in reaction to the degraded 
working conditions typical of capitalist production (Edwards & Scullion, 1982; Hodson, 
1995, 2001; Karlsson, 2012; Thompson, 2015).  On the other hand, employers would not 
be expected to share this routine motivation towards misbehaviour, because their best 
interests are generally already well-represented within the structure and standard 
operating procedures of a privately-owned work organization.  The typical capitalist 
organization is designed to produce the best return on investment for the owner – who 
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also has the freedom to withdraw her capital where this fails to be the case – so status-
quo economic production generally complements employers’ interests and would not be 
expected to foster employer misbehaviour to the same extent that it does for employees.   
Hypothesis #1: Employee misbehaviour will be reported as more common than 
employer misbehaviour.  
In addition to the above reasons to expect employer misbehaviour to be less prevalent 
than employee misbehaviour, it is also true that the dominance of capitalist hegemony 
will contribute to a general underestimation of the phenomenon by promoting the 
perception of employers as individuals largely incapable of misbehaviour.   
If misbehaviour is defined as activity that you are not supposed to do – and the structure 
of the capitalist work organization is designed to best serve the interest of the employer – 
then the activities of the employer – far from being perceived as misbehaviour – are 
much more likely to be presented as a model for ‘proper’ behaviour within the work 
organization, against which others’ actions can then be defined as misbehaviour (Contu, 
2008; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Hartt et al, 2015).  While much of the routine behaviour 
of the employer could rightly be defined as misbehaviour under another production 
system, the guiding principles of capitalist ideology lend legitimacy to actions by the 
owners of capital (Braverman, 1974; Burawoy, 1979; Marx & Engels, 1846), so that they 
are only really seen to misbehave when their actions infringe on the interests of other 
capitalists in ways that are generally accepted as illegitimate and illegal or when their 
misdeeds are exposed by regulators, whistleblowers, and muckraking journalists.  An 
expansion of the range of activities studied as examples of employer misbehaviour 
requires the challenging of the popular assumptions of misbehaviour as an activity 
engaged in only by employees.  Unfortunately, awareness of employers’ capacity to 
misbehave remains seriously limited in the main body of the organizational misbehaviour 
literature, where searches utilizing the keywords “employer” and “misbehaviour” will 
lead one towards work that questions only the extent to which employers should be liable 
for the misbehaviour of their employees (for examples, Bonner, 2017; Mustafa, 2016; 
Qiasi & Heidari, 2017; Rideout, 2014; Warburg, 2014)  
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Fortunately, this lacuna in the academic literature is not absolute and the adjacent fields 
of white collar and corporate crime research can contribute knowledge to our 
understanding of the misbehaviour of employers.  Although researchers in these areas 
generally prioritize the study of crime over misbehaviour more generally, it should be 
obvious that crime is also a form of misbehaviour – of a sort that is particularly well-
defined or generally denounced.  And so, even within these areas, the study of employer 
misbehaviour is limited primarily to activities which are unequivocally illegal or result in 
social damages both great and conspicuous – activities such as stealing employee 
pensions, killing workers or consumers with inadequate safety provisions or rampant 
pollution of the environment. (Arrigo & Lynch, 2015; Foster & Barnetson, 2017; Punch, 
1995; Stretesky & Lynch, 1998).   
Unfortunately, even in circumstances of blatant and pronounced illegal and immoral 
activity, the misbehaviour of employers still receives significant ideological justification 
and preferential media coverage (Burns & Orrick, 2002; Commager, 1971; McMullan & 
McClung, 2006; Michel et al., 2016; Schwartz & Ellison, 1982; Wright et al., 1995).  
Adding to this ideological protection, misbehaving employers will also often benefit from 
a variety of legal protections that make it difficult to assign culpability or punishment to 
individual owners – the limited liability corporation is particularly influential here, 
leveraging legal privileges not afforded to most human individuals (Bakan, 2004; Fisse & 
Braithwaite, 1993; Gilson & Gordon, 2003; Greenfield, 2006; Lamb, 2012; Peston, 
2012).  As a result, even the most destructive and illegal forms of employer misbehaviour 
often go unpunished or unresolved, so it is likely that less extreme forms of employer 
misbehaviour may routinely go unnoticed, contributing to a further underestimation of 
incidences of employer misbehaviour.  
In the previous chapter, we saw that members of lower occupational classes reported 
more employee misbehaviour – a result of their greater familiarity with degraded working 
conditions and higher likelihood of being an employee in the first place.  We suggest that 
there might likewise be a relationship between class and the perceived frequency of 
employer misbehaviour.  We suspect individuals of a higher occupational class – who 
find their economic interests generally well-represented within the capitalist system of 
101 
 
 
 
production – will be less likely to perceive employer misbehaviour to be a common 
occurrence, reframing activities that others might properly define as misbehaviour (ex. 
cutting worker benefits) as effective – or even proper – behaviour in the advancement of 
the bottom line.  Therefore, comparing perceptions of misbehaviour by class, we would 
expect respondents of a lower occupational class, who are more likely to find their best 
interests in conflict with capitalist hegemony, to report both employee and employer 
misbehaviour as more frequent than their upper-class counterparts.  
Hypothesis 2: Respondents of lower occupational classes will report more employee 
misbehaviour than other classes. 
Hypothesis 3: Respondents of lower occupational classes will report more employer 
misbehaviour than other classes.  
So, employer misbehaviour is a social phenomenon liable to be underreported and 
downplayed, but the literature does fortunately offers us a few clues as to the factors 
which might act to constrain or encourage it. 
An important and reoccurring finding within the academic literature associated with 
white collar and corporate crime – and one that is reinforced by the investigative 
journalists behind the most famous exposés on employer misbehaviour – is the pursuit of 
profit-maximization at the expense of wider values, ethics and normative expectations.  
Though the misbehaving employer, company or corporation will almost always seek to 
deny their involvement or redirect blame – citing the incompetence of managers or 
employees is a favoured strategy.  Concerned or affected parties (journalists, researchers, 
investigators, families of workers, etc.) have most often referenced how the maximization 
of profit came to outweigh all other considerations within a particular organization, 
creating an environment where immoral and illegal activity was permissible if it would 
help the bottom line (Bakan, 2004; Biggerstaff et al., 2015; Davidson, 1970; Gilbert, 
2005; McAdams, 1977; Nader, 1965; Schwartz & Ellison, 1982). 
Though the sorts of employer misbehaviour that are most often studied are primarily 
criminal, we predict that the drive towards greater profit will remain an influential 
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predictor of employer misbehaviour even when a more general conception of employer 
misbehaviour is utilized.  In the present study, we make use of several economic 
indicators expected to influence the amount of reported employer misbehaviour 
connected to the pursuit of profit.  
Hypothesis #4: Less wealthy employers will report more frequent misbehaviour.  
Hypothesis #5: Employers who report compensation lower than they feel they 
deserve will report more misbehaviour. 
Hypothesis #6: Employers who believe it is likely that they might lose their business 
will report more misbehaviour. 
Another question of interest to us is whether certain characteristics of an employer’s 
work force might influence the reported frequency of employer misbehaviour.  More 
specifically, we are interested in measures of employee vulnerability to employer 
misbehaviour.   
The central purpose of a labour union is to advance the interests of workers by 
maintaining or raising wages, protecting benefits and working standards, and providing 
collective representation for those who would otherwise be fundamentally disadvantaged 
in individual employment negotiations (Behrens, 2014; Fernandez, 2016; Marx, 1867; 
Webb & Webb, 1898).  While it is true that not all unions are equally effective – and they 
may offer little protection to customers, the wider public or the environment – we think it 
is reasonable to expect that their presence in a workplace will act as a constraint upon 
employer misbehaviour by opposing at least those instances of misbehaviour which 
threaten workers’ safety or economic interests.   
In contrast to unionized workers who might be expected to be better protected from 
employer misbehaviour, temporary or part-time workers facing precarious working 
conditions could be more vulnerable to employer misbehaviour because they lack the 
protections generally afforded to permanent employees (Letourneux, 1998; Quinlan, 
2012; Underhill & Rimmer, 2015; Vosko, 2006).  We hypothesize that the relative 
vulnerability of an employer’s workforce will influence the frequency of employer 
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misbehaviour – with a union presence acting as a constraint on misbehaviour and 
increased employment of part-time or temporary workers motivating greater 
misbehaviour by employers. 
Hypothesis #7: The presence of a union in the workplace will be associated with less 
reported employer misbehaviour. 
Hypothesis #8: Employers who report a recent organizational change towards 
greater employment of part-time or temporary workers will report more frequent 
employer misbehaviour. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Data 
The analyses associated with this study make use of two different samples, both of which 
are drawn from the larger Changing Workplaces in a Knowledge Economy (CWKE) 
2016 data set focused on issues of work and lifelong learning.  This data was gathered 
through random digit dialing and simple random selection of respondents from the Leger 
Research Intelligence Group’s professional web panel of 475,000 individuals.  Our larger 
CWKE data set is representative of the national working population and comprised of 
2,979 adult Canadians (more information on the data set and sampling methodology is 
available in the general methodology notes section of chapter 1).  In the following 
analytical approach section, we include an explanation of the two subsamples utilized for 
the analyses in this chapter. 
 
3.3.2 Analytical Approach 
The following analysis is separated into two distinct modules.  The first and shorter of 
these modules is focused on comparing the perceived frequency of employee and 
employer misbehaviour, while accounting for any differences in perceptions of 
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misbehaviour by occupational class (Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3).  Because we were interested 
in perceptions of employee and employer misbehaviour by respondents across the entire 
occupational hierarchy, our sample includes everyone from the CWKE data set that 
provided information on their class category (N=2881; about 97% of the complete 
CWKE data set of working Canadians N=2,979).  While some respondents in our sample 
chose not to answer one or either of our misbehaviour items, the response rate for both 
items remains respectable (N=2,613 and N=2,544).  This analytical module consists of 
only bivariate analysis. 
Our second – and larger – analytical module is concerned with exploration of the 
phenomenon of employer misbehaviour as reported by employers themselves 
(Hypotheses 4,5,6,7,8).  Correspondingly, we used a 9-category occupational class 
variable to select only small employers (1 to 10 employees) and large employers (11 or 
more employees) for these analyses.  Upper managers, middle managers, supervisors, 
professional employees, service workers, industrial workers, the self-employed (with no 
other paid employees) and respondents who could not be classified were excluded.  After 
this selection of only employers, we were left with a total sample of 108 respondents, 
spanning the range of employers who had only one paid employee up to those engaging 
as many as two-hundred and forty workers.  In this module, we began by conducting a 
separate bivariate analysis for each of our independent variables by the dependent 
variable (frequency of employer misbehaviour), and then conducted several waves of 
multivariate analysis that incorporate all explanatory variables alongside relevant control 
variables.  As with the previous chapter, we treat our ordinal dependent variables as 
continuous, enabling OLS regression for our multivariate analysis (see section 2.5 for 
justification of this decision).  We note here that a sample of only 108 individuals is a 
relatively small sample for multivariate analysis; though it would be preferable to have 
more respondents, our sample size is reflective of the lower proportion of employers 
within the Canadian work force.  For bivariate analysis, each of our independent 
variables were ordinal, so gamma was available to help describe each relationship.  We 
chose gamma over more conservative measures (ex. tau-b, tau-c) due to our greater 
familiarity with the measure and for ease of interpretation.  Additionally, our preliminary 
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analyses examining gamma alongside other possible ordinal by ordinal measures 
convinced us that gamma was not greatly exaggerating the strength of the relationships 
under study.   
 
3.3.2.1 Summary of Approach 
3.3.2.1.1 Module 1 
Bivariate Analyses: 
N=2,881 (all working individuals with valid occupational class data) 
 
1) Occupational Class x Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour 
2) Occupational Class x Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour 
 
3.3.2.1.2 Module 2 
Bivariate Analyses: 
N=97 (only employers of one or more other full-time employees, who also have a valid 
response on employer misbehaviour item). NOTE: Size of N varies across analyses 
according to missing data within independent variables. 
 
1) Employer Wealth x Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour  
2) Self-Evaluation of Appropriateness of Employer Compensation x Frequency of 
Employer Misbehaviour 
3) Likelihood of Business Loss x Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour 
4) Union Presence x Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour 
5) Increased Employment of Non-Permanent Workers x Frequency of Employer 
Misbehaviour 
 
Multivariate Analyses: 
N=97 (only employers of one or more other full-time employees, who also have a valid 
response on employer misbehaviour item). NOTE: Size of N varies across analyses 
according to missing data within independent variables.  
 
Model 1: Independent Variables: Wealth, Appropriateness of Compensation, Likelihood 
of Business Loss 
Dependent Variable: Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour  
 
Model 2: Independent Variables: Wealth, Appropriateness of Compensation, Likelihood 
of Business Loss, Union Presence, Greater Reliance on Non-Permanent Labour 
Dependent Variable: Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour 
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Model 3: Independent Variables: Wealth, Appropriateness of Compensation, Likelihood 
of Business Loss, Union Presence, Greater Reliance on Non-Permanent Labour 
Dependent Variable: Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour 
Control Variables: Sector, Industry, Number of Employees, Employer Participation in 
Organizational Decision-making 
 
 
3.4 Measures 
3.4.1 Dependent Variables 
The first of our dependent variables operationalizes employee misbehaviour.  The item, 
as it appeared to respondents, read “How common do you think employee misbehaviour 
such as taking organization-owned materials or loafing on the job is in places like where 
you work?  Respondents could answer “extremely uncommon”, “fairly uncommon”, 
“fairly common” or “extremely common”.   This dependent variable is only used within 
the first analytical module of our study (See general methodological notes section in 
chapter 1 for more information about this variable and Appendix 2 for non-response 
analysis).   
Our second dependent variable – and the one which is used throughout the entirety of our 
analysis – measures respondents’ perceptions of the frequency of employer 
misbehaviour.  The item, as posed to respondents, read “How common do you think 
employer misbehaviour such as not paying employees some earned benefits or avoiding 
taxes on earnings is in places like where you work?”  As with our other employee 
misbehaviour item, the four available valid responses ranged from “extremely 
uncommon” to “extremely common” (See general methodological notes section in 
chapter 1 for more information about this variable and Appendix 2 for non-response 
analysis). 
It should be noted here that both of our misbehaviour items measure respondents’ 
perceptions of misbehaviour, rather than an objective count of misbehaviour events.  The 
measuring of the latter would entail significant methodological difficulties and ethical 
concerns, including identification of misbehaving individuals, so we move forward with 
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the assumption that respondent perceptions of misbehaviour – while remaining an 
indirect measure – will generally reflect the actual incidence of employer misbehaviour. 
 
3.4.2 Independent Variables 
3.4.2.1 Occupational Class 
The first of our independent variables measures respondent occupational class and was 
constructed using detailed job description and job title information provided by 
respondents (See Appendix 3 for construction logic).  Respondents could belong to one 
of nine occupational classes (large employer, small employer, self-employed, upper 
manager, middle manager, supervisor, professional employee, service worker and 
industrial worker) or remain unclassified. 
This variable was the primary explanatory variable in the first analytical module and was 
also used to select our sample of employers for the second module.  This variable is not 
further utilized in the second module as the applicable sample is composed of 
respondents of only two occupational class categories – small and large employers. 
We regard certain occupational classes as lower in the hierarchy of the relations of 
production than others:  Industrial and service workers are lower in the class order than 
both non-managerial professional employees and managerial employees.  Within the 
managerial hierarchy, we consider supervisors as lower in class position than middle 
managers, who are themselves lower than upper managers.  Large and small employers 
are considered higher in the class order than most other occupational categories. 
 
3.4.2.2 Employer Net Wealth 
Our net wealth variable was originally presented to all respondents as a 15-point scale 
ranging from “less than $5,000” to “Above $10 million,” but has been reduced to only six 
categories for ease of bivariate analysis and presentation in module 2, which makes use 
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of ordinal by ordinal measures of association and significance.  An additional reason for 
this reduction of categories for bivariate analysis was because of the small number of 
cases in some wealth categories (somewhat to be expected with an N lower than 100).  In 
the multivariate portion of module 2, we incorporate the more specific information 
provided by the original 15-category wealth variable.   
 
3.4.2.3 Employer Self-Evaluation of Appropriateness of 
Compensation 
In the following analysis, we utilize an appropriateness of compensation variable to 
measure employers’ subjective evaluation of the profit gleaned from their position of 
ownership.  The applicable item posed the following question to respondents, “Compared 
to the value you produce at your workplace, do you think your compensation is much less 
than you deserve, somewhat less, about right, somewhat more than you deserve or much 
more than you deserve?” and provides us with a 5-point ordinal variable for use within 
our second analytical module.  For the purposes of the bivariate ordinal by ordinal 
analysis, the two categories of “somewhat more than you deserve” and “much more than 
you deserve” are combined due to the low number of cases within these categories 
(again, not unexpected when working with a smaller sample size). 
 
3.4.2.4 Likelihood of Business Loss in the Next Year 
For hypothesis 6, we were interested in whether the economic pressure associated with 
the loss of one’s business might encourage greater employer misbehaviour.  The original 
questionnaire item associated with this variable requested all respondents answer “How 
likely is it that you will lose your job/business in the next year?”.  Moving forward with a 
sample of only employers for Module 2, we assume that all remaining respondents are 
commenting on the likelihood of business loss (rather than job loss).  The responses to 
this questionnaire item provide us with an ordinal variable with data points along a 4-
point Likert scale ranging from very unlikely to very likely. 
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3.4.2.5 Presence of Union within Employer’s Work Organization 
Our union presence variable is made up of the respondents’ answers to the question “Is 
there a trade union at your workplace?” with “Yes or “No” as the only two valid response 
categories (3 non-response categories were also available).  Further information on the 
characteristics of the union, its effectiveness or the rate of unionization among employees 
within the employer’s organization is unfortunately not available within our data set. 
 
3.4.2.6 Increased Employment of Non-Permanent Workers 
For our eighth hypothesis, we are interested in examining whether a precarious workforce 
will motivate employers towards greater misbehaviour.  The assumption here is that the 
lack of protections afforded to non-permanent workers – and viable options for recourse 
in the face of employer misbehaviour – will provide employers with greater opportunity 
to misbehave.  We do not have available to us a straightforward measure on the 
employment status of the employees who make up a respondent’s workforce, but we do 
know whether an employer’s organization has increased its employment of part-time or 
temporary workers in the past five years.  Two obvious caveats here surround the fact 
that the magnitude of the increased reliance on non-permanent workers for the employer 
is unknown and also that it is possible for an employer who has been relying on non-
permanent labour for longer than five years – without increasing this reliance – to 
reasonably answer in the negative to our question “Has your workplace experienced any 
of the following forms of organizational change in the last five years: greater reliance on 
part-time or temporary workers?”  We acknowledge the possibility of these outside cases 
as potential sources of error, but still consider it worthwhile to use this variable – the only 
measure of employers’ engagement of precarious labour available to us.  Valid responses 
to this item are in binary format (yes or no). 
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3.4.3 Control Variables 
The control variables included in our final multivariate model were selected in an effort 
to avoid spuriousness and separate the influence of our key explanatory variables from 
that of other potentially relevant variables. 
The first of our control variables indicates the sector of the employer’s work organization 
(private, public or non-profit).  In our sample, about 95% of the employers are associated 
with the private sector.   
The second control variable measures the industry the employer is associated with 
(goods-producing or service providing).  About 33% of our sample of employers are 
associated with goods-producing industries while the remainder are service-providers. 
The third control variable measures the size of the work organization defined by the 
number of employees.  This number ranges from one to two hundred and forty, but about 
84% of our sample of employers engage ten or fewer employees. 
Our fourth and final control variable indicates whether the employer participates in 
workplace decision-making related to policy on types of products or services delivered, 
employee hiring and firing, budgeting, determining workload or changing work 
procedure.  Eighty-eight percent of the employers indicated involvement in decisions 
such as these. 
 
3.4.4 A Note on Multicollinearity 
A correlation matrix was constructed to check for multicollinearity (see Appendix 6).  
This was particularly important considering the high R2 values in our multivariate models 
(Table 3.7).  Our correlation matrix reveals only weak and very weak associations 
between independent and control variables.  The associations between the dummy 
categories of organizational sector are moderately powerful, but this is to be expected and 
not cause for concern.  Despite their lower strength, there are still several significant 
relationships worth highlighting here: 1) The presence of a union by employer wealth (-
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.30), 2) employer wealth by employer subjective evaluation of compensation (.27) and 3) 
employer wealth by risk of business loss (-.24).  Though these relationships are weak, 
they are between variables which are all significantly related to the dependent variable 
and this limited multicollinearity could be inflating our R2 measures to some extent.  
However, this multicollinearity is still well within tolerance with each of these 
explanatory variables maintaining significant power of association with the dependent 
variable.  It is likely that the high R2 values have more to do with the limited sample size 
of later multivariate models (N=37; N=36).   
Note that the above discussion of multicollinearity applies only to the second and primary 
module of this chapter, focused on the exploration of the phenomenon of employer 
misbehaviour.  The smaller analytical module concerned with perceptions of the 
frequency of misbehaviour by occupational class features only bivariate analysis, making 
a multicollinearity check unnecessary.  
 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Module 1: Reported Misbehaviour by Occupational Class 
The results for the first module of our analysis is displayed in Table 3.1.  First, we can 
see that, across every occupational class, the perception of organizational misbehaviour 
as common or extremely common is a minority position.  However, while the general 
trend is to perceive both employer and employee misbehaviour as an uncommon 
occurrence, there is an obvious difference between these types of misbehaviour in terms 
of their perceived frequency:  Only about 15% of respondents reported employer 
misbehaviour as common, while 37% of the sample perceived misbehaviour by 
employees to be a common workplace occurrence.  This perception of misbehaviour by 
employees as being more frequent than that of employers holds across all class positions 
and provides solid evidence in support of our first hypothesis (see rightmost column of 
Table 3.1 for magnitude of employee misbehaviour reporting relative to employer 
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misbehaviour).  However, there are also notable differences by occupational class in the 
reported frequency of both types of misbehaviour. 
In the previous chapter, we examined the association between non-managerial employee 
occupational class and the frequency of employee misbehaviour and found it to be 
significant, with employees who occupied lower class positions (service and industrial 
workers) reporting more misbehaviour than employees of a higher occupational class 
(professionals).  Now, comparing all respondents across the full range of the occupational 
class structure, a general trend whereby employee misbehaviour is reported as less 
frequent by those higher up in the hierarchy of the work organization is immediately 
perceptible:  Less than 34% of all the employers, upper managers and middle managers 
report it as a common workplace occurrence.  On the other hand, those occupying lower 
class positions perceive employee misbehaviour as much more frequent, with as many as 
48% of the respondents in some categories reporting it as a fairly or extremely common 
event.  Professional employees stand out as reporting considerably less employee 
misbehaviour than other non-managerial employee categories, with figures much closer 
to that of employers and upper and middle management.  Finally, supervisors – the 
managerial group most closely observing non-managerial workers – were distinguished 
as the class category reporting the greatest frequency of employee misbehaviour:  Close 
to half of them (48%) perceived it as a common occurrence in the workplace.  
We found a similar trend to that outlined above in the reporting of greater employer 
misbehaviour by respondents lower in the occupational class structure – service workers 
and industrial workers reported employer misbehaviour as common in greater numbers 
than the respondents in any other class category.  Once again, professional employees 
were notable in reporting employer misbehaviour as considerably less frequent than other 
non-managerial employees.  On the other hand, supervisors – the occupational class 
category which reported employee misbehaviour as more frequent than any other – do 
not particularly stand out with regards to their reporting of the frequency of employer 
misbehaviour.   
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Table 3.1 Perceived Frequency of Misbehaviour (Employee and Employer) by 
Occupational Class 
Occupational Class % who report 
employee 
misbehaviour 
as common 
or extremely 
common 
% who report 
employer 
misbehaviour 
as common or 
extremely 
common 
% difference in 
reporting of 
employee 
misbehaviour 
compared to 
employer 
misbehaviour 
Employers    
Large Employer 29.4 17.6 11.8 
Small Employer 25.6 12.7 12.9 
Managers    
Upper Manager 23.0 4.8 18.2 
Middle Manager 33.4 8.1 25.3 
Supervisor 47.8 13.3 34.5 
Non-Managerial 
Employees 
   
Professional Employee 30.7 11.0 19.7 
Service Worker 41.5 19.6 21.9 
Industrial Worker 44.5 19.5 25.0 
Self-Employed (no full-
time employees) 
29.1 19.3 9.8 
Overall % 36.6 15.1 21.5 
Total N 2613 2544  
Though we found considerable evidence of higher perceptions of employer misbehaviour 
by those at the bottom of the occupational class structure, there is no obvious linear trend 
that can be perceived across the entire hierarchy:  The service and industrial workers did 
express the highest reporting of employer misbehaviour – around 20% say it is common 
or extremely common – but the large employers are close behind with 18% in that 
category of respondent saying the same (note: a 2% difference is not significant for a 
sample of this size and there may be no practical difference between these groups).  
Additionally, it was interesting to find that the lowest reporting of employer 
misbehaviour was to be found within the managerial class hierarchy – where upper and 
middle managers reported employer misbehaviour as relatively infrequent (only 4.8% of 
upper managers and 8.1% of middle managers perceived it to be common). 
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3.5.2 Module 2: Key Factors Associated with Employer 
Misbehaviour 
3.5.2.1 Bivariate Analysis 
The following results correspond to our second analytical module, featuring a sample of 
only employers, to explore the structural factors associated with the reported frequency of 
employer misbehaviour.  Our fourth hypothesis suggested that less wealthy employers 
would be more likely to report greater misbehaviour and the bivariate results displayed in 
Table 3.2 provide evidence in-line with this assumption. 
    Table 3.2 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Employer Wealth 
Total Wealth ($) N Employer 
misbehaviour fairly or 
extremely common (%) 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
(p-value) 
20,000 or less 8 37.5   
20,001 to 75,000 4 25.0   
75,001 to 150,000 14 35.7   
150,001 to 500,000 15 0.0   
500,001 to 1 million 10 10.0   
Above 1 million 18 5.6   
Total 69 15.9 -.503 .000 
For every employer wealth category up to $150,000, 25% or more of the respondents 
reported employer misbehaviour as a fairly or extremely common occurrence – with the 
percentage of respondents reporting common employer misbehaviour reaching as high as 
38% in the lowest employer wealth bracket.  On the other hand, employers in wealth 
brackets above $150,000 reported employer misbehaviour as considerably less frequent:  
None of the employers possessing wealth between $150,000 to $500,000 and 10% or less 
of those possessing above $500,000 reported employer misbehaviour as a common 
occurrence.  Our measure of association for the bivariate relationship between employer 
wealth and the frequency of misbehaviour is significant with a gamma coefficient (γ) of -
.503, indicating a negative relationship of moderate strength. 
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  Table 3.3 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Appropriateness of 
Compensation 
Compared to the value 
you produce at your 
workplace, do you think 
your compensation is… 
N Employer 
misbehaviour 
fairly or extremely 
common (%) 
Gamma (γ) Significance 
(p-value) 
Much less than deserved 16 50.0   
Somewhat less 21 19.0   
About right 48 2.1   
More than deserved 7 14.3   
Total 92 15.2 -.443 .008 
The second of our economic explanatory variables looked at the subjective evaluation of 
the appropriateness of compensation by employers (see Table 3.3 above for bivariate 
results).  First, while it was possible for respondents to evaluate the appropriateness of 
their compensation using any of the five categories from “much less than deserved” to 
“much more than deserved”, the great majority of employers answered in the range from 
“much less than deserved” through “somewhat less than deserved” to “about right”.  Only 
7% of the employers sampled believed their compensation to be “somewhat more than 
deserved” or “much more than deserved” and were grouped together as one category for 
bivariate analysis.  
This analysis of employers’ evaluations of compensation appropriateness in relation to 
frequency of employer misbehaviour revealed significant evidence of a moderately strong 
negative relationship between these variables (γ= -.443):  Employers who evaluated 
themselves as undercompensated reported more frequent employer misbehaviour than 
those who felt adequately compensated or overcompensated.  The results for those few 
employers who reported overcompensation are harder to interpret for a couple reasons: 1) 
the number of cases are few, requiring additional caution in our conclusion, and 2) they 
do not easily fit the established linear trend between variables – the employers who 
reported more compensation than deserved reported less frequent misbehaviour than 
those who felt undercompensated, but considerably more than those who believed they 
were adequately compensated.  
Our third explanatory variable, likelihood of employer business loss – like wealth and 
appropriateness of compensation – acts as an indicator of the economic circumstances or 
116 
 
 
 
pressures that employers can find themselves confronted with.  In Table 3.4, the bivariate 
results for this variable are displayed. 
Table 3.4 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Likelihood of Business 
Loss 
How likely is it that you 
will lose your business in 
the next year? 
N Employer misbehaviour 
fairly or extremely 
common (%) 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
Very unlikely 57 12.1   
Somewhat unlikely 20 5.0   
Somewhat likely 9 37.5   
Very likely 2 0.0   
Total 88 12.5 .233 .219 
The employers reporting the most frequent misbehaviour were those who believed it was 
somewhat likely that they might lose their business in the next year.  However, the 
frequencies for the other categories do not follow any perceivable trend and our test of 
significance was not passed, so there is little evidence of a bivariate relationship between 
the likelihood of business loss and our dependent variable. 
We next examined the possibility of a bivariate relationship between the amount of 
misbehaviour reported by employers and the presence (or non-presence) of a union 
within the work organization (see Table 3.5).  Here, we found intriguing evidence in 
support of such a relationship, but in the opposite direction as hypothesized:  80% of the 
employers of unionized workers reported employer misbehaviour as common or 
extremely common compared to only 11% of the employers of non-unionized workers.  
Additionally, our test of association provides further evidence of a significant and very 
strong positive relationship between these two variables (γ= .952).  It should be noted that 
only about 5% of employers reported a union presence in their organization, so there is 
some reason to be cautious in our conclusions regarding this relationship.  Nevertheless, 
the differences in frequency of employer misbehaviour by union presence is particularly 
pronounced – and there is no obvious reason to suspect that our sampled employers of 
unionized workers are not representative of the wider Canadian population – so we move 
forward assuming our results indicate the existence of a real increase in the perceived 
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frequency of employer misbehaviour explained by the presence of a union within the 
workplace. 
   Table 3.5 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Union Presence 
Union Present in 
the Workplace? 
N Employer misbehaviour fairly 
or extremely common (%) 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
No 89 11.2   
Yes 5 80.0   
Total 94 14.9 .952 .017 
While we expected the presence of a union within the workplace to act as a constraint on 
employer misbehaviour, an increasing reliance upon non-permanent workers was 
hypothesized to have the opposite effect – motivating employers towards more frequent 
misbehaviour.  The results of the bivariate analysis displayed in Table 3.6 seem to 
provide support for a connection between a workforce characterized by non-permanent 
employment arrangements and greater perceptions of employer misbehaviour – about 
13% more of the employers who indicated a recent organizational change towards greater 
reliance on part-time or temporary workers – compared with those who did not indicate 
such an organizational change – reported common or extremely common employer 
misbehaviour.  However, our measure of association falls short of statistical significance, 
so we should be cautious in our interpretation of the bivariate relationship between these 
variables.  
Table 3.6 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Greater Reliance on 
Non-Permanent Workers 
Greater reliance on part-
time or temporary 
workers 
N Employer misbehaviour 
fairly or extremely 
common (%) 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
No 34 8.8   
Yes 18 22.2   
Total 52 13.5 .324 .199 
 
3.5.2.2 Multivariate Models 
Following the bivariate analyses, we conducted multivariate analyses for three models of 
employer misbehaviour, with each subsequent one incorporating additional explanatory 
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variables (all of which are key variables receiving attention in the preceding bivariate 
portion of module 2). 
Table 3.7 Multivariate Models of Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  β coefficient 
(SE) 
β coefficient 
(SE) 
β coefficient 
(SE) 
Economic 
Pressures 
Total net wealth -.344 
(.029)** 
-.439 
(.036)** 
-.574 
(.039)*** 
Appropriateness of 
compensation  
-.245 
(.091)* 
-.297 
(.117)* 
-.439 
(.119)** 
Likelihood of Business 
Loss 
-.034 (.117) -.035 (.115) -.125 (.112) 
Protection 
or 
Vulnerabilit
y of 
Workforce 
Trade union present in 
workplace 
 .459 
(.338)*** 
.369 
(.339)** 
Greater Reliance on Non-
Permanent Workers 
 .205 (.241) .369 
(.253)** 
Control 
Variables 
Number of Employees   .265 (.015)* 
Sector    
Private (ref.)   -- 
Public   -.245 (.402) 
Non-Profit   -.174 (.718) 
Industry    
Goods-producing (ref.)   -- 
Service-providing   -.118 (.212) 
Employer participates in 
workplace decision-making 
  .019 (.271) 
R2  .194 .597 .717 
Adjusted R2  .156 .534 .610 
N   66 37 36 
Notes. *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001.  
Regression coefficients represent standardized slopes (standard error in brackets). 
The first of our multivariate models contained three explanatory variables – total net 
wealth, appropriateness of compensation and likelihood of business loss.  These variables 
are related to the economic circumstances and pressures faced by employers – identified 
as potential explanatory factors by the white-collar crime and corporate violence 
literature that routinely lists profit-maximization as a central motivator towards employer 
misbehaviour.  Unsurprisingly, the two measures most closely connected to employer 
profits – total wealth and appropriateness of compensation – were revealed to wield 
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considerable and significant influence, with both lower net wealth and evaluations of 
compensation as less than deserved contributing to greater frequency of perceived 
employer misbehaviour.  The relative effects of these explanatory variables are similar, 
but there is some indication that total net wealth may be the slightly more influential of 
the two measures (β= -.344 versus β= -.245).  On the other hand, likelihood of business 
loss appeared to have no significant association with the dependent variable. 
Our second multivariate model retains our three economic explanatory variables and adds 
in our two measures of workforce protection and workforce vulnerability – 
conceptualized as trade union presence and greater reliance on non-permanent workers.  
After incorporating these two additional measures, both of the significant economic 
predictors of employer misbehaviour from the first model retained their significance – 
with an increase in their estimated influence on the dependent variable.  As with the first 
model, the likelihood of business loss did not appear to be significantly linked with the 
reported frequency of misbehaviour.   
Of the two variables measuring workforce protection/vulnerability to employer 
misbehaviour, only trade union presence emerged as significantly associated with the 
dependent variable.  As with the prior bivariate results, a union presence in the 
organization was associated with the reporting of employer misbehaviour as more 
frequent.  The estimated strength of this relationship is considerable (β= .459) and union 
presence as a predictor exceeds the explanatory power of both employer wealth and 
appropriateness of compensation (β= -.439 and β= -.297).  
In Model 3, we retained all previous explanatory variables and incorporated four control 
variables – number of employees, sector, industry and employer involvement in 
organizational decision-making.  One of these control variables – number of employees – 
was found to have a weak to moderate positive relationship with the dependent variable 
(β= .265), so there is reason to suspect that employer misbehaviour may be more frequent 
in larger organizations.  
Unsurprisingly, the inclusion of these control variables modified the strength of 
association for the significant factors already outlined, but none of the predictors of 
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perceived employer misbehaviour identified in the previous models lost significance 
through the inclusion of these controls.  In this third model, both wealth and 
appropriateness of compensation once again emerged as the most influential predictors, 
with lower wealth (β= -.574) and lower self-evaluated appropriateness of compensation 
(β= -.439) corresponding with a higher reported frequency of employer misbehaviour.  
The presence of a union remained a significant predictor of more frequent employer 
misbehaviour, but the inclusion of our control variables reduced the influence of this 
variable slightly (β= .369 down from β= .459).   
Interestingly, the inclusion of our control variables also resulted in our measure for 
increased employer reliance on non-permanent labour gaining significance as a 
moderately powerful predictor of greater frequency of employer misbehaviour (β= .369).  
Employers who indicated greater employment of part-time or temporary workers also 
reported greater frequency of employer misbehaviour. 
 
3.6 Discussion 
The first analytical module of our study was concerned with evaluating how the 
perceived frequency of misbehaviour – by employees and employers – was associated 
with the occupational class of the respondent.  In the previous chapter, we studied the 
relationship between occupational class and reported frequency of solely employee 
misbehaviour for non-managerial and managerial employees separately.  This chapter 
incorporates employers and compares respondents across the full range of the 
occupational hierarchy in their reporting of the frequency of both employee and employer 
misbehaviour.  These inclusions have provided us a more nuanced understanding of 
organizational misbehaviour – though there is some limited overlap with our previous 
exploration of the topic. 
One trend which was present in the previous chapter and remains evident here is the 
reporting of employee misbehaviour as more frequent by industrial and service workers.  
This finding is not surprising from a perspective which understands the phenomenon of 
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employee misbehaviour as a reaction by employees to negative working conditions, as 
industrial and service workers are the occupational groups most likely to be confronted 
by degraded working conditions on a routine basis (see chapter 2).     
However, we also found industrial and service workers to be the greatest reporters of 
frequent employer misbehaviour – rivaled only by large employers.  This higher 
perception of frequent employer misbehaviour by respondents of the lowest occupational 
classes supported our third hypothesis and is more easily understood when recognizing 
the ideological element in the very act of recognizing employer misbehaviour:  Those 
who experience the greatest alienation and whose working lives are in stark contradiction 
to the promises of capitalist ideology may be more likely to express resistance to 
hegemonic rule – in this case, by greater recognition of employers’ capacity to 
misbehave.   
Because hegemony is a feature of the antagonistic relationship between classes and 
constantly leaves room for resistance by exercise of consciousness outside those patterns 
sponsored by the economically dominant, it can never be fully complete (Connel, 1978; 
Marx, 1844, 1867; Shapiro, 1984).  However, it is those whose best interests are in 
contradiction to capitalist hegemony that have the most to gain by challenging it, and this 
is one possible explanation for why industrial and service workers report employer 
misbehaviour as more frequent than both professional employees and managerial workers 
– who both generally occupy more privileged positions in the class hierarchy and have 
less to gain by challenging the popular assumption of employers as less prone to 
misbehaviour than their employees.   
In addition to this ideological explanation, it is also the case that industrial and service 
workers may report greater employer misbehaviour because they are the ones most likely 
to suffer from it:  The negative working conditions experienced by many lower-class 
workers can often be explained – at least in part – by an employer’s misbehaviour, 
negligence or reluctance to take unprofitable action towards improving working 
conditions (Bakan, 2004; Burns & Orrick, 2002; Greenwood, 2005; Hambrick & Mason, 
1984; Marx, 1844, 1848, 1867). 
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In chapter 2, we also proposed that professional employees report less employee 
misbehaviour than other workers because of their lower inclination to report bad 
behaviour of peers, the behavioural regulation that accompanies a professional identity 
and because of the considerable benefits of their position relative to non-professionals.  
Additionally, professional employees are probably less likely to be the victims of 
employer misbehaviour, as the privileges and protections of their vocation – as well as 
the fact that their specialized skills are not easily replaceable – make them harder 
potential targets for employer misbehaviour.  
Previously, we found that the reporting of frequent employee misbehaviour declined as 
one ascended through the ranks of management and supervisors – those lowest in the 
managerial hierarchy stood out as the class of worker that reported employee 
misbehaviour as most frequent.  We suggested that this result could be related to job 
expectations and supervisor responsibility for early detection of employee misbehaviour 
and routine discipline (see chapter 2).  In terms of the detection of employer 
misbehaviour, however, supervisors do not appear to regard it as a very frequent 
occurrence – except when compared to other managers who report employer 
misbehaviour as even more infrequent. 
The occupational class that stood out as reporting the smallest amount of employer 
misbehaviour were upper managers – a distinction they also hold with regards to the 
reporting of employee misbehaviour.  Upper managers’ lower perceptions of employee 
misbehaviour can be explained by both their relative distance from the routine labour 
taking place within the work organization and from the negative working conditions 
which generally give rise to more frequent employee misbehaviour.  On the other hand, 
upper managers’ perceptions of employer misbehaviour as a rare occurrence likely has 
more to do with the unity of economic interest generally shared by upper managers and 
employers and the dependence of upper managers on employers for their relative 
advantages over lower managers and non-managerial employees.  While theorists have 
commented in the past on the numerous distinctions between members of the upper class 
and problematized the view of this group as monolithic (Bourdieu, 1986, 1996; 
Dahrendorf, 1959; Flemmen, 2012; Scott, 1997; Weber, 1946; Zeitlin, 1989), at least in 
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cases of employer misbehaviour which serve the bottom line, upper managers’ general 
unity of economic interest with owners might contribute to a general overlooking of 
misbehaviour engaged in by the latter. 
Though there are obvious class differences in the reporting of misbehaviour, our results 
also indicated a relative underreporting of the frequency of employer misbehaviour by 
respondents of all occupational class positions – compared to the much higher reported 
frequency of employee misbehaviour.  The magnitude of reported difference between 
employer misbehaviour and employee misbehaviour unsurprisingly varied by class – that 
is, supervisors stood out as reporting far more employee than employer misbehaviour; 
however, respondents of every class reported misbehaviour by employees as the more 
common phenomenon.  These results provide support for one of our initial hypotheses 
and were not particularly surprising:  The benefits of ownership extend considerable 
ideological and legal protection to employers, making it far less likely that their actions 
will be perceived as misbehaviour.   
Three of our independent variables were selected to evaluate how economic pressures on 
the employer can encourage greater employer misbehaviour.  The first of these economic 
variables measured employer wealth and was found to have an inverse relationship with 
the reported frequency of employer misbehaviour.  A simple explanation to this result is 
that less wealthy employers face greater economic pressure and may be more inclined to 
engage in misbehaviour as a means by which to raise profits.  In contrast, an employer of 
greater wealth may already be doing quite well using more legitimate means of wealth-
creation and can afford to avoid the most questionable methods of raising profits.  Profit-
maximization has been highlighted by the corporate crime literature as a key motivator 
towards misbehaviour for employers (Bakan, 2004; Biggerstaff et al., 2015; Davidson, 
1970; Gilbert, 2005; McAdams, 1977; Nader, 1965; Schwartz & Ellison, 1982), and 
wealthy owners are surely just as capable of misbehaviour – but it is likely that those who 
are less wealthy will be more prone to engage in misbehaviour as a means to remain 
competitive with other capitalists.    
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Our second economic explanatory variable measured employers’ subjective evaluation of 
their own compensation, and we found a meaningful relationship whereby employers 
who believed themselves to be undercompensated reported more frequent employer 
misbehaviour.  Previous work has outlined how envy by the undercompensated can act as 
a powerful motivator towards unethical behaviour in a variety of circumstances (Gino & 
Pierce, 2009, 2010; John et al., 2014; Toby, 1979), and we suspect we are witnessing a 
similar effect here.  We should note that a true deficit is not necessary for feelings of 
envy to emerge, and that a simple overestimation of personal contributions to the work 
environment is more than sufficient to motivate one towards misbehaviour as a means by 
which to correct the perceived state of under compensation (Zenger, 1994).  Therefore, it 
is not just the less wealthy employers who are motivated towards misbehaviour in this 
way, as a full 40% of the sampled employers reported feeling under compensated (only 
8% felt overcompensated and 52% said their compensation was about right).  As such, 
subjective under-compensation emerged as a powerful predictor of greater perceived 
misbehaviour for employers of all wealth levels.   
We also included a variable for likelihood of business loss and hypothesized that 
employers who perceived a greater likelihood that they would soon lose their business 
would report more misbehaviour:  The assumption here being that potential business loss 
would motivate employers towards misbehaviour in hopes of maintaining the viability of 
their business.  However, we found no evidence of such a relationship.  On reflection, it 
may be that the diversity of potential reasons for losing one’s business could make a 
difference:  For example, low profits threatening the longevity of the business might be 
improved by cost-cutting employer misbehaviour, but it is hard to imagine how this 
would save a business that sells a newly-obsolete product.  Additionally, the loss of one’s 
business may not always be a wholly-negative experience that employers seek to avoid 
(ex. being purchased by a competitor), and we might expect less motivation towards 
employer misbehaviour in such circumstances.  However, it should be noted here that 
only 13% of the sampled employers anticipated business loss as somewhat or very likely 
in the next year and perhaps a relationship would be discovered with a larger sample 
and/or information on the reason for an employer’s loss of business. 
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The last two of our main explanatory variables were chosen to aid in the examination of 
whether characteristics of the work force might act to motivate or constrain employer 
misbehaviour.  It was hypothesized that greater employment of non-permanent workers 
(temporary or part-time) would be associated with more frequent misbehaviour by 
employers, and we found significant evidence of this relationship in our final model.  
There is ample evidence within the literature to support the argument that precarious and 
non-permanent workers are more likely to be victims of employer misbehaviour:  Non-
permanent workers more frequently suffer psychologically as a result of organizational 
injustice (Inoue et al., 2013), are more frequently treated as second-class employees by 
employers (Boyce et al., 2007), are paid less and receive fewer benefits (Kalleberg et al., 
2000) and are often employed in hazardous jobs where they are easily replaceable 
(Kochan et al, 1994).  Therefore, despite the advantages provided to employers, non-
permanent workers’ vulnerability to mistreatment is salient, while any benefits of a 
nonstandard work arrangement apply primarily to the highly-skilled and self-employed 
(ex. lawyers, independent contractors, etc.) (Rasell & Appelbaum, 1998).  In less-
preferred positions, non-permanent employment is clearly not a first-choice and engaged 
in mainly out of a lack of other viable options (one study reported that 66% of on-
call/day-labourers and 73% of temporary workers would prefer a permanent position 
[Rasell & Appelbaum, 1998]).  We propose that the relative vulnerabilities of non-
permanent workers make this group a more enticing target for misbehaving employers, as 
a lack of job security and few alternative employment options offer scarcer protection 
from exploitation and ill-treatment.      
On the other hand, the presence of a union within a work organization was hypothesized 
to contribute to a lower perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour.  Compared to 
those without collective representation, unionized workers generally receive better 
employment protection and job training, higher pay and more robust non-wage benefits 
(health, pension, support for reskilling/upskilling, etc.) (Boheim & Booth, 2004; 
Kalleberg, 2009; Kalleberg et al., 2000; Oh, 2012; Raymo et al., 2011).  In distinction to 
the expected vulnerability of non-permanent workers to employer misbehaviour, the 
advantages afforded to unionized workers were expected to act as additional protection 
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from – and act as a restraint on – employer misbehaviour.  However, we were surprised 
to find significant evidence to the contrary, with employers reporting a union presence in 
their organization also reporting more frequent employer misbehaviour.  We think the 
most likely explanation for this relationship is that unionization drives will be more 
successful where there is a recognized history of employer misbehaviour.  Martinez and 
Fiorito (2009) and Eaton et al. (2014) have demonstrated how a negative evaluation of an 
employer as “bad” was more influential than workers’ knowledge of the instrumental 
advantages of union membership in predicting whether a particular drive towards union 
formation would be successful.  Therefore, to some extent, we should expect a 
misbehaving employer to motivate employees towards unionization.   
However, there is also some indication that employers might engage in more frequent 
misbehaviour as a means of combatting union influence or weakening a union’s 
effectiveness:  Blacklisting of union activists, hiring private investigators to intimidate 
and spy, fostering employee dependency on employer paternalism and the promotion of 
“company” or conservative unions are all strategies that have been utilized by employers 
in the past (Cochrane, 1989; Cooper & Patmore, 2002, 2009; Wright, 1995).   
While unionization will not always prompt retaliatory employer misbehaviour, Bentham 
(2002) found that Canadian employers opposed unionization 80% of the time; others 
have added that incidences of unfair business practice by employers tend to increase in 
response to unionization drives (Bruce, 1994; Riddel, 2001).  Because union-busting 
activities are often successful, employers may be motivated to participate in these 
activities in circumstances where the outcome of the unionization drive is uncertain or 
where union formation threatens to significantly diminish their profits (Freeman & 
Kleiner, 1990).  In this context, our results demonstrating the positive association 
between union presence and perceptions of employer misbehaviour as more frequent is 
understandable – with unionization as both a reaction by workers to past employer 
misbehaviour and as motivation for further employer misbehaviour in the form of union-
busting activities. 
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Finally, though an examination of the relationships between control variables and our 
dependent variable were not a primary focus of our study, there are a few results worth 
mentioning.   
We found evidence of a weak to moderate strength positive relationship between 
organizational size (number of employees) and the frequency of employer misbehaviour 
reported.  A similar relationship was discovered for employee misbehaviour in the 
previous chapter and it may be that the additional cover and shielding from discovery – 
as well as the considerable legal protections – that a large organization provides also 
motivates greater employer misbehaviour.  Additionally, the greater familiarity between 
employers and employees in smaller organizations might function to reduce employer 
misbehaviour by increasing the psychological cost of misbehaviour that would negatively 
impact the lives of employees who they have a personal connection with.  On the other 
hand, the greater distance between larger employers and those they employ likely reduces 
this cost, allowing employers distance from the consequences of their actions and also the 
ability to more easily abdicate responsibility for their actions and transfer blame onto 
upper managers (Biggerstaff et al., 2015; Gottschalk, 2012; McMullan & McClung, 
2016; Shaban et al., 2017; Trevino, 2005). 
Sector was included in this study as a control variable instead of a main explanatory 
variable for employer misbehaviour because nearly all the employers sampled were 
owners of for-profit organizations (only 5% were non-profit or public).  In the context of 
our findings that economic pressure towards profit-maximization is a key motivator of 
employer misbehaviour, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the phenomenon will be more 
frequent in for-profit environments which prioritize the bottom-line as the primary – or 
sole – means of evaluating organizational performance.  Examining the role of 
organizational sector with a more diverse sample of employers would surely be a fruitful 
direction for future research on the topic of employer misbehaviour.  
 
128 
 
 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
Comparing perceptions of both employee and employer misbehaviour by occupational 
class, we found considerable differences in reported frequency related to differences in 
structural position and divergent economic interests.  In addition, across every class 
group, there was a consistent trend towards the underreporting of employer misbehaviour 
relative to the reported frequency of employee misbehaviour.   
The results of our exploratory research into the phenomenon of employer misbehaviour 
revealed lower wealth, subjective under compensation, employment of non-permanent 
workers and union presence within the workplace to be important predictors of a higher 
perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour.   
However, while our model boasts a relatively high measure of explained variance in 
employer misbehaviour (Adjusted R2=.61), it is likely that the relatively small sample 
size of our final multivariate model is playing a role here (N=36).  Correspondingly, 
replication of these results is one obvious and necessary direction for future research into 
employer misbehaviour.  
Two other promising avenues for future research would address the need for a closer 
examination of the relationship between unionization and employer misbehaviour and a 
fuller accounting of the differences in employer misbehaviour by sector (for-profit versus 
non-profit). 
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Chapter 4 
4 Class Consciousness and Perceptions of 
Organizational Misbehaviour 
4.1 Introduction 
In our earlier general methodological notes section (chapter 1), we acknowledged that 
respondent subjectivity would invariably colour the reported frequency of misbehaviour 
within a workplace.  In the two previous papers (chapters 2 and 3), we focused on the 
relationships between respondents’ structural conditions and the frequency of workplace 
misbehaviour reported by them, treating subjective differences in respondents’ 
perceptions of misbehaviour as an unknown – but unavoidable – source of error inherit to 
our methodological approach.   
However, in this chapter we enquire whether an individual’s class consciousness will 
influence their perception of the frequency of workplace misbehaviour.  We highlight 
three key elements of class consciousness in the present study: (1) Personal class 
identification (what class does the individual identify themselves as being a part of), (2) 
oppositional attitudes (recognition of the structural conflict of interest between workers 
and owners) and (3) counter-hegemonic attitudes (believing there are viable alternatives 
to capitalist economic relations).  We find that all three of these elements of class 
consciousness influence the frequency of misbehaviour reported by respondents:  
Respondents who identified as a member of a lower class, who expressed a more 
oppositional perspective or who held more counter-hegemonic attitudes perceived both 
employee and employer organizational misbehaviour as more frequent than other 
respondents. 
 
4.2 Background 
The literature surrounding organizational misbehaviour provides good reason to examine 
the connection between ideological attitudes and perceptions of misbehaviour, as their 
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influence is more than evident within the variety of perspectives taken by those who write 
on the topic.  For example, studies on organizational misbehaviour taking an individual 
pathological approach – i.e. human-resource or management perspectives – tend towards 
underestimating the frequency of the phenomenon, denying or ignoring considerable 
evidence of workplace misbehaviour as a widespread phenomenon engaged in – at least 
to some extent – by most employees (Harper, 1990; Harris & Ogbonna, 2002, 2006; 
Lawrence et al., 2007; Lee & Ok, 2014; Paulsen, 2014; Slora, 1989).  This downplaying 
and underestimating of the phenomenon is not particularly surprising for a segment of the 
organizational misbehaviour literature that is primarily concerned with advancing 
managerial and employer interests:  To acknowledge that employee misbehaviour is 
widespread invites inquiry into the structural conditions that often give rise to it – 
degraded work, lack of autonomy and experiences of injustice.   
A structural understanding of employee misbehaviour and the recognition of its ubiquity 
compete with the dominant capitalist narrative of general worker compliance, orderly 
production and harmony of worker, manager and owner interests (Barker, 1999; Casey, 
1999; Frenkel et al., 1998; Kinnie et al., 2000; Luthans, 1972).  Therefore, the standard 
operating procedure of those who are aligned with the capitalist ideological perspective 
that presents capitalist relations of production as the only viable means by which to 
organize human economic activity has been to maintain that misbehaviour within the 
workplace is infrequent and carried out primarily by a small number of pathological 
individuals (Bibi, 2013; Henle et al., 2010; Kets de Vries, 2017; Laabs et al., 1999; 
Leavitt, 1973; Wilson & Rosenfeld, 1990). 
On the other hand, incidences of misbehaviour might also be overestimated by a different 
group of stake-holders.  Employee misbehaviour is often highlighted for its potential to 
act as a form of worker resistance that is subtle and individual – in contrast to more 
formalized or collective resistance strategies such as union representation and negotiation 
(Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Analoui, 1995; Edwards et al., 1995; Fleming & Sewell, 
2002; Hodson, 2001; Muholland, 2004; Prasad & Prasad, 2000; Thompson, 2016).  Now, 
while there is good reason to highlight how employee misbehaviour can sometimes 
function as a form of worker resistance (for example, sabotage or output limitation) there 
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is also a danger that those who emphasize this potential for resistance may overestimate 
misbehaviour.  In her work on “decaf resistance,” Alessia Contu (2008) is critical of 
those who are overly optimistic about misbehaviour, too-readily celebrating every small 
act of misbehaviour as a potentially revolutionary act.  Though the objective of Contu 
and others is to problematize the assumption of misbehaviour as resistance, their 
evidence suggests that those who are overly-inclined towards identifying misbehaviour as 
worker resistance – and highly-motivated in their search to find evidence of more 
resistance – might also perceive greater frequency of misbehaviour (Contu, 2008; 
Fleming, 2005; Fleming & Spicer, 2003; Paulsen, 2014; Prassad, 2008).  For example, a 
personal cynical disengagement from work that has no effect on production efficiency 
would not be considered a form of misbehaviour by most, but those who are looking for 
evidence of grass-roots worker resistance may readily do so (Baines, 2011; De Certeau, 
1984; Hodson, 2001; Mumby, 2005; Sotirin & Gottfried, 1999). 
It is evident that the political leanings of an individual can affect their perception of the 
frequency of organizational misbehaviour, but we might expect this relationship to be 
even stronger where a general definition of misbehaviour – rather than one which is 
rigidly defined – is utilized.  In the present study, we use a definition of organizational 
misbehaviour that encompasses any activity in the workplace that one is not supposed to 
engage in (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Burawoy, 1979; Sprouse, 1992).  With this 
general and non-restrictive definition of misbehaviour, the frequency of misbehaviour 
reported will be more heavily mediated by the subjectivity of the respondent – as every 
individual can be expected to have a unique conception of what is, and is not, proper 
workplace behaviour.  For example, is it acceptable to check personal email while at 
work?  If it is permissible to do so, does checking personal email become misbehaviour if 
engaged in too frequently?  If yes, what is the acceptable amount of personal email after 
which this behaviour becomes misbehaviour?  The range of possible perspectives on the 
activity of checking personal email at work varies widely and whether this activity is 
deemed to be misbehaviour would depend on each individual respondent’s evaluation of 
it.  This subjective evaluation of misbehaviour is likely impacted by the individual 
characteristics of the respondent – manners, habits, upbringing, characteristics of the job, 
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and so on – but the personal characteristics that we take for this study’s primary 
explanatory variables measure the various elements of the class consciousness of the 
respondent.  
Class consciousness is a concept originally outlined by Karl Marx, but one which has 
been developed considerably since his time, as later Marxists have come to grips with the 
reality of a proletarian revolution that seems to be endlessly forestalled.  In his critique of 
capitalism, Marx outlined the objective conditions inherit to this system of production 
that would produce the circumstances ripe for a proletarian revolution – degraded work, 
alienation, exploitation and class antagonism (Marx, 1848, 1867) – but the industrial 
proletariat of the 19th century let him down by failing to develop the requisite popular 
revolutionary class consciousness (Mann, 1973; Ollman, 1972).  Marx originally 
explained class consciousness as the transition from the proletariat as a ‘class-in-itself’ to 
a ‘class-for-itself,’ but it can also be understood as the process of psychological 
development leading to one’s recognition that they are a part of a class and that the 
members of this class have common interests (Ollman, 1972).  Revolutionary proletarian 
class consciousness would then go one step further by including the recognition that 
one’s interests are best served by overthrow of the system of capitalist production that 
exploits the proletariat both individually and collectively (Mills, 1962).   
Class consciousness is a useful concept for reminding us how the structural conditions 
produced by class antagonism inherent to the capitalist system of production – while a 
necessary condition for proletarian revolution – are not sufficient, on their own, to bring 
it about.  Marx (1852) recognized that proletarian revolution overthrow of the capitalist 
system was not inevitable and that it would be brought about only by the determined 
actions of individuals guided by a revolutionary class consciousness.  However, Marx 
might still be criticized for over-simplifying the psychological development of the 
proletariat to a single step from false consciousness to a fully-formed proletarian class 
consciousness (Ollman, 1972).   
It is necessary to acknowledge that class consciousness can exist in a partially developed 
form and neo-Marxist theorists have aided us in this recognition by emphasizing how 
146 
 
 
 
Marxist class conscious is comprised of several distinct psychological elements, all of 
which must be present for an individual to be fully class conscious – and free of false 
consciousness.  Michael Mann (1973) outlines (1) class identity, (2) opposition to the 
capitalist class, (3) recognition of the systemic nature of class antagonism and 
exploitation under capitalism and (4) believing that there is a viable alternative to the 
capitalist system of production as necessary for revolutionary class consciousness.  These 
elements do not always arise together and Mann (1973) has noted how the working class 
has often been strong on solidarity – the first two elements – but weak on their 
perceptions of alternative political and economic relations to those of capitalism.  There 
is some indication that this trend may be reversing as support for the profit motive has 
decreased since 1982 and around half of non-managerial workers now believe that 
effective economic relations are possible without it (Livingstone and Watts, 2018). 
Additionally, worker solidarity is not always progressive or revolutionary, as when it is 
restricted to only those belonging to one’s narrow segment of the working-class:  There is 
a history in North America – and elsewhere – of white, higher-paid and more privileged 
workers benefitting from secondary exploitation and taking reactionary and racist 
positions in their dealings with non-white, lower-paid and less privileged workers 
(Bonacich, 1972; Lapides, 1987; Lenin, 1901; Ollman, 1972). 
So, class consciousness is clearly not monolithic, but another way to perceive it is as a 
scale with multiple points running from false consciousness – or a capitalist ideological 
perspective – to full proletarian revolutionary consciousness.  Bertell Ollman (1972) 
approaches class consciousness this way, outlining nine psychological steps that a worker 
must ascend on the path to revolutionary consciousness, beginning with the simple 
realization that they have interests (step 1), through the realization that their class 
interests take precedence over interests related to nation, race, ethnicity or religion (step 
4) and concluding with the will to take action when the revolutionary moment arrives 
(step 9).  Ollman’s scale approach is interesting because it presumably allows for the 
evaluation and comparison of individuals by their level of class consciousness: “What we 
find then is that most workers have climbed a few of these steps (enough to complain), 
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that some have scaled most of them (enough to vote for working-class candidates), but 
that relatively few have managed to ascend to the top” (Ollman, 1972, p. 8).  
In the present study, we borrow primarily from Michael Mann’s approach (1973) and 
conceptualize class consciousness using three primary elements: (1) class identity (the 
individual’s recognition that they are part of a class), (2) an oppositional perspective 
(recognition of systemic class antagonism and exploitation and opposition to the 
capitalist class) and (3) a counter-hegemonic perspective (believing that there are viable 
alternatives to capitalist relations of production and other possible social formations).  By 
focusing on these three elements, we can examine how the class consciousness of the 
individual is related to the frequency of misbehaviour that they report.  Note here, that 
counter-hegemony is defined in the context of the individual’s questioning of the 
legitimacy or necessity of primary elements of capitalism and therefore problematizing 
capitalist hegemony – defined by Mann as the dominant ideological perspective that 
believes ‘freedom and justice are best secured by “breaking down” man’s [human] needs 
and activities into separate segments (work, consumption, politics, etc.) and providing 
each one with a separate market in which individuals can express their preferences and 
realise their needs’ (1973, p. 19).  What makes this ideology hegemonic is its popular 
adoption and elevation to the level of ‘common-sense’, so that a counter-hegemonic 
perspective will always require the challenging of the status-quo and popular consensus 
on the dynamics of social reality (Gramsci, 1971). 
Though Marxist class consciousness is generally discussed in the context of the 
proletarian class, our analytic sample is not restricted and contains individuals of every 
class.  As noted previously, the capitalist perspective on misbehaviour has tended towards 
underestimation of the phenomenon, pathological explanations for employee 
misbehaviour and the denial of employers as individuals even capable of misbehaving in 
the workplace.  Correspondingly, we expect those who benefit most from the capitalist 
system and have the greatest interest in defending it (upper classes) will report less 
misbehaviour of both types than other respondents.  
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Hypothesis 1A: Upper class and upper-middle class respondents will perceive 
employer misbehaviour as less frequent than respondents with any other class 
identities.   
Hypothesis 1B: Upper class and upper-middle class respondents will perceive 
employee misbehaviour as less frequent than respondents with any other class 
identities.   
Class identity is obviously an important element of class consciousness, but we were also 
interested in how ideological attitudes relate to respondents’ perceptions of the frequency 
of organizational misbehaviour.  The second component of our conceptualization of class 
consciousness is holding an oppositional perspective – which we operationalize as greater 
support for workers’ right to strike and agreeing that owners make gains at the expense of 
their employees.  It is predicted that holding more oppositional attitudes will correspond 
with perceptions of misbehaviour as more frequent, as these respondents are already 
more critical of capitalist economic relations and interests and will have less inclination 
to underestimate occurrences of misbehaviour – they have little interest in supporting the 
capitalist ideological account of misbehaviour as rare and pathological by underreporting 
or downplaying its occurrence.    
Hypothesis 2A: Respondents who support the right to strike will report more 
frequent employer misbehaviour. 
Hypothesis 2B: Respondents who support the right to strike will report more 
frequent employee misbehaviour. 
Hypothesis 3A: Respondents who believe owners make gains at the expense of 
workers will report more frequent employer misbehaviour. 
Hypothesis 3B: Respondents who believe owners make gains at the expense of 
workers will report more frequent employee misbehaviour. 
The final element of class consciousness we concern ourselves with here is the 
development of a counter-hegemonic perspective.   Because the capitalist hegemonic 
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perspective is to present capitalism as – if not the perfect economic system – the only 
pragmatic means by which to organize human production, those who question the 
proposed necessities of capitalism – or the entire system itself – can be distinguished as 
counter-hegemonic by their problematization of “common-sense” notions that often go 
unquestioned within an ideological domain dominated by capitalist interests.  In the 
present study, we operationalize a counter-hegemonic perspective using two attitudinal 
variables – the belief that a modern economy is possible without the profit motive and 
belief that employee-run work organizations can be effective.  Respondents holding more 
counter-hegemonic attitudes are less likely to be convinced by the capitalist hegemonic 
account of misbehaviour as a minor phenomenon, and so they are expected to report 
more frequent misbehaviour than other respondents. 
Hypothesis 4A: Respondents who believe a modern economy is possible without the 
profit motive will report more frequent employer misbehaviour. 
Hypothesis 4B: Respondents who believe a modern economy is possible without the 
profit motive will report more frequent employee misbehaviour. 
Hypothesis 5A: Respondents who believe work organizations could be run by non-
management without bosses will report more frequent employer misbehaviour. 
Hypothesis 5B: Respondents who believe work organizations could be run by non-
management without bosses will report more frequent employee misbehaviour. 
 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Data 
The data for this study are drawn from the complete Changing Workplace in a 
Knowledge Economy (CWKE) 2016 sample of employed Canadians above 18 years of 
age (N=2,979).  A detailed description of this dataset (including sampling technique, 
weighting and response rate) is available in our methodology notes section in chapter 1.  
The respondents for this study were recruited both through random digit dialing and the 
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simple random selection from a professional web panel maintained by the Leger 
Research Intelligence Group (N=475,000).  The overall response rate for this data set is 
52% (see Appendix 1 for this calculation).  For this chapter, our analytical subsamples 
are reduced as a result of non-response on our two key misbehaviour variables to 
N=2,663 and N=2594 respectively.  For each individual portion of the following analyses, 
all valid cases are utilized, so the value of N varies according to the response rate of the 
explanatory variables under consideration in each case.    
 
4.3.2 Measures 
4.3.3 Dependent Variables 
The first of our dependent variables measures perceptions of the frequency of employee 
misbehaviour.  The questionnaire item associated with this variable requested that 
respondents answer the following: “How common do you think employee misbehaviour 
such as taking organization-owned materials or loafing on the job is in places like where 
you work?”  The valid responses to this question make up a 4-point Likert scale ranging 
from “extremely uncommon” to “extremely common,” through “fairly uncommon” and 
“fairly common” as intermediary options. 
Our second dependent variable measures respondents’ perceptions of the frequency of 
employer misbehaviour.  The item, as posed to respondents, read “How common do you 
think employer misbehaviour such as not paying employees some earned benefits or 
avoiding taxes on earnings is in places like where you work?”  As with our other 
misbehaviour item, the four available valid responses ranged from “extremely 
uncommon” to “extremely common”.   
More information about both of these misbehaviour variables is available within the 
general methodological notes section of chapter 1 and the results of a non-response 
analysis can be located within Appendix 2.    
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It should be mentioned that both of our misbehaviour items measure respondents’ 
perceptions of the frequency of workplace misbehaviour and should not be conflated with 
an objective accounting of employee or employer misbehaviour events.  Additionally, we 
cannot know what activities the respondent is considering when reporting the frequency 
of misbehaviour – though it is reasonable to expect that the examples of misbehaviour we 
included will be salient for most respondents during their individual deliberations. 
 
4.3.4 Independent Variables 
4.3.4.1 Class Identity 
Our class identity variable contains respondents’ self-evaluations of their own class 
membership.  The item as presented to respondents read, “IF YOU HAD TO CHOOSE 
one of the following names for your social class, which one would you say you belong 
to?”  Valid responses were upper class, upper-middle class, middle class, lower-middle 
class, working class and lower class, but several non-response options were available 
(Don’t know, Refused or I do not think of myself as part of any class).  Just over 4% of 
respondents chose a non-valid response category and are left out of any analyses that 
incorporate class identity.  We have grouped together the original categories to create a 
new ordinal scale variable: (1) working/lower class, (2) lower-middle class, (3) middle 
class and (4) upper/upper-middle class. 
 
4.3.4.2 Oppositional Attitude – Right to Strike 
The first of our oppositional attitudinal variables measures the individual’s support for 
the right of workers to strike.  The question as it appeared to respondents read, “During a 
strike, management should be prohibited by law from hiring workers to take the place of 
strikers”.  Respondents indicated their level of agreement with this statement choosing 
from one of five Likert-scale categories (1 – Strongly disagree, 2 – Somewhat disagree, 3 
– Neither, 4 – Somewhat agree, 5 – Strongly agree).  Respondents who answered with an 
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“I don’t know” or “Refused” were left out of further analysis utilizing this variable (about 
10% of the sample chose one of these non-valid response categories). 
 
4.3.4.3 Oppositional Attitude – Owner’s Gain at Workers’ Expense 
Our second oppositional attitude variable is composed of responses to the statement 
“Owners of corporations make gains at the expense of their workers.”  Again, 
respondents indicated their level of agreement along a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 
“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.  About 7% of respondents refused to answer or 
indicated they did not know. 
 
4.3.4.4 Counter-Hegemonic Attitude – Modern Economy Possible 
without Profit Motive 
Our first counter-hegemonic perspective measure evaluates respondents’ attitude 
regarding the necessity of the profit motive to effective economic relations.  The 
statement respondents were asked to agree/disagree with was “It is possible for a modern 
economy to run effectively without the profit motive” and they did so using the same five 
response categories as the previous two oppositional attitude variables (from “Strongly 
disagree” to “Strongly agree”).  Eleven percent of respondents chose a non-valid 
response category. 
 
4.3.4.5 Counter-Hegemonic Attitude – Employee-Run 
Organizations Can Be Effective 
Our final attitudinal variable measures respondents’ agreement/disagreement with the 
counter-hegemonic belief that employee-run work organizations can be effective.  Using 
the same answer categories as the previous three attitude variables, respondents indicated 
their level of agreement with the sentiment “Non-management could run things without 
bosses”; 6% of respondents chose a non-valid response category instead. 
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4.3.5 Control Variables 
We include several individual demographic variables as controls for our multivariate 
models.  These controls were chosen due to suspected association with key explanatory 
or dependent variables in effort to avoid spuriousness.  We were also interested if there 
might be additional differences in perceptions of misbehaviour between demographic 
categories not accounted for by the class consciousness of the respondent. 
The first of our demographic control variables indicates the gender of the respondent.  
We make use of a binary gender variable for our analyses in the present study and our 
analytic sample is 52% male and 48% female. 
The second control variable concerns respondent’s highest level of education attained.  
This information is represented in a 5-point ordinal scale (1 – No diploma, 2 – High 
school diploma, 3 – Non-University Post-Secondary Certificate, 4 – Bachelor Degree, 5 – 
Professional/Graduate degree).  Our sample is relatively highly educated with about 68% 
of respondents attaining a credential above the high-school diploma level – this level of 
education is comparable to the Canadian labour force.  
Our third demographic variable is respondent age.  The range for our sample is 75 years, 
with all respondents being between 19 and 94 years old.  The average age of respondents 
is 43. 
Our last control variable is respondent self-identified race.  We make use of a 2-category 
binary variable (white or non-white) for simplicity in presentation of results and to 
capture the influence of the advantages and privileges afforded to individuals categorized 
as white.  We note here that the respondents who make up the non-white category self-
identified as over two dozen distinct racial categories (or a mixture of two or more) and 
so conclusions about these respondents (except in comparison to their counterparts who 
identified as white) should be treated with caution.  Most (82%) of our sample identified 
themselves as white, while the remaining respondents associate themselves with a non-
white racial group. 
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4.3.6 A Note on Multicollinearity 
In order to check for potential issues resulting from multicollinearity, we constructed a 
correlation matrix (see Appendix 7).  Most of the significant relationships between 
variables are weak or very weak, with those of moderate strength or greater limited to 
dummy variable categories (to be expected and not cause for concern).  It is worth briefly 
highlighting the relationships between our attitudinal explanatory variables.  Though 
these relationships are weak (strongest is r=.30), every one of these attitudinal variables 
is related to every other.  The strongest relationships between attitudes were always with 
the complimentary measure – oppositional attitudes are more closely associated with one 
another than with counter hegemonic attitudes (and vice-versa) – which provides some 
additional support for our operationalization of these concepts.  The associations between 
our attitudinal explanatory variables are not of sufficient strength to suspect 
multicollinearity is inflating our measures of R2 but are still useful in reminding us that 
certain attitudes will tend to accompany one another.   
 
4.4 Analytical Approach 
Our analytical approach begins with a bivariate analysis of class identity by each of our 
dependent variables (perceived frequency of employee misbehaviour and perceived 
frequency of employer misbehaviour). 
Next, we ran bivariate analyses for both oppositional attitude variables by both dependent 
variables to compare the individual influence of each oppositional attitudinal measure as 
a predictor of respondents’ perceptions of the frequency of misbehaviour.  This process is 
repeated a final time for the counter-hegemonic attitude measures.  It was possible to use 
gamma throughout the entirety of our bivariate analyses (every independent variable was 
ordinal) and we chose to do so, prioritizing this measure over other more conservative 
options (ex. tau-b and tau-c) for ease of interpretation derived from our greater familiarity 
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with the measure.  We did examine other ordinal by ordinal measures and found no cause 
to suspect that gamma was exaggerating results in the context of this study.  
Finally, we ran two series of multivariate regression models (one for each of our 
dependent variables).  The first model of each series contains only our class 
consciousness variables: class identity, oppositional attitudes and counter-hegemonic 
attitudes.  The second model of each series also incorporates demographic control 
variables (gender, education, age and race).  For the purposes of multivariate analysis, 
both of our dependent variables were treated as continuous, enabling OLS regression.  
Our four ordinal attitudinal variables were also treated as continuous.  We made the 
decision to treat these ordinal variables as continuous for several reasons: (1) increases 
and decreases in perceptions of misbehaviour and movement on the attitude scale were 
more important to us than comparison between particular variable categories as 
categorically different, (2) OLS regression allows for use of statistical techniques and 
methods of presentation more familiar to our readers and (3) it is reasonable to assume 
approximately equal distance between the categories of these variables – in this case, 
OLS regression will provide us with understandable and realistic results.  Class identity 
was treated as a categorical variable in our multivariate analysis to enable the comparison 
between particular class groupings.  Dummy variables were created so that a regression 
coefficient could be calculated for each class category (middle class – as the most-
populated category – was chosen as the reference group). 
 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Bivariate Results 
4.5.1.1 Perceived Misbehaviour by Class Identity 
The result of our bivariate analysis of class identity and perceived frequency of employer 
misbehaviour are displayed in Table 4.1.  Across every class identity category, the 
respondents who perceive employer misbehaviour to be a fairly or extremely common 
occurrence are outnumbered by those who perceive it to be uncommon.  However, there 
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is also an obvious difference in the perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour across 
class groups – there is a linear progression of decreased reporting of employer 
misbehaviour by those higher up the class hierarchy:  Only 12% of upper class and 
upper-middle class respondents perceived employer misbehaviour to be a common 
occurrence compared with 22% of the respondents in the lowest class category.  Our 
gamma coefficient of -.158 provides further evidence of a negative relationship between 
these variables and our test of significance allows us to be confident (at the .001 level) 
that this result is not due to random chance.  Together, these results provide strong 
evidence to support our hypothesis (1A) of an inverse relationship between class identity 
and the perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour. 
Table 4.1 Perceptions of Employer Misbehaviour by Class Identity 
Class Identity N % who report employer 
misbehaviour as fairly 
or extremely common 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
(p-value) 
Working/Lower Class 479 22.2   
Lower-Middle Class 398 15.9   
Middle Class 1111 13.4   
Upper/Upper-Middle Class 534 11.8   
Total 2522 15.1 -.158 .000 
Turning our attention to Table 4.2, we have reported the bivariate results of our 
exploration of the relationship between class identity and perceptions concerning the 
frequency of employee misbehaviour.  In comparison with the results from Table 4.1 
concerning employer misbehaviour, it is clear that – while the perception of employee 
misbehaviour as a common occurrence is still a minority position for the respondents of 
every class – employee misbehaviour is very clearly perceived to be more frequent 
overall than employer misbehaviour:  No less than 30% of even the upper/upper-middle 
class respondents, and as many as 46% of the working/lower class respondents, perceived 
employee misbehaviour to be a common workplace occurrence.  The reported 
frequencies in Table 4.2 suggest a linear trend, and our measures of association (γ= -.145) 
and significance (p= .000) provide verifying evidence of a negative relationship between 
class identity and perceptions of employee misbehaviour that is similar in strength, 
direction and level of significance to the results for employer misbehaviour.  Once again, 
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respondents identifying with a higher class perceived misbehaviour to be significantly 
less frequent than other respondents (support for hypothesis 1B). 
Table 4.2 Perceptions of Employee Misbehaviour by Class Identity 
Class Identity N % who report employee 
misbehaviour as fairly or 
extremely common 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
(p-value) 
Working/Lower Class 494 46.4   
Lower-Middle Class 419 38.9   
Middle Class 1139 35.0   
Upper/Upper-Middle 
Class 
542 29.8   
Total 2594 36.7 -.145 .000 
 
4.5.1.2 Perceived Misbehaviour by Oppositional Attitudes 
The next section of our bivariate analysis examines the relationship between agreement 
or disagreement with oppositional ideological attitudes and respondents’ perceptions of 
the frequency of employer misbehaviour (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4).  Through examination 
of the frequencies for each table, it is evident that agreement with these oppositional 
statements corresponds with the reporting of employer misbehaviour as more frequent, 
while the respondents who indicated disagreement with these statements generally 
perceived less frequent employer misbehaviour (support for Hypotheses 2A and 3A). 
The level of significance calculated for both variables’ relationship with the dependent 
variable is at the .001 level and provides us with confidence that each of these 
oppositional attitudes are significant bivariate predictors of perceived frequency of 
employer misbehaviour.  However, by comparing measures of association (γ) for each 
attitude, it is possible to evaluate which of our two oppositional attitudes is more strongly 
related with the perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour.  Doing so, we find 
evidence that the recognition of corporate owners as deriving profit at the expense of 
their workers (γ= .206) may be more closely related with the dependent variable than 
support for the right to strike (γ= .108).  However, while absolute difference between 
these measures of association is not particularly great, the frequency distribution for the 
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recognition of owners profiting at workers’ expense shows a greater difference in 
perceptions of employer misbehaviour as common between those who strongly disagreed 
and those who strongly agreed with the associated statement (16%).  In comparison, the 
range of difference in the perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour as common by 
those who strongly disagreed and those who strongly agreed with the statement 
concerning the right to strike was only 9%. 
Table 4.3 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Support for Right to Strike 
During a strike, management 
should be prohibited by law 
from hiring workers to take the 
place of striker. 
N % who report 
employer 
misbehaviour as 
fairly or extremely 
common 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
(p-value) 
Strongly disagree 343 10.8   
Somewhat disagree 324 9.6   
Neither 381 16.3   
Somewhat agree 574 15.5   
Strongly agree 791 19.7   
Total 2413 15.5 .108 .000 
 
Table 4.4 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Recognition of Class 
Antagonism 
Owners of corporations 
make gains at the expense of 
their workers. 
N % who report 
employer 
misbehaviour as fairly 
or extremely common 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
(p-value) 
Strongly disagree 300 7.7   
Somewhat disagree 316 8.2   
Neither 354 11.0   
Somewhat agree 855 16.4   
Strongly agree 652 24.4   
Total 2477 15.6 .206 .000 
Moving on to our bivariate analysis of oppositional attitudes by perceptions of employee 
misbehaviour (see Table 4.5 and 4.6), we find that agreement with either oppositional 
attitude predicts a higher reported frequency of misbehaviour (both bivariate relationships 
are positive and significant at the .001 level).  These results support hypotheses 2B and 
3B, but there is an obvious difference in strength between oppositional attitudes in their 
strength of association with the dependent variable.  Once again, the recognition of class 
antagonism between owners and workers is distinguished as more influential in 
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predicting the perceived frequency of employee misbehaviour than a respondent’s 
opposition to strikebreaking (γ= .233 compared with γ= .075).  It is also worth noting that 
the lack of a clear trend within the frequency distribution of Table 4.5 gives reason to 
question whether there is a substantive bivariate relationship between support for the 
right to strike and perceptions of the frequency of employee misbehaviour.  In obvious 
contrast, the frequency distribution in Table 4.6 demonstrates a clear difference in the 
perception of employee misbehaviour as common between those who strongly disagree 
(29.3%) and those who strongly agree (49.4%) with the statement “Owners of 
corporations make gains at the expense of their workers.” 
Table 4.5 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Support for Right to 
Strike 
During a strike, management should 
be prohibited by law from hiring 
workers to take the place of striker. 
N % who report employee 
misbehaviour as fairly 
or extremely common 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
(p-value) 
Strongly disagree 347 38.3   
Somewhat disagree 325 32.9   
Neither 390 34.1   
Somewhat agree 591 38.7   
Strongly agree 818 38.8   
Total 2471 37.2 .075 .001 
 
Table 4.6 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Recognition of Class 
Antagonism 
Owners of corporations make 
gains at the expense of their 
workers. 
N % who report 
employee 
misbehaviour as 
fairly or extremely 
common 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
(p-value) 
Strongly disagree 307 29.3   
Somewhat disagree 315 27.3   
Neither 358 28.2   
Somewhat agree 870 36.3   
Strongly agree 690 49.4   
Total 2540 36.8 .233 .000 
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4.5.1.3 Perceived Misbehaviour by Counter-Hegemonic Attitudes 
We next conducted a bivariate analysis for each of our counter-hegemonic attitudinal 
variables by respondents’ perceptions of the frequency of employer misbehaviour.  For 
each of these two attitude variables, agreement with the offered statement indicated a 
more counter-hegemonic perspective on the part of the respondent – a perspective which 
appears to be related to a higher reported frequency of employer misbehaviour.  The 
results displayed in both Table 4.7 and 4.8 suggest a significant positive bivariate 
relationship for each of our counter-hegemonic attitude variables with the dependent 
variable.  The gamma values suggest our second measure (Non-management could run 
things without bosses) may be more strongly associated with perceptions of employer 
misbehaviour than our first counter-hegemonic attitudinal measure (It is possible for a 
modern economy to run effectively without the profit motive).  However, the magnitude 
of difference between these measures of association is not particularly great (γ= .132 and 
γ= .220, respectively), so these variables may still be relatively similar in their influence 
over the dependent variable. 
Table 4.7 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Believe Non-Profit 
Economy Possible 
It is possible for a modern 
economy to run effectively 
without the profit motive. 
N % who report employer 
misbehaviour as fairly 
or extremely common 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
(p-value) 
Strongly disagree 450 12.7   
Somewhat disagree 652 10.7   
Neither 361 18.8   
Somewhat agree 660 17.0   
Strongly agree 283 24.0   
Total 2406 15.6 .132 .000 
The final section of our bivariate analyses concerns the relationship between each of our 
two counter-hegemonic attitude variables and the perceived frequency of employee 
misbehaviour (see Table 4.9 and 4.10).  Examining the frequency distributions for both 
tables, we find some evidence in support of Hypotheses 4B and 5B (holding more 
counter-hegemonic attitudes will be related to a higher reported frequency of employee 
misbehaviour).  In a similar fashion to the results pertaining to perceptions of employer 
misbehaviour, we find that both counter-hegemonic attitudes (Belief in the possibility of 
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a non-profit economy and support for employee-run organizations) are significantly and 
positively related with respondents’ perceptions of the frequency of employee 
misbehaviour.  However, our gamma values here (γ= .075 and γ= .111) suggest that these 
counter-hegemonic attitudes might be weaker predictors of the reported frequency of 
employee misbehaviour than they are for predicting employer misbehaviour. 
Table 4.8 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Support for Employee-
Run Organizations 
Non-management could run 
things without bosses. 
N % who report employer 
misbehaviour as fairly 
or extremely common 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
(p-value) 
Strongly disagree 558 10.4   
Somewhat disagree 709 9.3   
Neither 312 15.7   
Somewhat agree 701 18.8   
Strongly agree 240 32.5   
Total 2520 15.2 .220 .000 
 
Table 4.9 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Believe Non-Profit 
Economy Possible 
It is possible for a modern 
economy to run effectively 
without the profit motive. 
N % who report employee 
misbehaviour as fairly 
or extremely common 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
(p-value) 
Strongly disagree 466 34.3   
Somewhat disagree 657 33.6   
Neither 365 38.1   
Somewhat agree 677 37.1   
Strongly agree 290 44.8   
Total 2455 36.7 .075 .002 
 
Table 4.10 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Support for Employee-
Run Organizations 
Non-management could 
run things without bosses. 
N % who report employee 
misbehaviour as fairly 
or extremely common 
Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
(p-value) 
Strongly disagree 560 34.1   
Somewhat disagree 716 32.0   
Neither 319 35.4   
Somewhat agree 715 41.4   
Strongly agree 258 43.4   
Total 2568 36.6 .111 .000 
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4.5.2 Multivariate Results 
4.5.2.1 Perceptions of Employer Misbehaviour 
Leaving behind our bivariate analysis, we focus on the multivariate relationships between 
all the elements of class consciousness and the perceived frequency of employer 
misbehaviour.  In the first multivariate model of Table 4.11 (containing only our primary 
class consciousness variables and our dependent variable), we found several noteworthy 
results.  First, we found that working class or lower-class respondents reported 
significantly more frequent employer misbehaviour (β= .090) than the comparison 
category (middle class respondents), while lower-middle-class and upper/upper middle-
class respondents do not appear significantly different from middle-class respondents in 
their reporting of employer misbehaviour.  Second, in examining the multivariate results 
for our oppositional attitude variables, we found that only one remained a significant 
predictor of a higher reported frequency of misbehaviour: Owners of corporations make 
gains at the expense of their workers (β= .105).  Meanwhile, the attitude that strike-
breaking should be prohibited by law lost the significance it demonstrated in earlier 
bivariate analysis with the dependent variable.  The results for our counter-hegemonic 
attitudes told a similar story:  Support for the employee-run work organizations was 
significantly related to a higher reported frequency of employer misbehaviour (β= .132) 
while questioning the necessity of the profit motive to the efficacy of a modern economy 
was not significantly related to our dependent variable. 
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Table 4.11 Multivariate Models of Perceptions of Employer Misbehaviour 
  Model 1 Model 2 
  β 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Significanc
e (p-value) 
β 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Significanc
e (p-value) 
Class 
Identity 
Class Identity     
  Working or Lower-class .090 (.050) .000*** .072 (.050) .002** 
  Lower-middle class .017 (.053) .431 .005 (.053) .818 
  Middle class (ref.) -- -- -- -- 
Upper or upper-middle 
class 
-.018 (.046) .428 -.023 (.047) .307 
Oppositional 
Attitudes 
Strike-breaking should be 
prohibited by law 
.029 (.013) .188 .028 (.013) .206 
Owners of corporations 
make gains at the expense 
of their workers 
.105 (.014) .000*** .096 (.014) .000*** 
Counter-
Hegemonic 
Attitudes 
Possible for a modern 
economy to run effectively 
without the profit motive 
.013 (.014) .564 .014 (.014) .525 
Non-management could 
run things without bosses 
.132 (.014) .000*** .138 (.014) .000*** 
Control 
Variables 
Gender     
  Male (ref.)   -- -- 
  Female   -.094 (.036) .000*** 
Highest Education Level     
No diploma   .049 (.085) .029* 
High school diploma 
(ref.) 
  -- -- 
Non-university post-
secondary certificate 
  -.007 (.047) .783 
Bachelor degree   -.033 (.053) .205 
Professional/Graduate 
degree 
  -.045 (.067) .065 
Age   -.073 (.001) .001*** 
Race     
  Non-white (ref.)   -- -- 
  White   -.053 (.048) .014* 
R2  .055  .079  
Adjusted R2  .052  .073  
N  2198  2133  
Notes. *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001. Regression coefficients represent standardized slopes. 
Once we controlled for individual demographic variables in our second multivariate 
model of employer misbehaviour (Table 4.11), we see that the results from the first 
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model remain relatively unchanged.  However, the inclusion of these control variables 
revealed new relationships between respondent demographics and perceptions of the 
frequency of employer misbehaviour.  We found that female (β= -.094) and white (β= -
.053) respondents reported less employer misbehaviour than their male and non-white 
counterparts.  Age was found to be negatively related to our dependent variable (β= -
.073) with older respondents generally perceiving employer misbehaviour to be a less 
frequent occurrence.  A low level of education is also a significant factor, with those 
respondents who have not earned a high school diploma reporting more frequent 
misbehaviour than those with a high school diploma or better (β= .049). 
 
4.5.2.2 Perceptions of Employee Misbehaviour 
For the final section of our results, we repeated the above multivariate analysis of class 
consciousness and demographic variables by perceptions of the frequency of workplace 
misbehaviour – this time substituting employee misbehaviour as the dependent variable.  
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 4.12 and – examining our first model 
which contains only the elements of class consciousness as explanatory variables – we 
see many of the same significant factors from our multivariate analysis of employer 
misbehaviour are relevant for predicting perceptions of the frequency of employee 
misbehaviour.  Agreement with the oppositional attitude that owners of corporations 
make gains at the expense of their workers (β= .166) and the counter-hegemonic attitude 
that non-management could run things without bosses (β= .057) are both significantly 
related with a higher reported frequency of employee misbehaviour, while our other two 
measures of oppositional and counter-hegemonic attitudes are not.  In addition, a working 
class or lower-class identity once again predicts reports of more frequent misbehaviour 
(β= .064) than middle class respondents, but the upper-class and upper-middle class 
respondents distinguish themselves as reporting employee misbehaviour as significantly 
less frequent (β= -.044).  This marks a considerable difference from the multivariate 
results for employer misbehaviour, where upper-class and upper-middle class 
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respondents were not significantly different from middle-class respondents in their 
perceptions of the frequency of misbehaviour. 
Table 4.12 Multivariate Models of Perceptions of Employee Misbehaviour 
  Model 1 Model 2 
  β 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Significanc
e (p-value) 
β 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Significanc
e (p-value) 
Class 
Identity 
Class Identity     
Working or lower class .064 (.054) .004** .057 (.054) .013* 
Lower-middle class .028 (0.57) .200 .021 (.057) .356 
Middle class (ref.) -- -- -- -- 
Upper or upper-middle 
class 
-.044 (.050) .049* -.038 (.051) .094 
Oppositiona
l Attitudes 
Strike-breaking should be 
prohibited by law 
-.015 (.014) .500 -.024 (.015) .289 
Owners of corporations 
make gains at the expense of 
their workers 
.166 (.015) .000*** .161 (.016) .000*** 
Counter-
Hegemonic 
Attitudes 
Possible for a modern 
economy to run effectively 
without the profit motive 
.014 (0.15) .536 .009 (.016) .701 
Non-management could run 
things without bosses 
.057 (.015) .010** .055 (.016) .015* 
Control 
Variables 
Gender     
Male (ref.)   -- -- 
Female   -.022 (.039) .305 
Highest Education Level 
Attained 
    
No diploma   .016 (.091) .469 
High school diploma (ref.)   -- -- 
Non-university post-
secondary certificate 
  .040 (.050) .129 
Bachelor degree   -.027 (.057) .294 
Professional/Graduate 
degree 
  -.047 (.072) .050* 
 Age   -.092 (.001) .000*** 
 Race     
 Non-white (ref.)   -- -- 
 White   -.014 (.052) .512 
R2  .048  .062  
Adjusted R2  .045  .056  
N  2230  2168  
Notes. *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001. Regression coefficients represent standardized slopes 
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The incorporation of individual demographic variables in our second model (Table 4.12) 
changes little about the observed relationships between the elements of class 
consciousness and perceptions of employee misbehaviour frequency, though the lower 
reported frequency of misbehaviour by upper/upper-middle class did lose significance 
(indicating that the 6% difference in their reporting of employee misbehaviour as a 
common occurrence compared to middle class respondents does not constitute a 
statistically significant difference). 
We also found considerably fewer significant relationships between the demographic 
control variables themselves and perceptions of employee misbehaviour.  Age was once 
again found to be significantly negatively correlated with reported frequency of employee 
misbehaviour (β= -.092) while the highest category of educational attainment 
(professional or graduate degree) was related with a significantly lower reported 
frequency of misbehaviour (β= -.047) than the comparison category (high school diploma 
holders). 
 
4.6 Discussion 
The most important of our findings concern the relationship between the elements of 
class consciousness and the perceived frequency of misbehaviour (both by employees 
and employers).  The three elements of class consciousness focused on in this paper are 
(1) class identity, (2) oppositional attitudes and (3) counter-hegemonic attitudes; we 
found that each one of these elements was significantly related with perceptions of the 
frequency of misbehaviour. 
The first step to explaining the relationship between greater class consciousness and 
respondents’ perceptions of misbehaviour is to understand that the recognition of 
misbehaviour as a frequent occurrence is inherently incompatible with popular 
justifications for capitalist relations of production.  The dominant capitalist narrative for 
explaining organizational misbehaviour has been to define the phenomenon as being the 
result of individual deficiencies and weaknesses in character (Analoui, 1995; Biggerstaff 
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et al., 2015; Edwards et al., 1995; Henle et al., 2010; Lee & Ok, 2014; McMullan & 
McClung, 2006; Trevino, 2005).  Correspondingly, it is frequently assumed that 
misbehaviour is a rare occurrence engaged in only by a pathological minority of workers 
and managers – and almost never by employers – in a contemporary workplace 
characterized by unity of interest between workers, managers and owners and generally 
congenial industrial relations (Leavitt, 1973; Luthans, 1972; Wilson & Rosenfield, 1990).   
With regards to the misbehaviour of employers, this general denial of the phenomenon is 
even more pronounced.  Not only are employers generally regarded to be individuals 
largely incapable of organizational misbehaviour, their activities are also those usually set 
forth as the model for proper workplace behaviour – workers labouring as hard as 
possible to increase profit.  In Richard Nixon’s famous interview with David Frost, the 
former president said, “when the president does it, that means it is not illegal” (Frost & 
Nixon, 2007, p. 1).  There is a similar power-based justification at work for employer 
misbehaviour:  When an employer does it, that means it is not misbehaviour.  The strong 
influence of this strategy is evidenced by the general lack of inquiry into the 
misbehaviour of employers within the organizational misbehaviour literature.   
Considering the significant ideological protection granted to employers – and the 
motivation for defenders of capitalist relations to deny the frequency of both employee 
and employer misbehaviour – we were not particularly surprised to find that the 
respondents who were most likely to perceive organizational misbehaviour as more 
frequent were those who identified as lower or working class, expressed oppositional 
attitudes or held more counter-hegemonic beliefs.  These respondents have the least to 
gain by defending the capitalist system and were correspondingly less likely to 
underreport the frequency of misbehaviour. 
Having established connections between class consciousness and perceptions of 
misbehaviour, we were also interested in a closer examination of which elements of class 
consciousness might be most influential as predictors.   
Looking at our results for class identity, we found that a working/lower class identity was 
a significant predictor of a higher perceived frequency of misbehaviour across every 
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multivariate model.  This result is as expected:  These individuals’ interests are not best 
served by capitalist relations of production, so they are less motivated to prop up this 
system by underestimating the frequency of misbehaviour.  However, we were somewhat 
surprised to see that our multivariate results revealed no significant difference between 
lower-middle class respondents and middle-class respondents in their reporting of 
misbehaviour.  There are a couple likely explanations for this result: (1) lower-middle 
class respondents may occupy economic circumstances – and have economic interests – 
relatively similar to middle-class respondents and (2) the identification of one’s self as 
lower-middle class, rather than working/lower-class, may indicate individual aspirations 
of upward mobility and therefore greater support for the capitalist system.  Finally, we 
found only limited evidence to suggest that upper/upper-middle class respondents 
perceive misbehaviour as less frequent than middle class respondents, so it appears likely 
that – all other factors being equal – it is only working-class/lower-class respondents who 
perceive the frequency of misbehaviour considerably differently than the members of 
other classes. 
With regards to our measures of oppositional attitudes, we were somewhat surprised to 
find that our ‘support for the right to strike’ variable was not a significant factor in any of 
our multivariate models, while the recognition that owners of corporations make gains at 
the expense of workers was a significant predictor of a higher reported frequency of 
misbehaviour throughout.  The explanation for this difference in significance is not 
entirely clear, though it may be partially explained by the more explicit reference to 
employer behaviour located within the statement “Owners of corporations make gains at 
the expense of their workers” compared with “Strike-breaking should be prohibited by 
law”.  The first item requires the respondent to think in terms of class antagonism and 
conflicts of interest, whereas it is possible for respondents to regard the second question 
as purely a matter of policy or jurisprudence:  In short, the first item may be the better 
measure of respondents’ oppositional attitudes.   
On examination of the multivariate results for our counter-hegemonic attitude variables, 
we discovered a similar trend as that described above:  One counter-hegemonic attitude 
was significant across all multivariate models while the other was not significant within 
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any.  Here, we were surprised to find that a questioning of the economic necessity of the 
profit motive was not related to the perceived frequency of misbehaviour:  Because 
support for the pursuit of private profit is a key element of capitalist hegemony, we had 
expected to find that criticism of this central ideological component would also signal 
greater perceived frequency of misbehaviour.  This non-significance is particularly 
striking considering our other counter-hegemonic attitudinal variable – measuring 
respondents’ agreement that “non-management could run things without bosses” – was 
significantly related with the perceived frequency of misbehaviour across every 
multivariate model.  This higher significance may be linked to the explicit mention of 
bosses in the above statement, prompting respondents to consider the behaviour of their 
employers. 
After confirming that a working-class/lower-class identity, recognition of class 
antagonism between owners and workers, and support for employees’ capacity to self-
direct production were related with individual perceptions of the frequency of 
misbehaviour, we examined whether the relative strength of these predictors differed by 
the type of misbehaviour under consideration – employee or employer.  The most striking 
difference here can be seen in the relative strength of influence of the individual’s support 
for employees’ capacity to self-direct work – it was a much stronger predictor of the 
frequency of employer misbehaviour compared to that of employee misbehaviour (β= 
.138 compared to β= .055).  It could be that questioning the necessity of managerial and 
employer control corresponds with a greater inclination to question the legitimacy of the 
actions of managers and employers – and correspondingly regard more of these actions as 
illegitimate, unnecessary or as misbehaviour.   
Another notable difference in the influence of our class consciousness variables across 
type of misbehaviour is demonstrated by our measures of association between the 
dependent variables and agreement with the oppositional attitude that owners of 
corporations make gains at the expense of workers.  This measure was notably stronger in 
its association with the perceived frequency of employee misbehaviour (β= .161 
compared with β= .096 for employer misbehaviour).  This difference in strength of 
association might be explained by a greater likelihood by those who recognize systemic 
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class antagonism between employers and employees to define employee misbehaviour as 
a form of worker resistance – and so perceive it as more frequent.   
However, it should be noted that the differences in strength of association that we have 
discussed above are still relatively small – r2= .06 and .08 in final multivariate models – 
and our suggested explanations tentative.  A fuller understanding of differences in the 
perceived frequency of employee versus employer misbehaviour that might be attributed 
to specific oppositional and counter-hegemonic attitudes is one avenue for future 
research. 
Though they were of secondary priority to our study, we also discovered some interesting 
results outlining how perceptions of the frequency of misbehaviour might be influenced 
by the demographic characteristics of the respondent.  Examining our demographic 
control variables in the context of our multivariate analysis, we found evidence of a trend 
towards lower perceptions of misbehaviour frequency – of both types – by older 
respondents.  Additionally, those who have obtained a professional or graduate degree 
reported significantly less frequent employee misbehaviour.  
In the previous two chapters, we found that more privileged work circumstances 
corresponded with less misbehaviour: (1) More privileged workers are less likely to 
engage in misbehaviour as they are further from the degraded working conditions that 
often give rise to employee misbehaviour and (2) Advantageous working conditions 
characterized by higher wages, job security, collective representation and other benefits 
tend to act as a constraint upon – and protection from –  employer misbehaviour.  We 
should also expect that individuals in more advantageous employment arrangements will 
identify more strongly with organizational interests and correspondingly overestimate 
organizational harmony and underestimate the amount of misbehaviour taking place.   
Research has shown that wages tend to be higher for those who have completed more 
years of educational training and those who have lived more years since leaving school 
(presumably time spent gaining work experience and additional job training) (Lemieux, 
2006; Mincer, 1974; Murphy & Welch, 1990).  Though the effects of age and education 
on wage are not necessarily linear – and our understandings of these relationships have 
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become more nuanced over the last three decades – these factors remain influential in 
predicting not only wages, but other positive work outcomes, such as permanent 
employment, job security and job satisfaction (Kalleberg et al., 2000; Muñoz-Comet, 
2016; Sapkal & Sundar, 2017; Vosko, 2006).   
Thus, while an advanced education and greater age are obviously not guarantees of 
positive work outcomes, it is evident that higher education and older age (more work 
experience is often assumed, correctly or not, to accompany more life experience) 
generally extend some advantage in matters of employment.  We suspect the lower rates 
of perceived misbehaviour by older respondents and those with an advanced degree result 
from the greater likelihood of working in better employment circumstances – protection 
from employer misbehaviour and distance from the most degraded of working conditions.  
On the other hand, a lack of educational credentials clearly puts one at greater risk of 
undesirable working conditions and offers less protection from misbehaving employers – 
which explains why our analysis revealed a significantly higher perceived frequency of 
employer misbehaviour by those respondents with no high school diploma:  Unskilled 
workers are easily replaced and often have few alternative employment opportunities and 
so are more enticing targets for employer misbehaviour. 
Finally, our analysis found no relationship between the race or gender of the respondent 
and their perception of employee misbehaviour, but both male and non-white respondents 
reported more frequent employer misbehaviour than female and white respondents. 
In the previous chapter, we found that employers of a workforce characterized by 
increased engagement of non-permanent workers (part-time or seasonal) reported more 
frequent employer misbehaviour.  Our conclusion was that the vulnerabilities associated 
with non-permanent employment made these workers more attractive targets for 
employer misbehaviour. This targeting of vulnerable populations of workers by 
employers may be behind the higher perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour 
reported by non-white respondents:  There is a well-documented history of employment 
discrimination by race (Cohn & Fossett, 1995; Wilson et al., 1995) where the ascribed 
status of “non-whiteness” brings a devaluing label to the individual resulting in greater 
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risk of lower-skilled, menial, low-pay and unsafe work (Beggs, 1995; Kaufman, 1986, 
2002; Mason, 2000; McCall, 2001).  In the context of the greater risk of non-permanent 
work for non-white individuals – and the greater motivation for employers of non-
permanent workers to engage in misbehaviour – it is unsurprising that employer 
misbehaviour was reported as more frequent by non-white respondents.   
However, it is not clear why we have not found evidence of a similar effect for female 
respondents, as occupational segregation by gender also puts women at greater risk of 
non-permanent and non-desirable work compared to men (England, 1992; Padavic & 
Reskin, 2002; Philzacklea, 1983; Roscigno et al., 2007).  Instead, the female respondents 
in our sample perceived employer misbehaviour to be significantly less common than the 
male respondents.  This difference may yet be explained by gendered differences in 
definitions of organizational misbehaviour – which could provide an intriguing avenue 
for future qualitative research into individuals’ perceptions of organizational 
misbehaviour – but it is likely the result of gender segregation of the Canadian work 
force.  Men are still over-represented in the industrial sector while women predominate in 
the service sector (see Appendix 8) and the distinctions between these sex segregated 
work environments may result in different rates of employer misbehaviour.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Examining the relationships between the elements of class consciousness and individual 
perceptions of misbehaviour, we found significant evidence that a working class or 
lower-class identity was associated with a higher reported frequency of both types of 
misbehaviour.  In addition, regardless of respondent class, holding certain oppositional 
and counter-hegemonic attitudes predicted perceptions of organizational misbehaviour as 
more frequent. 
The results of this study suggest that individuals’ perceptions of misbehaviour are shaped 
by their class interests and ideological attitudes/beliefs.  The acknowledgement of 
misbehaviour as a ubiquitous workplace phenomenon and the recognition that it is not 
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only employees that misbehave – employers can also, and often do, engage in 
misbehaviour – represents an ideological challenge to capitalist rule and is a perspective 
which is most likely to be taken up by those who are more class conscious.   
We also uncovered evidence of demographic differences in perceptions of the frequency 
of misbehaviour.  Older respondents and those with a high level of education perceived 
misbehaviour to be less frequent – likely the result of generally more advantageous 
working conditions experienced by these individuals.  In addition, we found that non-
white respondents – and individuals of any race who had not acquired a high school 
diploma – reported significantly more frequent employer misbehaviour overall.  Non-
white individuals – and those with a lower level of education – are often segregated into 
more degraded, vulnerable and precarious employment circumstances – working 
conditions which tend to encourage greater misbehaviour by both employees and 
employers (see chapters 2 and 3). 
One intriguing avenue for future research would include an examination in greater detail 
of which attitudes are most strongly associated with a higher reporting of misbehaviour – 
and whether these attitudes differ in their strength of influence by the type of 
misbehaviour under consideration.  Another possible direction for further research might 
be concerned with exploring demographic differences in both ideological attitudes and 
individuals’ perceptions of organizational misbehaviour.   
Finally, while our conclusions are based upon several significant relationships, the 
explanatory power of our multivariate models in accounting for the total variance in 
perceptions of employer misbehaviour (adjusted R2=.07) and employee misbehaviour 
(adjusted R2=.06) remain modest.  There is still considerable unexplained variation in 
perceptions of misbehaviour frequency to be uncovered by further study. 
 
4.8 References   
Ackroyd, S. & P. Thompson. (1999). Organizational misbehaviour. Thousand Oaks; 
London: Sage Publications. 
174 
 
 
 
Analoui, F. (1995). Workplace sabotage: Its styles, motives and management. Journal of 
Management Development, 14(7), 48-65.  
Baines, D. (2011). Resistance as Emotional Labour: The Australian and Canadian 
Nonprofit Social Services. Industrial Relations Journal, 42(2), 139–56. 
Bakan, J. (2004). The corporation: The pathological pursuit of profit and power. New 
York; London;: Free Press. 
Barker, J. (1999). The Discipline of Teamwork: Participation and Concertive Control. 
London: Sage. 
Beggs, J. (1995). The institutional environment: Implications for race and gender 
inequality in the U.S. labor market. American Sociological Review, 60(1), 612-
633. 
Bibi, Z., J. Karim & S. Din. (2013). Workplace incivility and counterproductive work 
behavior: Moderating role of emotional intelligence. Pakistan Journal of 
Psychological Research, 28(2), 317-334. 
Biggerstaff, L., D. Cicero & A. Puckett. (2015). Suspect CEOs, unethical culture, and 
corporate misbehavior. Journal of Financial Economics, 117(1), 98-121. 
Blair, T. (1999). The Key Points of Prime Minister Tony Blair's Speech to the Labour 
Party Conference. BBC news online network, 
www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/460029.stm. 
Bonacich, E. (1972). A theory of ethnic antagonism: The split labor market. American 
Sociological Review, 37(5), 547-559. 
Burawoy, M. (1979). Manufacturing consent: Changes in the labor process under 
monopoly capitalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Casey, C. (1999) “Come, Join Our Family”: Discipline and Integration in Corporate 
Organizational Culture. Human Relations, 52(2), 155-178. 
175 
 
 
 
Cohn, S. & M. Fossett. (1995). Why racial employment inequality is greater in northern 
labor markets: Regional differences in white-black employment differentials. 
Social Forces, 74(1), 511-542. 
Contu, A. (2008). Decaf resistance. Management Communication Quarterly: McQ, 21(3), 
364. 
D'Addio, A. & M. Rosholm. (2005). Exits from temporary jobs in Europe: A competing 
risks analysis. Labour Economics, 12(4), 449-468. 
De Certeau, M. (1984). The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Edwards, P., D. Collinson & G. Della Rocca. (1995). Workplace resistance in western 
Europe: A preliminary overview and a research agenda. European Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 1(3), 283-316. 
England, P. (1992). Comparable worth: Theories and evidence. New York: Aldine de 
Gruyter. 
Fisher, M. (2009). Capitalist realism: Is there no alternative? Washington, US; 
Winchester, UK;: Zero Books. 
Fisher, M. & J. Gilbert. (2013). Capitalist realism and neoliberal hegemony: Jeremy 
gilbert A dialogue. New Formations, 80(80), 89-101. 
Fisse, B. & J. Braithwaite. (1993). Corporations, crime and accountability. Cambridge; 
New York;: Cambridge University Press. 
Fleming, P. (2005). Metaphors of resistance. Management Communication Quarterly, 
19(1), 45-66. 
Fleming, P. & G. Sewell. (2002). Looking for the good soldier, švejk: Alternative 
modalities of resistance in the contemporary workplace. Sociology, 36(4), 857-
873.  
176 
 
 
 
Fleming, P. & A. Spicer. (2003). Working at a cynical distance: Implications for power, 
subjectivity and resistance. Organization, 10(1), 157-180. 
Frenkel, S., M. Tam, M. Korczynski & K. Shire. (1998). ‘Beyond Bureaucracy? Work 
Organisation in Call Centres’. The International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 9(6), 957-979. 
Frost, D. & R. Nixon. (2007, September 7). Great Interviews of the 20th Century: ‘I have 
impeached myself’. The Guardian. 
Gilson, R. & J. Gordon. (2003). Controlling controlling shareholders. University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, 152(2), 785-843. 
Gottschalk, P. (2012). Rotten apples versus rotten barrels in white collar crime: A 
qualitative analysis of white collar offenders in Norway. International Journal of 
Criminal Justice Sciences, 7(2), 575-590. 
Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the prison notebooks. New York: International. 
Greenfield, K. (2006). The failure of corporate law: Fundamental flaws & progressive 
possibilities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Harper, D. (1990). Spotlight Abuse – Save Profits. Industrial Distribution, 79(10), 47-51. 
Harris, L. & E. Ogbonna. (2002). Exploring service sabotage: The antecedents, types and 
consequences of frontline, deviant, antiservice behaviors. Journal of Service 
Research, 4(3), 163-183. 
Harris, L & E. Ogbonna. (2006). Service sabotage: A study of antecedents and 
consequences. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 34(4), 543-558.  
Haufler, V. (2013). A public role for the private sector: Industry self-regulation in a 
global economy. Carnegie Endowment. 
177 
 
 
 
Henle, C., C. Reeve & V. Pitts. (2010). Stealing time at work: Attitudes, social pressure, 
and perceived control as predictors of time theft. Journal of Business Ethics, 
94(1), 53-67.  
Hodson, R. (2001). Dignity at Work. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Kalleberg, A. (2009). Precarious work, insecure workers: Employment relations in 
transition. American Sociological Review, 74(1), 1-22. 
Kalleberg, A, B. Reskin & K. Hudson. (2000). Bad jobs in America: Standard and 
nonstandard employment relations and job quality in the United States. American 
Sociological Review, 65(2) 256-278. 
Kaufman, R. (1986). The impact of industrial and occupational structure on black-white 
employment allocation. American Sociological Review, 51(1), 310-323. 
Kaufman, R. (2002). Assessing alternative perspectives on race and sex employment 
segregation. American Sociological Review, 67(1), 547-572. 
Kets de Vries, M. (1985). The dark side of entrepreneurship. Harvard Business Review, 
85(6), 160-167. 
Kingston, P. (2000). The classless society. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. 
Kinnie, N., S. Hutchinson & J. Purcell. (2000). “Fun and Surveillance”: The Paradox of 
High Commitment Management in Call Centres’. International Journal of Human 
Resource Management, 11(5), 967-985. 
Laabs, J., L. McClure & L. Davidson (1999). Employee sabotage: Don't be a target. 
Workforce, 78(7), 32-38. 
Lamb, J. (2012). Prosecuting a corporate ghost: Federal courts and dissolved state 
corporations. Criminal Justice, 27(2), 39. 
Lapides, K. (1987). Marx and Engels on the Trade Unions. New York: Praeger. 
178 
 
 
 
Lawrence, T. & S. Robinson. (2007). Ain't misbehavin: Workplace deviance as 
organizational resistance. Journal of Management, 33(3), 378-394. 
Leavitt, H. (1973) Managerial Psychology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Lee, J. & C. Ok. (2014). Understanding hotel employees’ service sabotage: Emotional 
labor perspective based on conservation of resources theory. International 
Journal of Hospitality Management, 36(1), 176-187. 
Lemieux, T. (2006). The “Mincer equation” thirty years after schooling, experience, and 
earnings. In S. Grossbard (ed.) Jacob Mincer A Pioneer of Modern Labor 
Economics (pp. 127-145). Boston, MA: Springer US. 
Lenin, V. (1901). What is to be Done? In H. Christman (ed.) Essential works of Lenin: 
"What is to be Done?" and Other Writings. New York: Dover Publications. 
Livingstone, D. & A. Scholtz. (2016). Reconnecting class and production relations in an 
advanced capitalist ‘knowledge economy’: Changing class structure and class 
consciousness. Capital & Class, 40(3), 469-493. 
Livingstone, D & B. Watts. (2018). The Changing Class Structure and Pivotal Role of 
Professional Employees in an Advanced Capitalist ‘Knowledge Economy’: 
Canada, 1982-2016. Studies in Political Economy, 99(1), 79-96. 
Luthans, F. (1972) Organization Behaviour. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Mann, M. (1973). Consciousness and action among the western working class. London: 
Macmillan. 
Marx, K. (1844). Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. 
Marx, K. (1848). The Communist Manifesto. 
Marx, K. (1852). The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. 
Marx, K. (1867). Capital, Volume 1. 
179 
 
 
 
Marx, K. & F. Engels. (1846). The German Ideology.  
Mason, P. (2000). Understanding recent empirical evidence on race and labor market 
outcomes in the USA. Review of Social Economy, 58(3), 319-338. 
McAdams, J. (1977). The appropriate sanctions for corporate criminal liability: An 
eclectic alternative. Cincinnati Law Review, 46(1), 989-1000. 
McCall, L. (2001). Sources of racial wage inequality in metropolitan labor markets: 
Racial, ethnic, and gender differences. American Sociological Review, 66(4), 520-
541. 
McMullan, J. & M. McClung. (2006). The media, the politics of truth, and the coverage 
of corporate violence: The Westray disaster and the public inquiry. Critical 
Criminology, 14(1), 67-86. 
Mills, C. (1962). The Marxists. New York: Dell Pub. Co. 
Mincer, J. (1974). Schooling, experience, and earnings. New York: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Muholland, K. (2004). Workplace resistance in an Irish call centre: Slammin', scammin' 
smokin' an' leavin'. Work, Employment & Society, 18(4), 709-724. 
Mumby, D. (2005). Theorizing resistance in organization studies: A dialectical approach. 
Management Communication Quarterly, 19(1), 19-44. 
Muñoz-Comet, J. (2016). Potential work experience as protection against unemployment: 
Does it bring equal benefit to immigrants and native workers? European 
Sociological Review, 32(5), 537-551. 
Murphy, K. & F. Welch. (1990). Empirical age-earnings profiles. Journal of Labor 
Economics, 8(2), 202-229. 
Ollman, B. (1972). Toward class consciousness next time: Marx and the working class. 
Politics & Society, 3(1), 1-24. 
180 
 
 
 
Padavic, I. & B. Reskin. (2002). Women and men at work. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine 
Forge Press. 
Paulsen, R. (2014). Empty labor: Idleness and workplace resistance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Payne, S. (2018). The construction of class consciousness. Dialectical Anthropology, 
42(1), 63-65. 
Peston, R. (2012, July 1). FSA calls for tighter laws against failing bankers. BBC News. 
Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18663470. Accessed on 
October 23, 2017. 
Philzacklea, A. (1983). In the front line. In A. Philzacklea (Ed.), One way ticket: 
Migration and female labour (pp. 95-112). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Prasad, P. & A. Prasad. (2000). Stretching the iron cage: The constitution and 
implications of routine workplace resistance. Organization Science, 11(4), 387-
403. 
Raymo, J., J. Warren, M. Sweeney, R. Hauser & J. Ho. (2011). Precarious employment, 
bad jobs, labor unions, and early retirement. Journals of Gerontology Series B: 
Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 66(2), 249-259. 
Rebhun U. (2008). A Double Disadvantage? Immigration, Gender, and Employment 
Status in Israel. European Journal of Population, 24(1), 87-113 
Roscigno, V., L. Garcia & D. Bobbitt-Zeher. (2007). Social closure and processes of 
Race/Sex employment discrimination. The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 609(1), 16-48. 
Sapkal, R. & K. Sundar. (2017). Determinants of Precarious Employment in India: An 
Empirical Analysis. In A. Kalleberg and S. Vallas (ed.) Precarious Work 
Research in the Sociology of Work, Volume 31 (pp. 335-361). Emerald Publishing 
Limited. 
181 
 
 
 
Shaban, O., A. Abdallah & O. Al-Ibbini. (2017). Financial crisis between personnel 
misbehavior, corporate governance and absence of ethics and values. 
International Research Journal of Applied Finance, 8(5), 264-272. 
Slora, K. (1989). An empirical approach to determining employee deviance base rates. 
Journal of Business and Psychology, 4(2), 199-219. 
Sotirin, P. & H. Gottfried. (1999). The ambivalent dynamics of secretarial `Bitching': 
Control, resistance, and the construction of identity. Organization, 6(1), 57-80. 
Sprouse, M. (1992). Sabotage in the American Workplace: Anecdotes of Dissatisfaction, 
Mischief, and Revenge. Pressure Drop Press. 
Thatcher, M. (1992). "Don't Undo My Work." Newsweek. 27 April: 36. 
Thompson, P. (2016). Dissent at work and the resistance debate: Departures, directions, 
and dead ends. Studies in Political Economy, 97(2), 106-123. 
Trevino, L. (2005). Out of touch CEO's role in corporate misbehavior. Brooklyn Law 
Review, 70(4), 1195-1211. 
Vosko, L. (2006). Precarious employment: Understanding labour market insecurity in 
Canada. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. 
Wilson, D. & Rosenfeld, R. (1990) Managing Organisations: Text Readings and Cases. 
London: McGraw-Hill. 
Wilson, F, M. Tienda & L. Wu. (1995). Race and unemployment: Labor market 
experiences of black and white men, 1968-1988. Work & Occupations, 22(1), 
245-270. 
Wolff, R. (2002). Capitalist hegemony and contesting concepts of class. Socialism and 
Democracy, 16(2), 153-162. 
 
182 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
5 Conclusion 
5.1 Contributions 
Despite mounting evidence of the general pervasiveness of misbehaviour within the 
contemporary workplace (Harper, 1990; Harris & Ogbonna, 2002, 2006; Lawrence et al., 
2007; Lee & Ok, 2014; Paulsen, 2014; Slora, 1989), individual pathological approaches 
towards explaining organizational misbehaviour remain popular with owners, managers 
and other policy-makers.  According to the individual-pathological narrative of employee 
misbehavior, the average worker is perceived as relatively compliant and well-behaved 
and any instance of misbehaviour is blamed on a small minority of “bad apple” 
employees (Analoui, 1995; Bibi, 2013; Giacalone & Rosenfield, 1987; Henle et al., 2010; 
Kets de Vries, 2017; Leavitt, 1973; Luthans, 1972; Wilson & Rosenfield, 1990).   
Accordingly, this dissertation contributes to a developing body of literature that 
challenges popular explanations of organizational misbehaviour by illuminating the 
structural determinants of the phenomenon (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Amichai-
Hamburger, 2003; Burawoy, 1979; Flynn, 1916; Marx, 1844, 1867).  We utilize the 
theoretical framework of Neo-Marxist theory to demonstrate how employee 
misbehaviour should be understood in the context of workers’ reactions to the enduring 
contradictions of the capitalist system and their experience of degraded work.  Our 
inclusion of occupational class as a key explanatory variable represents a unique 
contribution to the literature and suggests that the influence of worker autonomy and 
workplace injustice – characterized as primary determinants by earlier studies (Ackroyd 
& Thompson, 1999; Ambrose et al., 2002; Edwards et al., 1995; Folger, 1993; Lawrence 
& Robinson, 2007; Sheppard et al., 1992; Skarlicki et al., 2008) – may have been 
overemphasized in the past:  Once class is controlled for, we found these factors had 
much less individual explanatory power in accounting for the frequency of employee 
misbehaviour.  While lack of autonomy and the experience of injustice remain important 
elements for understanding the motivation towards employee misbehaviour, it may be 
that these variables can be better understood as intervening variables between class 
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position and the frequency of organizational misbehaviour (Occupational Class → 
Injustice, Lack of autonomy → Greater employee misbehaviour).   
Another major contribution of this dissertation is derived from its unique methodological 
approach.  Much of the previous research on organizational misbehaviour has taken a 
qualitative approach and focused on intimate observation of the phenomenon within a 
single workplace – or occasionally several workplaces (Ambrose et al., 2002; Brock et 
al., 2013; DiBattista, 1996; Giacalone & Rosenfeld, 1987; Muholland, 2004; Shkoler & 
Tziner, 2017; Skarlicki et al., 1999, 2008; Sprouse, 1992).  These studies are interesting 
and useful for both illuminating the wide varieties of employee misbehaviour and 
fostering an appreciation for the influence of the unique local dynamics within a 
workplace – but are understandably limited in their generalizability.  This dissertation 
addresses this general gap in the organizational misbehaviour literature by employing a 
representative sample of the Canadian adult working population – the first study to do so, 
to our knowledge. 
Finally, the most important contribution of our dissertation follows from our exploration 
of the topic of employer misbehaviour.  In general, the literature on organizational 
misbehaviour features a near-complete absence of any inquiry into this phenomenon – 
with a limited number of more recent exceptions (Barnes & Taksa, 2012; Lundmark & 
Westelius, 2015; Webb et al., 2009).  An explanation for this lacuna in the literature can 
be found in the considerable legal, political and ideological protections that prevent the 
actions of employers from coming to be defined as misbehaviour (Bakan, 2004; Burns & 
Orrick, 2002; Commager, 1971; Fisse & Braithwaite, 1993; Gilson & Gordon, 2003; 
Greenfield, 2006; Lamb, 2012; Marx & Engels, 1846; McMullan & McClung, 2006; 
Michel et al., 2016; Peston, 2012; Schwartz & Ellison, 1982; Wright et al., 1995).  In our 
exploration of employer misbehaviour, we have also provided evidence of a general 
asymmetry between the phenomena of employee and employer misbehaviour.  The drive 
to increase profits, the employment of vulnerable workers and the presence of a union in 
the organization emerge as key motivators towards greater misbehaviour for employers. 
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5.2 Summary of and links between findings 
Starting within paper 1 (chapter 2) our study of the phenomenon of organizational 
misbehaviour is grounded in Marxist theory, with an appreciation for structural 
conditions within the contemporary workplace which motivate individuals towards 
greater misbehaviour (Analoui, 1995; Edwards & Scullion, 1982; Hodson, 1995, 2001; 
Karlsson, 2012; Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Marx, 1844, 1867; Mulholland, 2004).  
Through the introduction of occupational class alongside more traditional measures – 
worker autonomy and experiences of injustice – we contribute intriguing new findings to 
the study of employee misbehaviour.   
First, we found that employees of lower occupational classes (industrial and service 
workers) reported significantly more misbehaviour than professional employees – we 
suggest this greater misbehaviour is motivated by exposure to more degraded working 
conditions which typically confront individuals occupying lower class positions.   
Second, we found that the inclusion of occupational class in our models reduced the 
strength of association between the reported frequency of employee misbehaviour and 
autonomy, unjust compensation and job insecurity, suggesting that lack of autonomy and 
these forms of injustice are tied to the class position of the respondent.  Interestingly, we 
found that our injustice measures related to unsafe work or workplace discrimination 
retained a unique association with the perceived frequency of misbehaviour, suggesting 
that non-managerial employees of all occupational classes may be more prone towards 
misbehaviour if they are discriminated against or made to work in unsafe conditions. 
In addition to our main analysis of non-managerial employees, we conducted a 
supplementary analysis of managerial employees in paper 1 (chapter 2).  Managers have 
often been overlooked as subjects capable of their own misbehaviour in past research – as 
they are assumed to generally act as good stewards of employers’ interests.  
Correspondingly, their treatment in the literature has usually emphasized their efforts to 
curtail organizational misbehaviour and not their capacity to engage in it (Ackroyd & 
Thompson, 1999; Analoui, 1995; DiBattista, 1996; Fleming and Sewell, 2002; Giesberg, 
2001).  Having conducted a multivariate analysis of misbehaviour for managers, we 
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found evidence of considerable differences in the influential factors related to the 
perceived frequency of employee misbehaviour reported by managers compared with 
non-managers:  A lower position in the managerial hierarchy and the subjective 
evaluation that one’s compensation is less-than-deserved were most closely associated 
with a higher reported frequency of misbehaviour.  These results may suggest that 
managers can be inclined towards misbehaviour when the privileges of their position are 
not sufficient to ensure their loyalty to employer interests (or perhaps undercompensated 
managers simply perceive employee misbehaviour as more frequent overall). 
Additionally, we found evidence suggesting that larger work organizations tend to feature 
greater employee misbehaviour, likely the result of the additional cover granted to illicit 
activities by the relative autonomy of having many co-workers (Ashforth, 1994; 
Roscigno et al., 2009) or because of the intensification of alienation and heavy 
rationalization characteristic of many large organizations (Braverman, 1974; Hodson, 
2001; Matheson, 2007; Rinehart, 2006; Roscigno et al., 2009; Sanders, 1997).    
The main priority of paper 2 (chapter 3) was an exploration of the understudied 
phenomenon of employer misbehaviour.  Drawing on the corporate crime literature that 
connects employers’ illegal activity to the pursuit of profit-maximization (Bakan, 2004; 
Biggerstaff et al., 2015; Davidson, 1970; Gilbert, 2005; McAdams, 1977; Nader, 1965; 
Schwartz & Ellison, 1982), we hypothesized that economic pressures would be primary 
motivators for greater employer misbehaviour.  In addition, we suspected that 
employment of a labour force characterized by greater vulnerability – non-unionized 
and/or non-permanent workers – would act as additional motivation towards employer 
misbehaviour, as these employees could be expected to have fewer protections from 
abusive actions by employers (Letourneux, 1998; Quinlan, 2012; Underhill & Rimmer, 
2015; Vosko, 2006).  Our results provided evidence in support of these hypotheses and 
we found that employers that reported lower wealth, evaluated themselves as 
undercompensated or employed a labour force characterized by non-permanent workers 
were those who perceived employer misbehaviour as most frequent. 
186 
 
 
 
We were surprised to find that – while the presence of a union within an employer’s 
organization was significantly related to the reported frequency of employer 
misbehaviour, exceeding both wealth and subjective under-compensation in its 
explanatory power – this relationship ran in the opposite direction than expected:  The 
presence of a union was related with greater employer misbehaviour, rather than less.  
We suspect this association is the result of a more complicated relationship between these 
variables than initially expected – with unionization as both a reaction by workers to past 
employer misbehaviour and as motivation for further employer misbehaviour in the form 
of union-busting activities (Bentham, 2002; Bruce, 1994; Eaton et al., 2014; Freeman & 
Kleiner, 1990; Martinez & Fiorito, 2009; Riddel, 2001).  
Once again, we found additional evidence of the relationship between organizational size 
and the perceived frequency of misbehaviour:  Complementing the findings from chapter 
2 concerning employee misbehaviour, employers associated with a larger work 
organization also reported greater employer misbehaviour.  This result may be explained 
by the additional cover provided by a large organization and the unique legal protections 
provided by corporate status.  
A secondary focus of paper 2 (chapter 3) was the examination of the reported frequency 
of misbehaviour by individuals across the full range of the occupational class hierarchy – 
as well as a comparison of the perceived frequency of employee versus employer 
misbehaviour.  As they did in our first paper (chapter 2), industrial and service workers 
once again stood out as reporting more misbehaviour – employee and employer – than 
most other occupational groups:  Members of these occupational groups are more likely 
to be the targets of employer misbehaviour and also the least likely to benefit from it – 
and so are less motivated towards underestimating its occurrence.  In confirmation of the 
results from our first paper (chapter 2), we found further evidence of a negative 
relationship between managerial level and the reported frequency of organizational 
misbehaviour.  Upper managers distinguished themselves as the occupational group that 
reported the lowest amount of both employee and employer misbehaviour – the privilege 
of their position keeping them far from the negative working conditions associated with 
greater employee misbehaviour, while their unity of economic interest with – and 
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dependency on – owners encourages turning a blind eye to instances of employer 
misbehaviour.  It is also important to note that employee misbehaviour was perceived to 
be more frequent than employer misbehaviour by respondents of every occupational class 
(37% of respondents perceived employee misbehaviour as a common occurrence 
compared with only 15% for employer misbehaviour).  This finding was not entirely 
surprising; employers benefit from considerable ideological and legal protection that 
makes it much less likely that their actions will be defined as misbehaviour. 
Paper 3 complements the findings from the previous two chapters by examining how the 
class consciousness of an individual is associated with their perception of the frequency 
of organizational misbehaviour.  Here, we found evidence of perceptions of both 
employee and employer misbehaviour as more frequent by respondents who identified 
themselves as lower- or working-class or who held certain oppositional or counter-
hegemonic attitudes (recognition of class antagonism between owners of corporations 
and their workers and support for the efficacy of employee-run organizations).  These 
findings suggest that individuals’ perceptions of misbehaviour are shaped by the interests 
of the class they identify with and their personal ideological attitudes/beliefs.  The 
capitalist hegemonic narrative on organizational misbehaviour is to downplay the 
frequency of employee misbehaviour and deny the possibility of employers to misbehave, 
and so the acknowledgement of misbehaviour as a ubiquitous workplace phenomenon is 
a perspective most likely to be taken up by those who are more class conscious. 
 
5.3 Limitations and Future Directions 
The papers which comprise this dissertation are not without limitation.  Details are 
discussed within each chapter, but the limitations of our study which have specific 
implications for future research are discussed here. 
First, it is worth reminding ourselves that our misbehaviour variables measure the 
perceived frequency of misbehaviour according to the respondent, rather than actual 
incidences of misbehaviour, and so respondent subjectivity in the reporting of 
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misbehaviour frequency represents a source of error inherit to our methodological 
approach.  In addition, in the formation of our hypotheses and the presentation of our 
findings, we often assume that others in the respondent’s workplace are similar to the 
respondent on key variables (for example, the employee misbehaviour reported by non-
managerial respondents is assumed to be engaged in by an individual or individuals with 
a similar level of autonomy as the respondent themselves).  We cannot be sure whether 
respondents are reporting the frequency of their own misbehaviour, the misbehaviour of 
others or perhaps both, and this represents a key limitation to our work.   
In this study, we made the decision to use a general measure of organizational 
misbehaviour.  This methodology provides us with representative results generalizable to 
the Canadian working population but restricts us from drawing conclusions in connection 
to any one form of misbehaviour.  In our examination of employee misbehaviour (chapter 
2), this is barely a limitation as there are a wealth of qualitative studies available which 
fill in these gaps (Ambrose et al., 2002; Brock et al., 2013; DiBattista, 1996; Giacalone & 
Rosenfeld, 1987; Muholland, 2004; Shkoler & Tziner, 2017; Skarlicki et al., 1999; 
Skarlicki et al., 2008; Sprouse, 1992).  However, as our exploration of employer 
misbehaviour (chapter 3) represents a new direction in the study of organizational 
misbehaviour – and there are few studies which feature any treatment of the topic – the 
drawbacks of our methodological approach are more evident there.  In future research 
into the different forms of employer misbehaviour, we expect this limitation will be 
addressed:  More nuanced measures of employer misbehaviour in further studies that 
identify specific actions would surely be useful.  Future qualitative studies to deepen our 
understanding of employer misbehaviour would also be incredibly helpful – we note here 
that recognition of how ideological narratives can shape perceptions of what 
misbehaviour entails and who most often engages in it should be included in future 
research in this area.   
Another limitation of our study is to be found in our coverage of managerial 
misbehaviour.  In paper 1 (chapter 2), we conducted a supplementary analysis concerning 
managers reporting of employee misbehaviour.  The corresponding results may include 
some element of managerial misbehaviour – or none, if managers interpreted the question 
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as inquiring after only the frequency of misbehaviour by non-managerial workers – but 
we have no specific measure of this unique form of organizational misbehaviour.  While 
managerial misbehaviour can take forms similar to either employee or employer 
misbehaviour, we know that there are also interesting elements of managers misbehaving 
which are not captured by our two misbehaviour measures.  This limitation should 
provide an intriguing avenue for future research into the character of managerial 
misbehaviour.  In particular, it would be valuable to explore three very different 
perspectives on managerial misbehaviour: (1) as an extension of employer misbehaviour, 
(2) as an extension of general employee misbehaviour and (3) as misbehaviour 
demonstrating unique dimensions dissimilar from both employer and non-managerial 
misbehaviour.    
The results of our third paper (chapter 4) uncovered some indication of demographic 
differences in the reported frequency of misbehaviour.  Older respondents and those with 
an advanced degree (professional or graduate) reported significantly less employee 
misbehaviour than other respondents, while older and female respondents reported less 
employer misbehaviour.  On the other hand, employer misbehaviour was reported as 
more frequent by non-white respondents and those without a high school diploma.  We 
have emphasized the role of ideological attitudes in relation to an individual’s perception 
of misbehaviour, and so another avenue for future qualitative research might examine 
whether conceptual definitions of misbehavior differ across social groups – it would be 
particularly helpful to see whether certain activities are regarded as misbehaviour by one 
group and as acceptable or even admirable behaviour by another. 
Our study also leaves room for alternative explanations concerning organizational 
misbehaviour.  Other as-yet-unaccounted-for structural factors might have an impact on 
the frequency of employee misbehaviour within a work organization: for example, low 
levels of monitoring, poor management, frequent downtime or overdeveloped 
bureaucratic regulations.  In the present study, our dataset did not afford us the ability to 
look at these relationships, but future research should endeavour to explore these 
relationships.  Additionally, while the focus of this study was to illuminate the structural 
factors related to organizational misbehaviour – in contrast to popular pathological 
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explanations of the phenomenon – it would be a mistake to suggest that individual 
characteristics do not also play a role here.  We believe that future research that accounts 
for both individual and structural motivators towards misbehaviour – and compares their 
relative influence –  would be incredibly informative and bridge a notable gap within the 
literature.      
It should also be noted here that the overall frequency of employee misbehaviour 
reported in our results – 36.7% of all our respondents believed it to be a common 
occurrence – appears to be considerably lower than the figures provided by several 
previous studies (Harris & Ogbonna, 2002, 2006; Lee & Ok, 2014; Slora, 1989) though 
still in-line with the lower-end of more conservative estimates (Harper, 1990; Lawrence 
et al., 2007).  It is quite possible that the lower amount of misbehaviour we report is a 
result of our use of a general measure of misbehaviour and asking respondents about 
specific forms of misbehaviour would see the reported frequency increase.  Of course, 
this lower reporting might also be connected with our reliance on respondents’ 
perceptions of misbehaviour frequency, rather than an objective count, if the individuals 
surveyed are consistently underestimating the actual incidence of employee 
misbehaviour.  While we think it reasonable that either – or both – of these explanations 
may account for the observed difference between our figures and those documented 
within the literature, we are unable to demonstrate this conclusively.  
Finally, while our conclusions are based upon numerous significant relationships, the 
explanatory power of our models remains limited.  In Appendix 9 and 10, we conducted 
supplementary multivariate analyses of non-managerial employees’ perceptions of the 
frequency of misbehaviour, incorporating explanatory variables from chapter 2, 3 and 4, 
and these combined models still provide us with low r-squared values (R2= .12 and .15; 
adjusted R2= .10 and .14).  There is still a considerable amount of unexplained variation 
in the amount of organizational misbehaviour and – while this does not invalidate our 
findings – it does suggest that there is still much work to be done (particularly with 
concern to expanding our understanding of the phenomena of employer and managerial 
misbehaviour).   
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5.4 Concluding Thoughts 
Drawing upon Marxist theoretical principles, this dissertation demonstrates the 
importance of occupational class and other structural factors that predict greater 
organizational misbehaviour.  Rather than framing misbehaviour as resulting from 
personal deficiencies on the part of the individual, this dissertation argues that 
misbehaviour can be a rational reaction to the conditions under which work takes place.  
The experience of degraded work – typical for both industrial and service workers – 
appears to reliably predict greater organizational misbehaviour by employees and 
interested policy-makers should look to strategies for the improvement of working 
conditions as a means by which to reduce incidences of misbehaviour within the 
workplace. 
Second, while employer misbehaviour is often assumed to be a rare phenomenon, the 
potential impact of misbehaviour by private owners is vast and surely deserving of 
greater study than it has received up to this point.  This dissertation advances an 
exploratory study of the phenomenon of employer misbehaviour, but adequate treatment 
of this topic will require further research.  In particular, future inquiry should aim to 
incorporate a greater diversity of employers:  Our sample was dominated by private 
employers with ten or fewer paid employees and it is possible that important dimensions 
of employer misbehaviour remain to be discovered.   
Third, perceptions of the frequency of misbehaviour are very clearly affected by 
individuals’ support for/opposition to the prevailing capitalist system of economic 
production, demanding we acknowledge the interests of various stake-holders in defining 
misbehaviour, estimating its prevalence and making policy decisions concerning how it 
should be dealt with.  Moving beyond simplistic pathological explanations of 
organizational misbehaviour requires a challenging of dominant ideological narratives of 
– not only this specific phenomenon – but also other “common sense” assumptions about 
the nature of contemporary work.     
192 
 
 
 
Finally, our findings indicate that class is a primary explanatory factor related to 
organizational misbehaviour.  We suggest that reconnecting with Marxist class analysis 
can improve our theoretical understanding of organizational misbehaviour in several key 
ways: (1) Lack of autonomy and injustice (key motivators towards employee 
misbehaviour) are not distributed evenly across the social hierarchy and those occupying 
less-desirable positions within the relations of production – industrial and service workers 
– are those who are most likely to experience these aspects of degraded work that 
motivate greater employee misbehaviour; (2) The absence of inquiry into employer 
misbehaviour (and only limited efforts at studying managerial misbehaviour) indicates 
our theoretical understanding of organizational misbehaviour is still seriously 
underdeveloped with the primary thrust of the literature concerning only the 
misbehaviour of workers; (3) Ideological attitudes shape our understanding of 
organizational misbehaviour – how it is defined, how frequently it takes place, whose 
misbehaviour is most worthy of study and whose misbehaviour should be excused or 
even celebrated. The influence of capitalist hegemony in this process must be 
acknowledged if we are to move towards a fuller understanding of misbehaviour within 
the contemporary workplace.     
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 Technical Report on Response Rate of Canada-wide Sample for the 
CWKE Survey 
Response Rate 
There are numerous ways to calculate response rates in survey.  
The response rate for the random phone survey was defined as follows: 
Response Rate = Completes/[( Eligibility Rate*Unknown) + Completes+ Eligible] 
Eligibility Rate ER= (Completes+Eligible)/(Completes+Eligible+Ineligible) 
For the telephone survey, the response rate was 33% using the above calculation.  
For the Leger Web panel, 2731 clicked on the link, resulting in a 65% response rate. 
The overall response rate was therefore 52%. 
NOTE: The preceding information was provided to the author by the Leger research group who gathered 
the survey data for this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
201 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 Non-Response Analysis of Key Misbehaviour Variables 
  Employer Misbehaviour 
(0=valid response; 
1=non-response) 
Employee Misbehaviour 
(0=valid response; 
1=non-response) 
  Odds Ratio 
(exp B) 
Standard 
Error 
Odds Ratio 
(exp B) 
Standard 
Error 
Occupational 
Class 
Large employer .00 11258.03 .00 11291.52 
Small employer 1.44 .45 .20 1.27 
Self-employed 2.10** .27 3.38*** .30 
Upper manager .26 1.16 .36 1.30 
Middle manager .68 .32 .59 .40 
Supervisor .96 .39 .95 .46 
Professional 
employee 
.83 .27 .89 .31 
Service worker 
(ref.) 
-- -- -- -- 
Industrial worker .58 .30 .57 .37 
 Net Wealth (15 
categories) 
.93* .03 .95 .04 
Highest 
Level of 
Education 
No diploma 1.36 .31 2.02 .38 
High school (ref.) -- -- -- -- 
Non-university 
post-secondary 
certificate 
.60* .22 .88 .27 
Bachelor’s degree .58* .27 .94 .31 
Professional or 
graduate degree 
.56 .34 .69 .42 
 Age 1.02* .01 1.00 .01 
Gender Male (ref.) -- -- -- -- 
Female 1.13 .18 1.64* .21 
Race 
(binary) 
White .68 .23 .62 .26 
Non-white (ref.) -- -- -- -- 
Union or 
professional 
association 
member 
Member 1.27 .18 1.19 .21 
Non-member 
(ref.) 
-- -- -- -- 
N  1900  1900  
R2  .026  .030  
NOTE: * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01; *** Significant at .001 
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Appendix 3 Construction Logic for Occupational Class 
1) The respondents’ occupations were coded into CCDO (SOC, Statistics Canada, 
1981). The 1981 CCDO codes (Canadian Classification and Dictionary of 
Occupations) can be examined in the 1980 Standard Occupation Classification 
published by Statistics Canada (catalogue 12-565E, ISBN 0-660-10673-6).  
2) Respondents’ 4-digit CCDO numbers were than coded into one of the following 
Porter-Pineo categories belonging to a well-known socio-economic index 
developed by Pineo, Porter and McRoberts (1977), based on the 1971 Canadian 
Census and updated in 1985 to reflect the 1981 Census. 
3) The initial coding of our occupational class variable involved allocating each of 
the 16 porter-pineo categories to one of our occupational class categories (see 
below): 
Porter-Pineo Categories                                                         WALL Class Categories 
1 Self-employed professionals                    →        3 Self-employed 
2 Employed professionals                           →        6 Professional employee 
3 Hi-level managers                                    →        4 Manager 
4 Semi-professionals                                   →        6 Professional employee 
5 Technicians                                               →        6 Professional employee 
6 Middle managers                                      →        4 Manager 
7 Supervisors                                               →        5 Supervisors 
8 Foremen/women                                       →        5 Supervisors 
9 Skilled clerical/Sales                                →        7 Service worker 
10 Skilled crafts                                           →        8 Industrial worker 
11 Farmers                                                   →        3 Self-employed 
12 Semi-skilled clerical/Sales                     →        7 Service worker 
13 Semi-skilled manual                              →        8 Industrial worker 
14 Unskilled clerical/Sales                         →        7 Service worker 
15 Unskilled manual                                   →        8 Industrial worker 
16 Farm labourers                                       →        8 Industrial worker 
 
4) If respondent reported their employment status as self-employed and was 
presently in another occupational class category, they were recoded as category 
3 Self-employed. 
5) Self-employed respondents who had at least one paid employee (aside from 
themselves) were recoded as either category 1 (Large employer) or category 2 
(Small employer) based on the number of employees working for them (1 to 10 
employees → small employer; 11 or more employees → large employer). 
6) Manager and Supervisor category coding was double-checked using the 
following managerial-level variable and a number of managers were demoted 
to the category of supervisor: 
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Which of the following best describes the managerial role you have at your place 
of work? 
     1 Top manager of a plant, branch or division of an organization 
     2 Upper level manager 
     3 Middle level manager 
     4 Lower managerial position 
     5 Supervisor 
     6 Foreperson 
 
7) The first two categories of the managerial-level variable above were utilized to 
promote some of the managerial respondents to a new occupational class 
category: upper manager 
8) With some reordering of categories, the final version of our occupational class 
variable comprises 9 categories: 
     1 Large employer 
     2 Small employer 
     3 Self-employed 
     4 Upper manager 
     5 Midmanager 
     6 Supervisor 
     7 Professional employee 
     8 Service worker 
     9 Industrial worker 
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Appendix 4 Correlation Matrix for Chapter 2 Independent Variables and Controls 
(non-managerial employee analysis) 
Part 1 of Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s r) 
 OC1 OC2 OC3 Wealth ClassID Auto1 Auto2 Injus1 Injus2 
OC1 1 0.57** -.44** .17** .18** .11** .03 .01 -.01 
OC2 -.57** 1 -.49** -.16** -.11** -.04 .01 -.05* .02 
OC3 -.44** -.49** 1 -.01 -.07* -.08** -.03 .04 -.01 
Wealth .17** -.16** -.01 1 .32** .12** -.06* .13** -.11** 
ClassID .18** -.11** -.07* .32** 1 .09** -.04 .15** -.10** 
Auto1 .11** -.04 -.08** .12** .09** 1 -.00 .07** .01 
Auto2 .03 .01 -.03 -.06* -.04 -.00 1 -.17** .23** 
Injus1 .01 -.05* .04 .13 .15 .07 -.17 1 -.11 
Injus2 -.01 .02 -.01 -.11** -.10** .01 .23** -.11** 1 
Injus3 .10** .14** -.26** .00 .09** -.02 -.18** .15** -.19** 
Injus4 .06* -.03 -.03 .10** .12** -.01 -.03 .05* -.16** 
Org.Size .22** -.13** -.09** .14** .07* -.06* .11** .03 .02 
Indus1 -.18** -.21** .42** .05 .02 -.03 -.02 .03 -.04 
Indus2 -.12** -.02 .15** .03 -.05 -.05* .03 .02 -.01 
Indus3 .23** .18** -.43** -.06* .02 .05* .00 -.02 .02 
Sector1 -.25** .08** .18** -.06* -.04 -.05* -.03 .00 -.01 
Sector2 .25** -.11** -.15** .10** .08** .05* .05* .01 .02 
Sector3 .02 .05* -.08** -.06* -.07* .02 -.03 -.01 -.00 
NOTE: * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01 
 
Legend: 
OC1: Professional Worker 
OC2: Service Worker 
OC3: Industrial Worker 
Wealth: Total Net Wealth 
ClassID: Personal Class Identification 
Auto1: Allowance to plan or design own work 
Auto2: Want more say in organizational decisions 
Injus1: Appropriateness of compensation compared to value produced 
Injus2: Experienced discrimination at work 
Injus3: Safety at work 
Injus4: Job security 
Org.Size: Number of employees 
Indus1: Goods-producing organization 
Indus2: Mixed industry organization 
Indus3: Service organization 
Sector1: Private sector 
Sector2: Public sector 
Sector3: Non-profit sector 
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Part 2 of Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s r) 
 Injus3 Injus4 Org. 
Size 
Indus
1 
Indus
2 
Indus
3 
Sector1 Sector2 Sector3 
OC1 .10** .06* .22** -.18** -.12** .23** -.25** .25** .02 
OC2 .14** -.03 -.13** -.21** -.02 .18** .08** -.11** .05* 
OC3 -.26** -.03 -.09** .42** .15** -.43** .18** -.15** -.08** 
Wealth .00 .10** .14** .05 .03 -.06* -.06* .10** -.06* 
ClassID .09** .12** .07* .02 -.05 .02 -.04 .08** -.07* 
Auto1 -.02 -.01 -.06* -.03 -.05* .05 -.05* .05* .02 
Auto2 -.18** -.03 .11** -.02 .03 .00 -.03 .05* -.03 
Injus1 .15 .05 .03 .03 .02 -.02 .00 .01 -.01 
Injus2 -.19** -.16** .02 -.04 -.01 .02 -.01 .02 -.00 
Injus3 1 .09** -.08** -.08** -.13** .15** .07** -.09** .02 
Injus4 .09** 1 .07** -.06* -.01 .08** -.09** .07** .04 
Org.Size -.08** .07** 1 -.07** .10** -.01 -.27** .35** -.11** 
Indus1 -.08** -.06* -.07** 1 -.15** -.68** .24** -.21** -.06* 
Indus2 -.13** -.01 .10** -.15** 1 -.56** .12** -.09** -.06** 
Indus3 .15** .08** -.01 -.68** -.56** 1 -.28** .24** .09** 
Sector1 .07** -.09** -.27** .24** .12** -.28** 1 -.87** -.34** 
Sector2 -.09** .07** .35** -.21** -.09** .24** -.87** 1 -.18** 
Sector3 .02 .04 -.11** -.06* -.06** .09** -.34** -.18** 1 
NOTE: * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01 
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Appendix 5 Correlation Matrix for Chapter 2 Independent Variables and Controls 
(managerial employee analysis) 
Part 1 of Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s r) 
 OC1 OC2 OC3 Wealth ClassID Auto1 Auto2 Injus1 Injus2 
OC1 1 -.47** -.20** .21** .15** .13** -.13** .01 -.04 
OC2 -.47** 1 -.77** -.03 .03 -.06 .00 .07 .03 
OC3 -.20** -.77** 1 -.11* -.15** -.03 .09* -.09* -.00 
Wealth .21** -.03 -.11* 1 .37** .15** -.09 .10* -.07 
ClassID .15** .03 -.15** .37** 1 .09 -.02 .19** -.11* 
Auto1 .13** -.06 -.03 .15** .09 1 -.10* -.03 -.06 
Auto2 -.13** .00 .09* -.09 -.02 -.10 1 -.28** .19** 
Injus1 .01 .07 -.09* .10* .19** -.03 -.28** 1 -.14** 
Injus2 -.04 .03 -.00 -.07 -.11* -.06 .19** -.14** 1 
Injus3 -.03 .08* -.07 .04 .04 .06 -.19** .19** -.16** 
Injus4 .02 .00 -.02 .00 -.01 .09* -.18** .15** -.05 
Org.Size -.12** .08 -.00 .09 .16** -.13** .16** .13** .02 
Indus1 -.06 -.11* .16** .06 .05 .06 .06 .02 -.03 
Indus2 .01 .03 -.03 .05 -.01 -.02 .06 -.04 .00 
Indus3 .06 .09* -.15** -.06 -.05 -.06 -.09* .03 .02 
Sector1 .04 -.16** .15** -.07 -.03 .03 .04 -.07 -.06 
Sector2 -.10* .18** -.13** .08 .03 -.06 -.03 .12** .04 
Sector3 .10* -.02 -.05 -.02 .00 .04 -.03 -.07 .05 
NOTE: * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01 
 
Legend: 
OC1: Upper Manager 
OC2: Middle Manager 
OC3: Supervisor 
Wealth: Total Net Wealth 
ClassID: Personal Class Identification 
Auto1: Allowance to plan or design own work 
Auto2: Want more say in organizational decisions 
Injus1: Appropriateness of compensation compared to value produced 
Injus2: Experienced discrimination at work 
Injus3: Safety at work 
Injus4: Job security 
Org.Size: Number of employees 
Indus1: Goods-producing organization 
Indus2: Mixed industry organization 
Indus3: Service organization 
Sector1: Private sector 
Sector2: Public sector 
Sector3: Non-profit sector 
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Part 2 of Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s r) 
 Injus3 Injus4 Org. 
Size 
Indus1 Indus2 Indus3 Sector1 Sector2 Sector3 
OC1 -.03 .02 -.12** -.06 .01 .06 .04 -.10* .10* 
OC2 .08* .00 .08 -.11* .03 .09* -.16** .18** -.02 
OC3 -.07 -.02 -.00 .16** -.03 -.15** .15** -.13** -.05 
Wealth .04 .00 .09 .06 .05 -.06 -.07 .08 -.02 
ClassID .04 -.01 .16** .05 -.01 -.05 -.03 .03 .00 
Auto1 .06 .09* -.13** .06 -.02 -.06 .03 -.06 .04 
Auto2 -.19** -.18** .16** .06 .06 -.09* .04 -.03 -.03 
Injus1 .19** .15** .13** .02 -.04 .03 -.07 .12** -.07 
Injus2 -.16** -.05 .02 -.03 .00 .02 -.06 .04 .05 
Injus3 1 .13** -.03 -.18** -.05 .18** -.09* .08 .02 
Injus4 .13** 1 -.03 -.04 -.01 .04 -.08 .05 .04 
Org.Size -.03 -.03 1 -.09* .07 .05 -.21** .34** -.16** 
Indus1 -.18** -.04 -.09* 1 -.13** -.78** .33** -.26** -.14** 
Indus2 -.05 -.01 .07 -.13** 1 -.43** .09* -.06 -.06 
Indus3 .18** .04 .05 -.78** -.43** 1 -.33** .25** .16** 
Sector1 -.09* -.08 -.21** .33** .09* -.33** 1 -.79** -.43** 
Sector2 .08 .05 .34** -.26** -.06 .25** -.79** 1 -.20** 
Sector3 .02 .04 -.16** -.14** -.06 .16** -.43** -.20** 1 
NOTE: * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01 
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Appendix 6 Correlation Matrix for Chapter 3 Independent Variables and Controls 
(employer analysis) 
Part 1 of Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s r) 
 Wealth Subj. Comp Busi. Loss Union Non-perm. 
Wealth 1 .27* -.24* -.30** .05 
Subj. Comp .27* 1 -.20 -.19 -.12 
Busi. Loss -.24* -.20 1 .02 -.25 
Union -.30** -.19 .02 1 .23 
Non-perm. .05 -.12 -.25 .23 1 
#employees .05 .08 -.11 -.05 -.01 
Private -.12 .15 -.03 -.13 -.13 
Public .13 -.19 .04 .20* .18 
Non-profit .02 .02 -.01 -.04 -.01 
Industry .14 .02 -.12 -.30** -.08 
Decide .25* .15 -.11 -.03 -.07 
NOTE: * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01 
 
Legend: 
Wealth=Total net wealth 
Subj. Comp=Appropriateness of compensation  
Busi. Loss=Likelihood of business loss 
Union=Trade union present in workplace 
Non-perm.=Greater reliance on non-permanent workers 
#employees=Number of Employees 
Private=Private sector 
Public=Public sector 
Non-profit=Non-profit sector 
Industry=Service-providing industry (1), Goods-producing industry (0) 
Decide=Employer participates in workplace decision-making 
 
Part 2 of Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s r) 
 #employees Private Public Non-profit Industry Decide 
Wealth .05 -.12 .12 .02 .14 .25* 
Subj. Comp .08 .15 -.19 .02 .02 .15 
Busi. Loss -.11 -.03 .04 -.01 -.12 -.11 
Union -.05 -.13 .20* -.04 -.30** -.03 
Non-perm. -.01 -.13 .18 -.01 -.08 -.07 
#employees 1 .01 .02 -.04 .12 -.21* 
Private .01 1 -.75* -.64** -.06 .05 
Public .02 -.75** 1 -.03 -.02 -.12 
Non-profit -.04 -.64** -.03 1 .11 .06 
Industry .12 -.06 -.02 .11 1 .01 
Decide -.21* .05 -.12 .06 .01 1 
NOTE: * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01 
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Appendix 7 Correlation Matrix for Chapter 4 Independent Variables and Controls 
(all employed individuals) 
Part 1 of Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s r) 
 Low LowMid Mid Upper Strike Owners NonProfit NoBosses 
Low 1 -.22** -.44** -.25** .04* .10** .07** .10** 
LowMid -.22** 1 -.39** -.22** .03 .04* .05* .04 
Mid -.44** -.39** 1 -.44** -.00 -.05* -.03 -.03 
Upper -.25** -.22** -.44** 1 -.07** -.08** -.07** -.10** 
Strike .04* .03 -.00 -.07** 1 .30** .23** .20** 
Owners .10** .04* -.05* -.08** .30** 1 .17** .20** 
NonProfit .07** .05* -.03 -.07** .23** .17** 1 .30** 
NoBosses .10** .04 -.03 -.10** .20** .20** .30** 1 
Female .02 .05** .01 -.07** .10** -.02 .09** .05** 
Nodiplo .06** .03 -.06** -.02 .03 .01 -.04* -.03 
HS .09** .01 -.03 -.06** .02 .02 .02 .03 
Non-uni .04* .03 .02 -.09** -.01 .04* -.01 .03 
BA -.13** -.01 .03 .10** -.01 -.03 .01 -.04* 
Advanced -.08** -.08** .03 .11** -.04 -.06** .00 -.02 
Age -.02 -.07** .04 .03 -.11** -.03 -.11** -.02 
White -.05** -.01 .01 .04* .01 -.03 -.04* -.04 
NOTE: * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01 
 
Legend: 
Low=Respondent identifies as working or lower-class 
LowMid=Respondent identifies as lower-middle class 
Mid=Respondent identifies as middleclass 
Upper=Respondent identifies as upper or upper-middle class 
Strike=Agreement that strike-breaking should be prohibited by law 
Owners=Agreement that owners of corporations make gains at the expense of their workers 
NonProfit=Agreement that it is possible for a modern economy to run effectively without the 
profit motive 
NoBosses=Agreement that non-management could run things without bosses 
Female=Female respondent (male is comparison category) 
Nodiplo=Respondent’s highest education level: no diploma 
HS=Respondent’s highest education level: high school diploma 
Non-uni=Respondent’s highest education level: non-university post-secondary certificate 
BA=Respondent’s highest education level: bachelor degree 
Advanced=Respondent’s highest education level: professional/graduate degree 
Age=Respondent Age 
White=Respondent identified as white (non-white is comparison category) 
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Part 2 of Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s r) 
 Female NoDiplo HS Non-
uni 
BA Advanced Age White 
Low .02 .06** .09 .04* -.13** -.08** -.02 -.05** 
LowMid .05** .03 .01 .03 -.01 -.08** -.07** -.01 
Mid .01 -.06** -.03 .02 .03 .03 .04 .01 
Upper -.07** -.02 -.06** -.09** .10** .11** .03 .04* 
Strike .10** .03 .02 -.01 -.01 -.04 -.11** .01 
Owners -.02 .01 .02 .04* -.03 -.06** -.03 -.03 
NonProfit .09** -.04* .02 -.01 .01 .00 -.11** -.04* 
NoBosses .05** -.03 .03 .03 -.04* -.02 -.02 -.04 
Female 1 -.06** -.03 .02 .04* .00 -.06** .04* 
Nodiplo -.06** 1 -.16** -.21** -.14** -.09** .07** .02 
HS -.03 -.16** 1 -.44** -.30** -.19** -.07** .04 
Non-uni .02 -.21** -.44** 1 -.39** -.25** .02 .07** 
BA .04* -.14** -.30** -.39** 1 -.17** -.05** -.07** 
Advanced .00 -.09** -.19** -.25** -.17** 1 .08** -.06** 
Age -.06** .07** -.07** .02 -.05** .08** 1 .16 
White .04* .02 .04 .07** -.07** -.06** .16** 1 
NOTE: * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01 
 
Appendix 8 Work Sector by Gender 
 Sector of Work 
Gender of 
Respondent 
Goods-
producing 
Service Mixed (transport, storage, 
communication) 
Total 
 N % N % N % N % 
Male 396  27.1 873 59.8 190 13.0 1459 100.0 
Female 107 7.8 1181 86.3 80 5.8 1368 100.0 
Total 503 17.8 2054 72.7 270 9.6 2827 100.0 
 
Chi2= 254.380 Significance= .000 
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Appendix 9 Combined Models of Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour 
(Non-Managerial Workers) 
  β Coefficient 
  Complete 
Model 
Partial 
Model 
1 
Partial 
Model 2 
Partial 
Model 3 
Partial 
Model 4 
Partial 
Model 
5 
Occupational Class Employee Occupational 
Class 
      
  Professional (ref.) -- -- -- -- -- -- 
  Service .042 .101***     
  Industrial .065 .131***     
Autonomy Allowance to plan or 
design own work 
-.063*  -.081***    
Want more say in 
organizational decisions 
.031  .136***    
Injustice Appropriateness of 
compensation compared 
to value produced 
-.049   -.088***   
Experienced 
discrimination at work 
.144***   .150***   
Threat to health/safety .151***   .155***   
Job insecurity .024   .059*   
Class 
Consciousness 
Class Identity       
Upper Class/upper-
middle class 
-.038    -.062*  
Middle class (ref.) --    --  
Lower-middle class .021    .032  
Working/Lower-class -.008    .036  
Strike-breaking should 
be prohibited by law 
-.019    -.008  
Owners of corporations 
make gains at the 
expense of their workers 
.115***    .169***  
Possible for a modern 
economy to run 
effectively without the 
profit motive 
-.011    .001  
Non-management could 
run things without 
bosses 
.073*    .066*  
Worker 
Power/Vulnerability 
Union Member -.029     .026 
Permanent .014     .013 
R-squared .117 .015 .025 .079 .048 .001 
Adjusted R-squared .104 .013 .024 .076 .043 .000 
Notes. *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001. Regression coefficients represent standardized slopes. 
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Appendix 10 Combined Models of Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour 
(Non-Managerial Workers) 
  β Coefficient 
  Complete 
Model 
Partial 
Model 1 
Partial 
Model 2 
Partial 
Model 3 
Partial 
Model 
4 
Partial 
Model 5 
Occupational Class Employee Occupational 
Class 
      
  Professional (ref.) -- -- -- -- -- -- 
  Service .095** .119***     
  Industrial .035 .116***     
Autonomy Allowance to plan or 
design own work 
.079**  .012    
Want more say in 
organizational decisions 
-.004  .101***    
Injustice Appropriateness of 
compensation compared 
to value produced 
-.038   -.093***   
Experienced 
discrimination at work 
.139***   .173***   
Threat to health/safety .201***   .167***   
Job insecurity .093***   .154***   
Class 
Consciousness 
Class Identity       
Upper Class/upper-
middle class 
-.021    -.036  
Middle class (ref.) --    --  
Lower-middle class .001    .020  
Working/Lower-class .029    .075**  
Strike-breaking should be 
prohibited by law 
.078**    .056*  
Owners of corporations 
make gains at the expense 
of their workers 
.061*    .110***  
Possible for a modern 
economy to run 
effectively without the 
profit motive 
-.053    -.020  
Non-management could 
run things without bosses 
.094***    .116***  
Worker 
Power/Vulnerability 
Union Member -.083**     -.009 
Permanent -.029     -.057* 
R-squared .148 .015 .010 .126 .050 .003 
Adjusted R-squared .136 .013 .009 .124 .045 .002 
Notes. *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001. Regression coefficients represent standardized slopes. 
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Appendix 11 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Union 
Membership (non-managerial workers) 
Union 
Membership 
N % who report 
employee 
misbehaviour as 
fairly or extremely 
common 
Employee Class Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
(p-value) 
   Professional .120 .067 
Non-member 667 36.0 Service .054 .435 
Union member 292 38.3 Industrial -.046 .524 
Total 959 36.6 All Non-
Managerial 
Employees 
.030 .442 
 
Appendix 12 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Union 
Membership (non-managerial workers) 
Union 
Membership 
N % who report 
employer 
misbehaviour as 
fairly or extremely 
common 
Employee Class Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
(p-value) 
   Professional .019 .821 
Non-member 267 14.8 Service -.150 .062 
Union member 123 16.6 Industrial .042 .610 
Total 390 15.3 All Non-
Managerial 
Employees 
-.040 .292 
 
Appendix 13 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Employment 
Status (non-managerial workers) 
Employment 
Status 
N % who report 
employee 
misbehaviour as 
fairly or extremely 
common 
Employee Class Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
(p-value) 
   Professional .162 .100 
Non-
permanent 
148 41.5 Service .025 .787 
Permanent 811 36.0 Industrial -.087 .398 
Total 959 36.8 All Non-
Managerial 
Employees 
.032 .569 
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Appendix 14 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Employment 
Status (non-managerial workers) 
Employment 
Status 
N % who report 
employer 
misbehaviour as 
fairly or extremely 
common 
Employee Class Gamma 
(γ) 
Significance 
(p-value) 
   Professional -.002 .988 
Non-
permanent 
82 22.9 Service -.168 .102 
Permanent 307 14.1 Industrial -.110 .350 
Total 389 15.4 All Non-
Managerial 
Employees 
-.102 .117 
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